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VII
Summary
When estimating the contingency between two variables, individuals often show bi-
ases in the association they infer: Sometimes they infer an association where there is
none, other times they infer an association that is opposite to the one that is actually
observed. These biases have been shown to occur when individuals attempt to infer a
contingency based on skewed samples of the variables: frequent categories are assumed
to be associated with each other as well as infrequent categories; a phenomenon called
pseudocontingency (e.g., Fiedler et al., 2009). The present thesis aimed to deepen the un-
derstanding of pseudocontingencies through the combination of experimental methods
and statistical modeling.
Empirical research demonstrates that pseudocontingencies are relied on for proba-
bility judgments and choices (e.g., Meiser et al., 2018). They are also reflected in re-
constructive guessing processes, when memory for individual observations fails (e.g.,
Klauer & Meiser, 2000). In the present thesis, I corroborate this result by analyzing
guessing processes based on pseudocontingencies using hierarchical multinomial pro-
cessing tree models and by validating the model parameters’ substantive interpretation
(see Manuscript I, Bott et al., in press). In this context, analyses additionally revealed
that interindividual differences in cognitive performance as measured by the INSBAT
test battery (Arendasy et al., 2009) do not seem to predict interindividual differences in
relying on pseudocontingencies (Bott et al., in press).
While early proposals assume differential processing of frequent versus infrequent
events (e.g., Hamilton & Gifford, 1976), more recent research suggests that pseudocon-
tingencies are the result of utilizing the marginal frequencies of variables, instead of
their joint frequencies, when inferring a contingency (e.g., Fiedler et al., 2009). In line
with this notion, in this thesis, I discuss a computational model, the Bayesian Marginal
Model (see Manuscript II, Bott et al., 2020; Klauer, 2015), as a normative reconstruc-
tion of the pseudocontingency heuristic. The model succeeds in capturing effects found
in the literature on pseudocontingency inference by assuming that beliefs about joint
frequencies and thus contingencies are updated by observed marginal frequencies.
Most research as well as the Bayesian Marginal Model put individuals in the role of
a passive observer of predetermined information. Thus the present thesis furthermore
extends empirical research by investigating the role of self-determined information sam-
pling in pseudocontingency inference (see Manuscript III, Bott & Meiser, 2020). The re-
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sults indicate that pseudocontingencies may result in wrong judgments and sub-optimal
choices. However, the probability of misguidance is largely reduced when individuals
actively search for information themselves.
Taken together, the experiments and statistical analyses discussed in the present thesis
corroborate pseudocontingencies as inferences based on marginal frequencies. More-
over, I provide original evidence that pseudocontingency effects can be captured by
a normative model following the norms of Bayesian belief updating, thereby render-
ing pseudocontingencies as not "illogical" as described by some of its proponents. The
results additionally highlight that pseudocontingencies are not necessarily wrong con-
tingency inferences, especially when individuals actively search for information.
IX
Articles
This cumulative thesis is based on three manuscripts, one of which has been published,
one has been accepted, and one has been submitted for publication. The manuscripts
are discussed and appended to this work in the order in which they are listed be-
low. In general, note that in summarizing the articles throughout this thesis, I refrain
from reiterating specific details of the respective manuscript which can be found in the
manuscripts appended to this work.
Manuscript I
Bott, F., M., Heck, D. W., & Meiser, T. (in press). Parameter validation in hierarchical
MPT models by functional dissociation with continuous covariates: An applica-
tion to contingency inference. Journal of Mathematical Psychology.
Manuscript II
Bott, F., M., Kellen, D., & Klauer, K. C. (2020). Normative accounts of illusory correlations.
Invited revision submitted to Psychological Review.
Manuscript III
Bott, F., M., & Meiser, T. (2020). Pseudocontingency inference and choice: The role of
information sampling. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1037/xlm0000840
The present thesis focuses on pseudocontingency effects in judgments and choices. In
the main text, I clarify when pseudocontingencies might occur and how they can be
measured in memory-based judgments, I discuss mathematical models that claim to
be able to capture the effect, and provide original evidence for the role of information
sampling.
In the first manuscript (Bott et al., in press), we use a hierarchical multinomial pro-
cessing tree (MPT) model to analyze biased guessing based on inferred pseudocontin-
gencies. Furthermore, we validate the substantive interpretation of the model’s guessing
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parameters. For this purpose, we exemplify a new approach to validating MPT model
parameters by testing their convergent validity and discriminant validity in a nomolog-
ical network. We thereby highlight how cognitive modeling in experimental psychology
can profit from its combination with psychometric assessment of relevant constructs (cf.
cognitive psychometrics, Batchelder, 1998, 2010; Riefer et al., 2002).
In the second manuscript (Bott et al., 2020), we discuss empirical and theoretical
limitations of the Rule of Succession as normative account of pseudocontingencies. As
an alternative, we demonstrate that the Bayesian Marginal Model successfully captures
pseudocontingency effects found in the literature. Moreover, we illustrate that the model
can also readily make new predictions yet to be tested empirically.
While pseudocontingencies are claimed to be highly successful in real-world environ-
ments, empirical research has mainly focused on attributing a passive observer role to
individuals. In order to investigate the phenomenon in a more naturalistic setting, the
third manuscript (Bott & Meiser, 2020) examines the role of free information sampling
in pseudocontingency effects and thereby sheds light on differences between passive
information intake and active information search.
All in all, these three manuscripts increase insights into the cognitive processes in-
volved in (pseudo-)contingency inference. Moreover, they illustrate that the combina-
tion of experimental psychology and statistical modeling is fruitful for gaining a better
empirical and theoretical understanding of cognitive processes involved in psychologi-
cal phenomena.
11 Perceived Associations Between Events as
Basis for Judgments and Decision Making
Are all BMW drivers road hogs? Does your favorite sports team always win when you
are wearing the team’s jersey? Or are you always late when taking the train? Indeed,
individuals often perceive associations between people, events, or behaviors based on
past observations or experiences; for example, between taking the train versus the bike
and being late versus on time. As a result, individuals make later judgments and deci-
sions accordingly. For instance, you will avoid taking the train, but instead go by bike to
be on time, you will try to wear your team’s jersey during all their games as a good-luck
charm, or the police carrying out traffic checks will not randomly pick cars to check,
but BMW vehicles will be checked particularly often. Such perceived associations may
be correct and may lead to informed decisions, however, they may as well be incorrect.
In this thesis, I will focus on one specific class of effects in contingency inference, which
is referred to as pseudocontingencies.
These pseudocontingencies are inferences of a contingency between two variables
from the variables’ marginal frequencies (e.g., Fiedler et al., 2009). Consider the sub-
tables in Table 1 which lists joint frequencies and marginal frequencies of two binary
variables X and Y each taking the values ‘0’ and ‘1’. The marginal frequencies show that
‘0’ is the most frequent value in both variables. Building on the example from above,
this could translate into a person who takes the train more often than the bike (options
X = 0 and X = 1)) and who is late more often than on time (outcomes Y = 0 and
Y = 1). Based on a pseudocontingency, being late would thus be expected to be more
likely when taking the train as compared with taking the bike. On an abstract level,
empirical evidence suggests that individuals tend to infer an association between the
variables X and Y, such that the frequent value of Y is judged to be more likely given
the frequent value of X than given the infrequent value of X.
Even if the train is taken most often and being late is more frequent than being on
time, however, the genuine contingency between means of transportation and punc-
tuality may indeed be positive (i.e., being late is more likely when taking the train),
but could instead also be zero or negative (i.e., being late is actually equally likely or
more likely when taking the bike). In order to mathematically quantify an association
between two binary variables, their joint frequencies (kij for Y = i and X = j) have to be
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Table 1: Example Contingency Tables Depicting Joint Frequencies and Marginal Fre-
quencies of the Binary Variables X and Y
φXY = 1.00
X = 0 X = 1
Y = 0 24 0 24
Y = 1 0 12 12
24 12
φXY = .00
X = 0 X = 1
16 8 24
8 4 12
24 12
φXY = −.46
X = 0 X = 1
12 12 24
12 0 12
24 12
taken into account. One way of quantifying a contingency is through the Phi coefficient
φ with −1 < φ < 1:
φ =
k00k11 − k01k10√
(k00 + k01)(k10 + k11)(k00 + k10)(k01 + k11)
(1)
Another way of quantifying the association is by comparing the probability of one pos-
sible value of Y conditional on the two possible values of X as in the ∆p rule:
∆p = P(Y = 0|X = 0)− P(Y = 0|X = 1) (2)
In both cases, the value φ = 0 or ∆p = 0 indicates that there is no contingency between
X and Y (see second subtable in Table 1). φ and ∆p will be positive/negative when
there is a positive/negative association between X and Y (see first and third subtable
in Table 1). So why do individuals perceive an association between the variables any-
way and expect the most frequent events to disproportionately co-occur as well as the
infrequent events?
In the following chapters, I will discuss opposing accounts regarding the emergence of
pseudocontingencies. Furthermore, I will present new empirical evidence on the differ-
ence between passive information intake and active information search for pseudocon-
tingency inference. Whereas early proposals of pseudocontingencies assumed a mem-
ory advantage for infrequent events as compared with frequent events, I show that there
is no such difference in recognition performance to account for pseudocontingencies.
Using hierarchical Bayesian multinomial processing tree models I further establish
that pseudocontingencies manifest in reconstructive guessing processes (Manuscript I,
Chapter 2.2.1). Moreover, I will explain that pseudocontingencies are inferred on the ba-
sis of statistically inappropriate information (i.e., marginal frequencies), wherefore they
are often described as illogical. Yet, I provide evidence that pseudocontingencies can be
captured by a computational model that reconstructs contingencies based on marginal
frequencies following the norms of Bayesian updating (Manuscript II, Chapter 2.3.2).
In Chapter 3, I will shed light on the role of active information sampling in relying on
marginal frequencies to infer a (pseudo-)contingency (Manuscript III).
32 Opposing Accounts of
Pseudocontingencies
2.1 Memory for Distinct Events
Early research focused on the effect of inferring an association between X and Y when
the actual contingency is zero, which is today still known as illusory correlation. In their
seminal work, Hamilton and Gifford (1976) investigated erroneous impression forma-
tion about majority groups and minority groups based on skewed samples. Participants
read statements about individuals that were members of either Group A or Group B
and who either showed desirable behavior or undesirable behavior. Similar to the stim-
ulus distribution in the second subtable of Table 1, Group A was the majority group and
most individuals were described as showing desirable behavior (Hamilton & Gifford,
1976, Experiment 1). Importantly, group membership and desirability of the behavior
were uncorrelated (P(desirable|A) = P(desirable|B) = .69, with ∆p = .00). Yet, partici-
pants estimated the probability of desirable behavior in Group A to be higher than in
Group B (pˆA = .66 and pˆB = .56, with ∆ pˆ = .10).
The traditional explanation of such effects proposes differential processing of frequent
and infrequent events (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976). It is assumed that infrequent events
(e.g., Group B and undesirable behavior) are more distinct than frequent events (e.g.,
Group A and desirable behavior), especially so when two rare events are paired. Due
to this paired distinctiveness, rare events are more salient and are paid more attention
to during encoding. Thus, they are processed more deeply and should be more easily
available from memory during retrieval in a judgment phase. It is further assumed that
as a consequence, the co-occurrence of the two rare events is overestimated, resulting in
the perception of a contingency where there is none (e.g., a contingency between group
membership and desirability).
2.1.1 Multinomial Processing Tree Models Testing Increased Memory for
Distinct Events
Initial evidence in favor of the distinctiveness-based account was given by Hamilton
et al. (1985) showing that in a free recall, more items were recalled which represented
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the co-occurrence of infrequent events (e.g., undesirable behaviors of Group B) as com-
pared with the other item categories (e.g., desirable behaviors of Group A, undesirable
behaviors of Group A, and desirable behaviors of Group B). Analyses of response times
further corroborated the distinctiveness-based account: Correct assignments of infre-
quent events to each other were faster than correct assignments of other combinations
(Johnson & Mullen, 1994; McConnell et al., 1994). However, instead of representing
memory processes these results of enhanced free recall and faster assignments might
as well reflect decision processes driven by expectancies that are in turn based on the
inferred contingencies.
In order to explicitly test the memory advantage for doubly infrequent events as
proposed by the distinctiveness-based account, more refined experimental techniques
and modeling techniques have been proposed. In so-called source-monitoring experi-
ments, participants have to discriminate between previously presented target items and
new distractor items. Additionally, they have to remember the source of the items (e.g.,
whether a presented behavioral statement described a member of Group A or a mem-
ber of Group B). Data from such recognition tests allow for model-based analyses using
multinomial processing tree (MPT) models to disentangle memory processes from guess-
ing processes (Batchelder & Riefer, 1990; Bayen et al., 1996). MPT models are statistical
models that account for observed response frequencies (e.g., frequency of Group A re-
sponses) by estimating the probabilities of latent cognitive processes jointly contributing
to that frequency data. In the case of source-monitoring experiments, MPT models are
used to estimate three types of processes involved: item memory, source memory, and
guessing (Bayen et al., 1996; Bröder & Meiser, 2007). The example MPT model depicted
in Figure 1 assumes that the individual responses (e.g., Group A responses, Group B
responses, and New responses) are each the result of qualitatively distinct processes.
Given the example of group membership and type of behavior, the model assumes that
participants recognize a target item as old and a distractor item as new with probability
D. Alternatively, an item is not recognized with the complementary probability 1−D. If
item memory fails, participants guess that an item was previously presented with prob-
ability b or that it is a new item with probability 1− b. The parameter dgroup denotes
the probability of correctly remembering the group as source attribute of a remem-
bered target item. If group membership is not remembered with probability 1− dgroup,
the model assumes that a participant guesses Group A with the probability ggroup and
Group B with the complementary probability of 1− ggroup. Thus, a correct response, for
instance Group A, may be the result of correctly remembering an item and its source, of
only remembering an item but guessing its source, or may even be the result of merely
guessing.
According to the distinctiveness-based account (wrongly) inferring a contingency be-
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Figure 1: Multinomial processing tree model of source monitoring for two sources:
group membership j ∈ A, B. Distractor items are referred to as New. D = probability to
recognize an item; dgroup = probability to remember Group j; b = probability to guess
that an item is old; ggroup = probability to guess Group A.
tween group membership and type of behavior is based on an enhanced memory for
doubly infrequent events, in the example, thus the result of enhanced memory for un-
desirable behavior performed by a member of Group B. Therefore, the MPT model
is fit specifying separate sets of parameters for desirable and undesirable behaviors.
Furthermore, studies tested whether recognition performance and source memory dif-
fered between Group A and Group B. Yet, contrary to the predictions based on paired
distinctiveness, source-monitoring experiments using MPT models showed that there
was no difference in recognition performance given behaviors describing members of
Group A versus Group B and no differential source memory, but only a general differ-
ence in memory for desirable versus undesirable behaviors (e.g., Klauer & Meiser, 2000;
Meiser, 2003; Meiser & Hewstone, 2001).
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2.2 Pseudocontingency Heuristic
An alternative explanation known as pseudocontingency heuristic proposes that individ-
uals infer a contingency based on the observed marginal frequencies instead of (specific)
joint frequencies. Broadly speaking, given that there is one frequent value per variable,
individuals are assumed to heuristically infer that the frequent observations per vari-
able are associated with each other (e.g., Group A and desirable behavior) and that the
rare observations per variable disproportionately co-occur (e.g., Group B and undesir-
able behavior). The pseudocontingency heuristic can thus account not only for illusory
correlations, but for a much broader scope of contingency inferences: Pseudocontin-
gencies may occur independent of the joint frequencies and thus independent of the
true contingency or even when joint frequencies are not presented. For instance, Fiedler
and Freytag (2004) found that inferred associations reflected the skewness found in
the marginal frequencies when only they were presented. Furthermore, pseudocontin-
gencies are inferred when the actual contingency is zero (illusory correlation; e.g., Eder
et al., 2011; Fiedler et al., 1993; Meiser & Hewstone, 2006) and when the actual contin-
gency is consistent with the inference based on marginal frequencies (e.g., first subtable
in Table 1; Fiedler, 2010). Researchers even demonstrated that pseudocontingency in-
ferences may override genuine contingencies (e.g., third subtable in Table 1; Fleig et al.,
2017; Meiser et al., 2018; Vogel et al., 2013). Moreover, the pseudocontingency heuristic is
further supported by results demonstrating that the combination of the two infrequent
values per variable (e.g., the co-occurrence of undesirable behavior and Group B) does
not even need to be observed for a pseudocontingency to be inferred (Fleig et al., 2017;
Meiser & Hewstone, 2004; Meiser et al., 2018). These results especially are incompatible
with the distinctiveness-based account.
Furthermore, pseudocontingencies have been shown to increase in strength with
decreasing working-memory capacity (Eder et al., 2011), increasing salience of the
marginal frequencies as compared with joint frequencies (Meiser et al., 2018), and the
more attention is paid to the marginal frequencies (Fleig et al., 2017). The less likely
joint frequencies are used to infer a contingency, the more likely pseudocontingencies
are inferred on the basis of marginal frequencies. As a consequence, many experimental
studies use more complex scenarios including a third context variable (e.g., desirable
versus undesirable behaviors describing members of Group A and Group B who live in
Town X and Town Y). Taking the example from the beginning, this would translate into
considering the frequencies of being late versus on time when taking the train versus the
bike, for instance, not only in Germany, but additionally considering those frequencies
when in the Netherlands. Table 2 illustrates one such stimulus distribution. Typically,
two contrasting contexts are used: the two focal variables’ marginal frequencies are
skewed within one context and co-vary across contexts. By implication, they are each
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associated with the context variable. In the example, in Germany, individuals might
be late three times as frequently as being on time and they might take the train more
frequently than going by bike, while in the Netherlands, both might be the other way
around. Using trivariate stimulus distributions is assumed to increase cognitive load
and to increase salience of skewed marginal frequencies, thus increasing the strength
of pseudocontingency effects (Fiedler & Freytag, 2004). According to the pseudocontin-
gency heuristic, in the example, the frequent means of transportation and the frequent
outcome are associated with each other as well as the infrequent means of transporta-
tion and the infrequent outcome, for Germany and the Netherlands. Thus, the same
contingency is predicted resulting in a preference for taking the bike in Germany as
well as in the Netherlands, when trying to be on time.
Taken together, the pseudocontingency heuristic assumes that contingencies are in-
ferred on the basis of marginal frequencies: joint frequencies are estimated based on the
marginal frequencies. Put differently, it is assumed, in principle, that individuals recon-
struct joint frequencies by marginal frequencies. Accordingly, illusory correlations, as a
special case of pseudocontingencies, do not result from a memory bias, but are instead
assumed to be inferred on the basis of perceived statistical regularities (i.e., marginal
frequencies).
Coming back to source-monitoring experiments, pseudocontingencies may neverthe-
less play a role in source-guessing processes, whenever source memory for an item fails:
instead of randomly guessing, individuals may match their response probabilities to
perceived item-source contingencies (e.g., Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Klauer & Wegener,
1998). This perceived contingency does not necessarily correspond to the genuine item-
source contingency in the stimulus distribution, but may reflect a pseudocontingency.
When participants, for example, do not remember whether a desirable behavior was
shown by a member of Group A or by a member of Group B, they will guess group
membership based on the inferred (pseudo-)contingency between group membership
and type of behavior. In line, Klauer and Meiser (2000) and Meiser and Hewstone
(2004) showed that the probability to guess Group A was higher given a desirable
behavior than given an undesirable behavior, when the pseudocontingency based on
observed marginal frequencies favored Group A over Group B. They interpreted the
source-guessing parameters as reflecting evaluative biases based on inferred pseudo-
contingencies. Taking biased guessing parameters as evidence of inferred pseudocon-
tingencies, however, renders the interpretation of the MPT model’s guessing parameters
theoretically important. Thus, one goal of the first manuscript (Bott et al., in press) was
to investigate the construct validity of guessing parameters in a source-monitoring MPT
model.
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2.2.1 Parameter Validation in Hierarchical Multinomial Processing Tree
Models
Bott, F., M., Heck, D. W., & Meiser, T. (in press). Parameter validation in hierarchical
MPT models by functional dissociation with continuous covariates: An applica-
tion to contingency inference. Journal of Mathematical Psychology.
Traditionally, MPT models are fitted to frequency data aggregated across participants
and are validated by testing the selective influence of specific experimental manipu-
lations on model parameters (Erdfelder et al., 2009; Hütter & Klauer, 2016). Discrete
realizations of factors that are assumed to influence specific cognitive processes in-
volved in the given task (e.g., item memory, source memory, or guessing) are realized
as experimental factors in order to test their selective effects on specific parameters.
However, using aggregated frequency data to fit an MPT model implies that there are
no substantial differences between items or participants (parameter homogeneity). Yet,
in case of parameter heterogeneity, parameter estimates may be biased (Klauer, 2006;
Smith & Batchelder, 2010). Thus, more recently, hierarchical extensions of MPT models
have been developed to explicitly account for parameter heterogeneity between partici-
pants (Klauer, 2010; Matzke et al., 2015; Smith & Batchelder, 2010). Besides addressing
concerns regarding biased parameter estimates, hierarchical MPT models additionally
offer a new possibility of parameter validation. Instead of using discrete variables, se-
lective covariations of interindividual differences in model parameters with continuous
variables can be tested. With regard to the source-monitoring experiments in pseudo-
contingency research, for example, direct measures of group evaluations can be used
to test selective covariations with guessing parameters; other model parameters should
not be related.
In our manuscript (Bott et al., in press), we thus demonstrated this novel validation
technique and validated the guessing parameters of an MPT model as indicators of per-
ceived (pseudo-)contingencies. Using data from an experiment on pseudocontingency
inference in a trivariate scenario, we tested for convergent parameter validity and dis-
criminant parameter validity by means of selective covariations with direct evaluative
judgments. As in previous studies, participants read statements about desirable versus
undesirable behaviors shown by members of Group A versus Group B living in Town X
versus Town Y. Using the event distribution as depicted in Table 2, Group A and desir-
able behavior were the frequent events given Town X, but the infrequent events given
Town Y, and vice versa for Group B and undesirable behavior. In a learning phase,
the total of 48 behavioral statements was presented in random order. The subsequent
test phase included direct evaluative judgments regarding the groups within towns
as well as a source-memory test. To assess the participants’ evaluations of Group A
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Table 2: Example 2 x 2 x 2 Contingency Table Depicting Joint Frequencies and Marginal
Frequencies of the Binary Variables Group Membership and Type of Behavior Within
Town X and Town Y
Town X Town Y
Behavior Group A Group B Group A Group B
Desirable 12 6 18 0 6 6
Undesirable 6 0 6 6 12 18
18 6 6 18
and Group B in Town X and Town Y, participants rated the groups on trait attributes
and estimated the groups’ frequencies of undesirable behavior per town. In the source-
memory test, participants decided for each of the 48 target items and additional 48
distractor items whether it was Old or New. If judged as Old, they were additionally
asked whether it occurred in Town X or Town Y and whether it described a member of
Group A or Group B (for more details see Bott et al., in press). As we used a trivariate
stimulus distribution, the classical source-monitoring MPT model depicted in Figure 1
cannot be used. Instead, an extension of MPT models to account for crossed source di-
mensions (e.g., town of residence and group membership; Meiser & Bröder, 2002) was
applied.
Figure 2 illustrates this source-monitoring MPT model for crossed source dimensions
which separately estimates source memory for the source dimension town of residence
and source memory for the source dimension group membership (Meiser & Bröder,
2002). As in the classical source-monitoring MPT model, the parameter D denotes the
probability that an item (here, behavioral statement) is correctly recognized as presented
during a learning phase (Old) or as a new item (New). Item memory fails with the com-
plementary probability 1−D. In that case, participants guess Old with probability b or
guess New with probability 1− b. The parameters d again measure the probability of
remembering the source of an item. In the case of crossed source dimensions, however,
the MPT model differentiates between source memory for town of residence (dtown) and
source memory for group membership (dgroup and egroup). If the town of residence is
not remembered with probability 1− dtown, participants guess Town X with probability
gtown and Town Y with probability 1− gtown. The parameter dgroup describes the prob-
ability of remembering group membership, if the town of residence is remembered. In
case source memory for town of residence fails, group membership is remembered with
probability egroup. Thus, the model reflects the assumption that source memory for one
source dimension may differ depending on source memory for the other dimension.
Differences between dgroup and egroup thereby correspond to stochastic dependency in
multidimensional source memory. This assumption can be tested via model compari-
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son by investigating whether model fit decreases when constraining dgroup and egroup to
be equal. The order of the source-memory parameters reflect the sequence of retrieval
processes in the memory test as they are specified in the same order as the source di-
mensions are prompted. If the source dimension group membership is not remembered
with probability 1− dgroup or 1− egroup, a behavioral statement assigned to Town X is
attributed to Group A with probability ggroup|X or to Group B with probability 1− g
group
|X .
Likewise, the parameter ggroup|Y denotes the probability of guessing Group A when an
item was attributed to Town Y. The conditional specification of the guessing parameters
for group membership again mirrors the order of responses in the source-memory test
and allows for differential guessing tendencies that may reflect inferred contingencies
(Meiser, 2003; Meiser & Hewstone, 2004).
According to the pseudocontingency heuristic, given the stimulus distribution in Ta-
ble 2, participants are expected to perceive Group A more favorably than Group B
within both towns. The overall evaluation of Town X should be more positive than the
evaluation of Town Y in line with the genuine contingency between town of residence
and type of behavior apparent in the marginal frequencies of desirable and undesirable
behaviors within each town. Thus, participants are expected to estimate the probability
of undesirable behavior to be higher given Town Y as compared with Town X and to
be higher given Group B than given Group A within each town. If guessing parameters
do indeed reflect evaluative judgments based on inferred (pseudo-)contingencies, they
should at least differ depending on the statement’s desirability. Therefore, separate sets
of parameters were estimated for desirable behaviors and for undesirable behaviors.
Moreover, as we aimed to validate gtown, ggroup|X , and g
group
|Y as indicators of perceived
(pseudo-)contingencies, we tested the parameters’ covariations with those evaluations
of towns and groups within towns (i.e., the direct measures of source evaluation: fre-
quency estimates of undesirable behavior and trait ratings). Evaluations of Town X
and Town Y should selectively relate to the guessing probability gtown, while group
evaluations should selectively relate to ggroup. More precisely, evaluations of Group A
versus Group B within Town X should selectively co-vary with ggroup|X and evaluations
of Group A versus Group B given Town Y should only co-vary with ggroup|Y . By con-
trast, parameters D, d, and e measure genuine memory performance and should not be
influenced by the evaluations of towns and groups.
Following the hierarchical latent-trait approach (Klauer, 2010), all MPT parameters
were modeled as random effects to account for differences between individuals. The
hierarchical MPT models were estimated using Bayesian methods as implemented in
TreeBUGS (Heck et al., 2018). In order to establish the guessing parameters’ validity via
functional dissociation, we included continuous variables (i.e., direct measures of source
evaluation) as predictors of model parameters. For this purpose, we z-standardized
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Figure 2: Multinomial processing-tree model of source monitoring for 2 × 2 crossed
sources: town of residence i ∈ X,Y and group membership j ∈ A, B. Distractor items are
referred to as New. D = probability to recognize an item; dtown = probability to remember
Town i; dgroup = probability to remember Group j given Town i was recollected; egroup
= probability to remember Group j given Town i was not remembered; b = probability
to guess that an item is old; gtown = probability to guess Town X; ggroup|X = probability of
guessing Group A given assignment of item to Town X; ggroup|Y = probability of guessing
Group A given assignment to Town Y.
the predictors and assumed a normal distribution N (µ = 0, σ = √2/2) as a prior
distribution of each slope parameter. Figure 3 illustrates the implied prior predictive
distributions when regressing an MPT parameter on a covariate and testing a directional
hypothesis (H1 : β > 0 or H1 : β < 0) or a non-directional hypothesis (H1 : β 6= 0).
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Figure 3: Prior predictive distribution for a probit regression of an MPT parameter
on a z-standardized covariate implied by the prior distribution of the slope parameter,
β ∼ N (µ = 0, σ = √2/2). Solid black lines depict the median, while the areas shaded
in gray depict prediction intervals. The left and right panels show the prior predictive
distribution given a directional hypothesis (H1 : β > 0 and H1 : β > 0, respectively).
The middle panel shows the prior predictive distribution given a non-directional hy-
pothesis (H1 : β 6= 0 ).
Replicating previous MPT analyses of aggregate data (Meiser & Hewstone, 2004,
2006), the probability of guessing Town X when source memory failed was higher for
desirable behaviors than for undesirable behaviors. Likewise, the probability of guess-
ing Group A was higher for desirable behaviors than for undesirable behaviors for those
statements that were assigned to Town X as well as for those assigned to Town Y. Fur-
thermore, these differences in guessing probabilities paralleled differences in the direct
measures of town evaluation and group evaluation (for details see Bott et al., in press).
To validate the guessing parameters, we first analyzed the relations of interindivid-
ual differences in source-guessing parameters with interindividual differences in direct
source evaluations (e.g., differences in evaluations between Town X and Town Y, dif-
ferences in evaluations between Group A and Group B given Town X, and differences
in evaluations between Group A and Group B given Town Y; Bott et al., in press). In-
deed, differences in evaluations of Town X and Town Y selectively predicted the guess-
ing probability gtown for desirable behaviors as well as for undesirable behaviors and
did not predict any other source-guessing parameter. Evaluative differences between
Group A and Group B in Town X specifically related to the guessing parameter ggroup|X
for desirable and undesirable behaviors, while differences between groups in Town Y
specifically predicted ggroup|Y given desirable behaviors and given undesirable behaviors.
No other source-guessing parameters were related, each. Additionally, there were no
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Figure 4: Regression of the probability to guess Group A given an item assigned to
Town Y (ggroup|Y ) on rating differences between Group A and Group B in Town Y. The
left panel shows the covariation of gpgroup|Y for desirable behaviors, while the covariation
of gngroup|Y is shown in the right panel. The solid lines depict the posterior median of
the prediction function, while the 95% Bayesian credibility intervals are shown in gray.
Individual-level predictions are depicted by the gray points. Vertical dashed lines show
the group mean of the covariate.
covariations with item-memory parameters, source-memory parameters, or the prob-
ability to guess Old. Representative of these results, Figure 4 displays the regression
of the ggroup|Y parameters for desirable behaviors and undesirable behaviors (gp
group
|Y and
gngroup|Y , respectively) on the difference in evaluative trait ratings between Group A and
Group B in Town Y. As can be seen, the more favorably Group A was evaluated, the
more likely desirable behaviors were assigned to Group A and the less undesirable be-
haviors were assigned to Group A. Taken together, the results corroborate the interpre-
tation of source-guessing parameters as reflecting perceived item-source contingencies.
In the example, the source-guessing parameters can indeed be interpreted as mirroring
evaluative biases based on inferred contingencies and pseudocontingencies, in the case
of town evaluations and group evaluations, respectively.
Going beyond, the framework of hierarchical MPT models allows for parameter val-
idation in an even wider context of continuous measures of psychological constructs.
Thereby, they offer means of validation and theory testing in a broader nomological
network. As an illustration, we investigated relations of the MPT parameters with cog-
nitive performance measures from a standardized cognitive assessment battery (Bott et
al., in press). Other researchers relied on this or a similar approach, for instance, to esti-
mate associations between personality traits and dishonest behavior (Heck et al., 2018),
moral judgments (Kroneisen & Heck, 2019), or environmental preferences (Klein et al.,
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2017), or to estimate associations of memory with fluid and crystallized intelligence
(Michalkiewicz et al., 2018). To further establish the construct validity of MPT model
parameters in pseudocontingency research, we analyzed the specificity of covariations
between MPT parameters and cognitive performance measures that may be relevant
for source monitoring and contingency inference: Pseudocontingencies are inferences
drawn from mathematically inappropriate information, yet they are based on statistical
regularities (i.e., marginal frequencies). Thus, interindividual differences in the ability
to apply mathematical skills (i.e., quantitative thinking as measured by the INSBAT,
Arendasy et al., 2009) as well as interindividual differences in the ability to combine in-
formation and to recognize regularities (i.e., fluid intelligence) might explain interindi-
vidual differences in inferring pseudocontingencies and thereby in source-guessing pa-
rameters. By contrast, memory parameters in the MPT model should be related to the
cognitive ability to remember and recognize information. Nonetheless, in exploratory
analyses, we did not find evidence for these cognitive performance measures as distinct
predictors of parameters of the MPT model for crossed source dimension (for more
details see Bott et al., in press).
To recap, the inference of pseudocontingencies has been shown to influence (evalu-
ative) judgments and subsequent decisions. Using hierarchical Bayesian MPT model-
ing, we demonstrated that inferred pseudocontingencies are related to specific guessing
processes that are indeed reflective of non-randomly attributing items to sources (Bott
et al., in press). Moreover, there is more corroborative evidence in favor of the infer-
ence of contingencies based on marginal frequencies as proposed by the pseudocon-
tingency heuristic than for the distinctiveness-based account: Contingencies mirroring
the skewness in marginal frequencies are inferred independent of whether the com-
bination of infrequent events is observed (e.g., Meiser et al., 2018). In addition, MPT
analyses did not show enhanced memory for doubly infrequent events as predicted
by the distinctiveness-based account (Klauer & Meiser, 2000; Meiser, 2003; Meiser &
Hewstone, 2004).
Although pseudocontingencies can be deceptive and research is largely focused
on decision problems that intend to induce wrong contingency inferences based on
pseudocontingencies, they do have considerable adaptive value: Indeed, marginal fre-
quencies do not determine joint frequencies. Yet, marginal frequencies do restrict the
range of possible values, especially so when they are skewed (Duncan & Davis, 1953).
Accordingly, Kutzner et al. (2011b) could demonstrate that pseudocontingencies often
succeed in capturing the sign of the actual contingency. Therefore, they are sometimes
described as "logically unwarranted but smart and useful" (Fiedler et al., 2013, p. 328)
which rests on the idea that pseudocontingencies are highly successful in real-world en-
vironments as compared with psychological experiments (cf. also ecological rationality,
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Gigerenzer, 2019; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). Do pseudocontingencies thus reflect
normatively unjustified information processing?
2.3 Normative Accounts
2.3.1 Regression-To-The-Mean Accounts
Fiedler (1996) and Dougherty et al. (1999) proposed exemplar-based memory models,
the BIAS model and the MINERVA-DM model, to account for pseudocontingencies.
Both assume that memory consists of a database of events experienced in the past. Each
event or item is stored in memory as a copy of it, called memory trace. However, the
memory traces are decayed to varying degrees and do not match the original event
exactly. To access memory and form judgments or make decisions, the memory traces
will be compared with the original event of interest (memory probe) which additionally
requires aggregation across the memory traces (e.g., summation or averaging). In gen-
eral, aggregation cancels out error variance. Thus, the aggregation across memory traces
will be more similar to the original event the more traces are aggregated, The models
propose that judgments and decisions are proportional to that similarity. Accordingly,
given the stimulus distribution of Town X in Table 2, for example, they predict that
the similarity with desirable behavior will be higher given memory traces of Group A
than for memory traces of Group B, due to the fact that there are more observations of
Group A. The models would thus predict pseudocontingencies. However, they are only
able to do so, when asked for an estimation regarding the frequent value of the vari-
able of interest (e.g., desirable behavior). Following the same mechanism, both models
would also predict higher probability estimates of undesirable behavior for Group A as
compared with Group B, again due to the fact that there are more memory traces for
Group A. The latter prediction, however, is neither in line with predictions based on
the pseudocontingency heuristic, nor with experimental results (e.g., Eder et al., 2011;
Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; Klauer & Meiser, 2000; Meiser, 2003).
While exemplar-based memory models are not successful in accounting for pseudo-
contingencies, Costello and Watts (2019) recently suggested that probability judgments
are the result of updating prior information as per the Rule of Succession (Laplace,
1820/1951). Given a sample of N observations and given that one out of two events
occurred k times in that sample, the Rule of Succession states that the normative esti-
mation for the probability of that event is
pˆ =
k+ 1
N + 2
=
2 · .50 + N · kN
2 + N
(3)
The re-parameterization of the Rule of Succession as weighted average of the probability
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.50 and the observed probability of the event in the sample ( kN ), highlights the assump-
tion that a prior probability of .50 (e.g., that an event occurs at chance level) is updated
based on the observed probability. The value 2 in the equation can be interpreted as one
pseudocount per possible event, as if each event has been observed once prior the actual
sample, wherefore the prior probability of 12 will be updated. The larger the observed
sample, the stronger the weight that is given to the observed probability as compared to
the prior probability. Thus, with an increasing number of observations N, the inferred
probability will be less regressive towards 12 . Costello and Watts (2019) demonstrated
that wrongly inferring a contingency between group membership and type of behav-
ior is the byproduct of applying the Rule of Succession to a sample in which marginal
frequencies are skewed, but the actual contingency is zero: When applying the Rule of
Succession to each group separately, the estimate for the majority group will deviate
less from the observed probability kN , while the estimate for the minority group will be
more regressive towards 12 . Thus, the estimates, for instance for the majority group A
and the minority group B, will conform to the inequality pˆA > pˆB > .50 when p > .50,
or pˆA < pˆB < .50 when p < .50 as predicted by the pseudocontingency account. The
estimates will imply a contingency when none is present.
However, applying the Rule of Succession to the example of Town X in Table 2, al-
ready discloses that the Rule of Succession has trouble capturing effects found in data on
pseudocontingency inference at large. In Town X, pˆA = 12+118+2 = .65 and pˆB =
6+1
6+2 = .875
(with ∆ pˆ = −.225) result as probability estimates for desirable behavior. According to
the Rule of Succession, the estimate pˆ is expected to be higher for the minority group
as compared with the majority group in line with the genuine group-behavior contin-
gency (i.e., ∆p = −.33). However, this prediction contradicts the inference based on
marginal frequencies (i.e., a positive pseudocontingency). Figure 5 displays the proba-
bility predicted by the Rule of Succession as a function of the number of observations
and different genuine event probabilities. As can be seen, with an increasing number of
observations N, the predicted probability approaches the genuine event probability p.
If event probabilities for the majority group A and the minority group B are equal and
larger .50 (e.g., pA = pB = .67), the Rule of Succession indeed produces higher proba-
bility estimates for the majority group A (e.g., pˆA = .653 for nA = 18) as compared with
the minority group B (e.g., pˆB = .639 for nB = 9) and thus pseudocontingencies. Yet, if
the actual probability for the minority group is higher than for the majority group (e.g.,
pA = .67, pB = .83, with ∆p = −.16), predictions derived from the Rule of Succession
contradict experimental results of higher probability estimates for Group A than for
Group B (e.g., Fleig et al., 2017; Meiser & Hewstone, 2004; Meiser et al., 2018) and thus
the predictions by the pseudocontingency heuristic (e.g., pˆA = .653 for nA = 18 and
pˆB = .770 for nB = 9).
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Figure 5: Probability of the frequent outcome (e.g., desirable behavior) predicted by
the Rule of Succession as a function of number of observations (N) from Group A and
Group B.
Another shortcoming of the Rule of Succession, as of any regression-to-the-mean
account with a prior probability of 12 , is exactly that
1
2 -midpoint which cannot be crossed
over: when p > .50, the predicted probability estimates will fall into the range .50 ≤
pˆ ≤ 1; when p < .50, the predictions will be .50 ≥ pˆ ≥ .00. However, inspection of
participants’ probability judgments show that given the infrequent group, the estimated
probabilities often do not only reflect an underestimation, but a reversal in which event
is frequent (i.e., pˆ < .50 for the frequent outcome; e.g., Bulli & Primi, 2006; Eder et al.,
2011; Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; Meiser & Hewstone, 2006; Meiser et al., 2018).
Although neither the exemplar-based accounts nor the Rule of Succession discussed
are able to account for pseudocontingencies, in the second manuscript (Bott et al., 2020)
we argue that pseudocontingencies nevertheless may reflect an instance of bounded
rationality (Simon, 1990). We demonstrate that a computational model, the Bayesian
Marginal Model originally proposed by Klauer (2015), predicts pseudocontingencies as
the output of updating a prior probability with observed marginal frequencies.
2.3.2 Bayesian Marginal Model
Bott, F., M., Kellen, D., & Klauer, K. C. (2020). Normative accounts of illusory correlations.
Invited revision submitted to Psychological Review.
As previously discussed, pseudocontingencies are inferred on the basis of associating
skewed marginal frequencies (e.g., Fiedler et al., 2009). As marginal frequencies do not
determine, but only restrict the range of possible cell frequencies and contingencies
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(Duncan & Davis, 1953), the Bayesian Marginal Model jointly considers all possible
cell distributions and thus contingencies which are in line with the observed marginal
frequencies.
Like any Bayesian account, the Bayesian Marginal Model captures prior beliefs about
the contingency by a prior distribution. Given the assumption that the data in a con-
tingency table follow a multinomial distribution, the prior beliefs are captured by a
Dirichlet distribution Dir(α). The Dirichlet distribution is parameterized by a vector
of, in our case, four concentration parameters α = (α00, α01, α10, α11), that can be inter-
preted as pseudocounts per cell in the contingency table. Figure 6 illustrates prior beliefs
about the contingency φ as captured by the Dirichlet distribution. When all αij are equal,
we see that the prior distribution is dispersed over the [-1, 1] range and concentrated
around zero. Moreover, the stronger the prior belief that there is no contingency (i.e.,
the higher values of alpha), the more peaked is the prior distribution around zero. The
use of prior beliefs that are unbiased (i.e., setting all αij to the same value) is reasonable
for studies in which little to no prior information is available, for instance, when using
abstract or novel variables (e.g., groups labeled ‘A’ and ‘B’). However, when a reasoner
does belief a priori that some events occur more frequently than others or that there is a
non-zero contingency, this can be captured via unequal values αij: the respective pseu-
docounts can be increased in value, for instance, if participants a priori expect that one
group is more frequent than the other, that desirable behavior is more common than
undesirable behavior, or both (see lower panels in Figure 6 from left to right, respec-
tively). Note that only the last panel of Figure 6 illustrates an example of not expecting
a zero contingency a priori.
The prior beliefs are then updated with new observations, however, only with the ob-
served marginal frequencies. In the Bayesian Marginal Model, this implies, that the prior
beliefs in terms of the pseudocounts α are updated with each possible cell distribution
that is consistent with the observed marginal frequencies. As an example see Table 3
that reports all possible joint frequencies under the marginal frequencies of the exam-
ple of Town X in Table 2. The contingencies (quantified by φ) are positive in five of the
seven possible sets of joint frequencies and their range is asymmetric −.33 ≤ φ ≤ 1.00.
In this example, the prior beliefs would be updated with seven possible sets of joint
frequencies, each.
The resulting posterior belief is a mixture distribution over the updated sets of joint
frequencies, thus a mixture of the posterior Dirichlet distributions with α∗ = α+ k,
where k corresponds to the respective joint frequencies consistent with the observed
marginal frequencies (e.g., k = (12, 6, 6, 0)). In the Bayesian Marginal Model, each pos-
terior Dirichlet distribution is weighted as a function of the marginal frequencies and
the prior. The first row of Figure 7 illustrates the weights associated with the possi-
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Figure 6: Example prior Dirichlet distributions of φ.
Table 3: Possible Joint Frequencies (kij for Behavior = i and Group = j) and Associations
(φ) Given the Marginal Frequencies of the Town X Example in Table 2 (n+ = 18, n− = 6,
nA = 18, nB = 6)
Index k+A k+B k−A k−B φ
1 12 6 6 0 -0.33
2 13 5 5 1 -0.11
3 14 4 4 2 0.11
4 15 3 3 3 0.33
5 16 2 2 4 0.56
6 17 1 1 5 0.78
7 18 0 0 6 1.00
Note. True φ = −0.33.
ble joint frequencies given the example marginal frequencies of Town X in Table 2. As
can be seen, under the prior of α = (1, 1, 1, 1), each set of joint frequencies is equally
weighted. Moving away from this prior would lead to differential weighting: the larger
the value of α the more weight will be attributed to the joint frequencies that are similar
to the prior beliefs. For instance, assuming α = (50, 50, 50, 50) would result in weighting
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the moderate joint frequencies most, like Index 2 and 3 in Table 3. Thus, most weight
will be attributed to a zero contingency.
The output of the Bayesian Marginal Model is a posterior distribution that will be
obtained by taking multiple samples from the Dirichlet distributions. A single sample
is taken by first sampling the component Dirichlet distribution (e.g., the Dirichlet dis-
tribution corresponding to the joint frequencies identified with Index 2 in Table 3, with
α∗ = (α00 + 13, α01 + 5, α10 + 5, α11 + 1)). Secondly, a sample is drawn from that specific
Dirichlet distribution. Figure 7 depicts resulting posterior φ distributions and corre-
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Figure 7: Illustration of the Bayesian Marginal Model under different priors given the
example of Town X in Table 2.
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Figure 8: Model fit to previously published data. Posterior means are displayed as
probabilities predicted by the Bayesian Marginal Model. ‘Model failure’ corresponds to
a qualitative mismatch between participants’ mean estimates and the model predictions.
sponding predictions for pˆA and pˆB. Pseudocontingencies are predicted to be prevalent
in the case of α = (1, 1, 1, 1) when the reasoner does not have strong prior beliefs. How-
ever, when they do (e.g., α = (50, 50, 50, 50)), pseudocontingencies are predicted to be
less likely and less strong. Furthermore, note that the model also predicts the occurrence
of pˆB < .50; a phenomenon that is problematic for regression-to-the-mean accounts.
To further explore the potential of the Bayesian Marginal Model, we investigated its
ability to capture the qualitative patterns of pseudocontingency effects reported in 43
previously published experimental conditions (Bott et al., 2020). As we focused on stud-
ies that used artificial groups or options, we used unbiased prior beliefs by restricting
αij to be equal. The results of the model fits are illustrated in Figure 8 and show that the
Bayesian Marginal Model can capture the qualitative patterns in the data: The model
can not only produce pseudocontingency effects, but can also account for the underesti-
mation of probabilities for the minority group to the point of reversal in which outcome
is most frequent (i.e., probability estimates < .50 for the minority group).
In the analyses, we provided original evidence that the Bayesian Marginal Model
constitutes a normative reconstruction of the pseudocontingency heuristic that suc-
cessfully predicts pseudocontingencies, including probability reversals, as a result of
belief updating using marginal frequencies (Bott et al., 2020). The actual reasoning pro-
cesses when estimating probabilities or contingencies, however, clearly do not identi-
cally correspond to the algorithmic computations of the model, but rather approximate
the process of updating and taking samples from a probability distribution. In sum, the
pseudocontingency account proposed by Fiedler and colleagues, which assumes that in-
dividuals infer contingencies based on marginal frequencies, can thus be corroborated
not only empirically, but also normatively.
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3 When Information Sampling May or May
Not Evoke Biases
Bott, F., M., & Meiser, T. (2020). Pseudocontingency inference and choice: The role of
information sampling. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1037/xlm0000840
In Chapter 2, I discussed pseudocontingencies as an inference from statistical regulari-
ties based on predetermined event sequences that are reflected, among other things, in
reconstructive guessing processes. On this basis, in the following chapter, I will elab-
orate on the role of individuals’ self-directed information sampling in pseudocontin-
gency inference as compared with information predetermined and presented by the
experimenter.
For a long time, research on pseudocontingencies has been mostly limited to studies
concerned with impression formation or stereotype formation. Using various scenarios,
researchers have demonstrated that associations between, for example, group mem-
bership and behavior or between gender and hobbies, abilities, or fields of study are
inferred from skewed marginal frequencies and may override genuine contingencies
(e.g., Fiedler, 2010; Fiedler et al., 2007; Meiser & Hewstone, 2004). More recently, it has
also been shown that pseudocontingencies influence decision making and may lead to
sub-optimal choice behavior even when choices are directly relevant for the reasoner
and in voluntary choices (Fleig et al., 2017; Kutzner et al., 2011a; Meiser et al., 2018).
In pseudocontingency experiments, scenarios are usually created in which skewed
marginal frequencies are observed that should result in the inference of a pseudocon-
tingency contradicting the genuine contingency. Observing one behavior or outcome
more frequently than another and additionally encountering one group or option more
frequently than another may be the case in some scenarios in everyday life. However,
at least equally often, before forming a judgment or making a decision, reasoners have
to gather information themselves. Therefore, the question arises whether pseudocon-
tingencies may actually also be crucial, when the available information is not predeter-
mined.
Investigating self-directed information sampling, researchers often realize a free sam-
pling paradigm: Participants are free to sample any number of single events by choosing
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between multiple - typically two - options in any order they desire. None of the draws
is incentivized, except for one final choice to be made at the end. Results on free infor-
mation sampling are inconclusive, though, with regard to whether options are sampled
equally often (e.g., Hau et al., 2008; Hertwig et al., 2004) or not (e.g., Lejarraga et al.,
2012; Wulff et al., 2018). Moreover, most studies on information sampling use options
that only vary in their outcomes’ magnitudes and outcomes’ probabilities, but not in
their mean payoff. Those that do use options with different mean payoffs reported a
preference for the option with the higher mean payoff in the final choice (e.g., Hertwig
et al., 2006; Hilbig & Glöckner, 2011). In contrast, according to the pseudocontingency
heuristic, a preference for the option with the higher mean payoff is only predicted if
that option was most frequently observed when positive outcomes are most common
or if it was the least frequent option when losses are most common (cf. e.g., Fiedler
et al., 2009). Consequently, it is unclear whether skewed marginal frequencies are sam-
pled. By implication, it is an open question whether freely drawn samples give rise to
the inference of a pseudocontingency which may or may not contradict the genuine
contingency (i.e., does not align with the options’ underlying payoff structure). Free in-
formation sampling might even foster genuine contingency assessment independent of
the skewness in the sampled marginal frequencies as it may draw the focus of attention
away from the marginal frequencies towards the joint frequencies (cf. Fleig et al., 2017).
3.1 The Effect of Self-Determined Information Samples on
Pseudocontingency Inferences
For this reason, we investigated information sampling behavior and its impact on
pseudocontingency inference manifested in probability judgments and choices (Bott &
Meiser, 2020). All experiments implemented the following general procedure. The ex-
perimental task was to first assess and later trade two shares (option X1 and option X2).
They were traded at two times of a day (context C1 and context C2) and yielded either
a gain (outcome Y1) or a loss (outcome Y2) with different probabilities also varying
over the time of day. The underlying event distribution is displayed in Table 4. After a
fixed number of learning trials, participants traded the shares themselves while aiming
at maximizing their gains. Finally, they were asked, among other things, to estimate the
options’ winning probabilities given each context.
Implementing this decision scenario in the traditional experimental paradigm with
predetermined learning trials, we presented the individual events summarized in Table
4 in random order during the learning phase: Participants observed option X1 more
frequently than option X2 and gains more frequently than losses in context C1 and
vice versa given context C2. Replicating previous findings we found pseudocontingency
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Table 4: 2 x 2 x 2 Contingency Table Representing Joint Frequencies and Marginal
Frequencies Underlying the Experiments in Bott and Meiser (2020)
Context C1 Context C2
Outcome Option X1 Option X2 Option X1 Option X2
Y1 (gain) 15 8 23 2 9 11
Y2 (loss) 9 2 11 8 15 23
24 10 10 24
Note. φYX|C1 = −.17; φYX|C2 = −.17;
φXC = .41; φYC = .35; φYX = .00
inferences in self-relevant choice: Participants preferred option X1 in both contexts as
indicated by higher choice frequencies and higher winning probability estimates (see
Table 5 and Bott & Meiser, 2020, Experiment 1).
In comparison, implementing a free sampling paradigm, when participants sample
information themselves during the learning phase, they are free to decide for each learn-
ing trial which context and which option to observe. The outcomes were drawn by the
experimental program in accordance with the event frequencies in Table 4. We analyzed
information sampling behavior by specifying a multivariate generalized linear mixed
model to predict information sampling in individual trials as a function of individual
previous observations, like the previously sampled option and the previously observed
outcome. The analysis revealed that individuals often adopt a sampling strategy of re-
sampling an option, especially when it resulted in a positive outcome previously (Bott
& Meiser, 2020). Moreover, options more likely resulting in a gain are sampled more
frequently than the options with a low winning probability, even though there are no
direct consequences of the resulting outcomes during information sampling. Figure 9
summarizes this result by depicting the mean relative frequencies of samples per option
Table 5: Relative Frequencies of Choices and Winning Probability Estimates of Options
Within Contexts in Experiment 1 in Bott and Meiser (2020)
Context C1 Context C2
Option X1 Option X2 Option X1 Option X2
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Choices 61.33 32.31 38.67 32.31 60.07 31.03 39.93 31.03
Estimates 54.95 20.36 46.95 22.31 42.60 21.32 37.84 19.42
Note. Data in percent conditional on context.
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Figure 9: Relative frequencies of sampling option X1 versus option X2 within the pre-
dominantly positive context C1 versus predominantly negative context C2 in Bott and
Meiser (2020, Experiment 4). Note, the options’ outcome probabilities corresponded to
the event frequencies depicted in Table 4.
within each context: Participants sampled both options within the predominantly pos-
itive context C1 more frequently than the options within the predominantly negative
context C2. Additionally, option X2 with the higher genuine winning probability was,
on average, more frequently sampled within the positive context than option X1; within
the negative context both options were sampled roughly equally often.
Furthermore, we analyzed subsequent choices also as a function of the individual
samples drawn. Consequential choices following the sampling phase reflected a pref-
erence for the most frequently sampled option when gains were the most frequent
outcome (i.e., in context C1; Bott & Meiser, 2020). Although this choice behavior seems
to be in line with the pseudocontingency heuristic, in most cases, the frequently sam-
pled and subsequently chosen option in the positive context corresponded to the op-
tion with the higher underlying winning probability (i.e., option X2). The inference of
a pseudocontingency would thus have resulted in the same preference as the inference
of the genuine contingency. Moreover, when both options were sampled equally often,
the superior option (i.e., option X2) was preferred, as well. For a few cases, neverthe-
less, self-determined information sampling resulted in sub-optimal choices based on in-
ferred pseudocontingencies. Within the predominantly negative context C2 effects were
reduced or even absent, in information sampling as well as later choice. Taken together,
the results revealed an asymmetry in choices given contexts of predominantly positive
outcomes versus given contexts of predominantly negative outcomes: While there are
no differences between options in negative contexts, in positive contexts, choice prefer-
ences are already discernible in the sample drawn, independent of whether they reflect
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genuine contingencies or pseudocontingencies.
Possibly, observing positive outcomes during the learning phase might be reinforcing
in itself, even though they have no direct consequences. As a result, individuals may
be hedonically motivated to focus on options which they evaluate positively and which
they expect to result in positive outcomes. Such effects of evaluation-based preferences
in information sampling and choice should be even more discernible in a so called par-
tial feedback paradigm. In this paradigm, each sample drawn represents information and
payoff. Thus, every single draw is incentivized according to the observed outcome. Im-
plementing the experimental design as a partial feedback paradigm, in a more recent
experiment, the tendency to re-sample an option that previously resulted in a gain was
indeed stronger (Bott, 2019). As a consequence, option X2 was chosen more frequently
than option X1 in the predominantly positive context C1. An effect that was addition-
ally stronger during the learning phase as compared with the free sampling paradigm.
However, again there was no difference between options given the predominantly neg-
ative context C2.
3.2 Asymmetric Pseudocontingency Effects
Similar results regarding the asymmetry between positive contexts and negative con-
texts have been found in previous research on pseudocontingency effects in impres-
sion formation as well as choice behavior (e.g., Fleig et al., 2017; Meiser & Hewstone,
2004; Meiser et al., 2018): Pseudocontingency effects were stronger when mostly posi-
tive outcomes were observed, whereas they were reduced or even absent when negative
outcomes were most common. Those experiments all used a trivariate scenario, similar
to the ones depicted in Tables 2 and 4, in which the overall positivity/negativity (e.g.,
town or context) were manipulated as within-participant factor. Due to observing con-
trasting contexts, one possible explanation for the asymmetry may be that the overall
positivity/negativity is learned fairly quickly. Assuming that reasoners focus on how
to maximize positive experiences (e.g., gains), they might disregard variables within
the negative context as less important, as they will generally avoid those anyways. For
instance, independent of whether there is a minority group of nice people, towns with
a bad reputation are rather avoided as a whole. The results on information sampling
discussed before hint at such avoidance: More samples were drawn within the pre-
dominantly positive context (Bott, 2019; Bott & Meiser, 2020). Yet, in the given stimulus
distribution, this could have also been the natural result of preferring options that result
in positive outcomes, independent of the overall positivity/negativity of the context.
To more explicitly test whether attention is allocated to available information de-
pending on the overall positivity/negativity, we examined whether contexts varying in
their overall winning probability are sampled to varying degrees (Bott & Meiser, 2020,
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Table 6: Relative Frequencies of Choices and Winning Probability Estimates of Options
Within Contexts in the Sampling Condition of Experiment 3 in Bott and Meiser (2020)
Context C1 Context C2
Option X1 Option X2 Option X1 Option X2
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Choices 66.54 33.16 33.46 33.16 50.75 32.98 49.25 32.98
Estimates 55.82 21.71 41.56 22.13 39.69 20.05 41.46 21.64
Note. Data in percent conditional on context.
Experiment 3). In this experiment, we again realized context C1 and context C2 as a
within-participant factor and participants were only free to decide for each learning
trial which context to observe. The options and outcomes were drawn by the experi-
mental program in accordance with the event frequencies summarized in Table 4. We
analyzed the probability to sample the predominantly positive context C1 in an in-
dividual learning trial by means of a generalized linear mixed model including the
previously sampled context and the previously observed outcome as predictors. Over-
all, we did not find differences between the predominantly positive context C1 and the
predominantly negative context C2 with regard to sampling frequency. Even though the
order of observations was not random, on average, the information per context did thus
not differ from the exact frequencies depicted in Table 4. Accordingly, we replicated
results obtained with predetermined learning trials: Pseudocontingencies were inferred
and used as basis for judgments and decision making, although leading to sub-optimal
choices. Yet again, the pseudocontingency effect was asymmetric with stronger effects
given the predominantly positive context. Mean relative choice frequencies and proba-
bility estimates are shown in Table 6.
An alternative explanation for the asymmetry also hinges on the notion that the over-
all positivity/negativity is learned fairly quickly before making inferences about the
variables within a context. Prior beliefs about these variables, formed on the basis of the
context’s positivity/negativity, may thus influence learning. Assuming that reasoners
may pay more attention to losses than gains (cf. Yechiam & Hochman, 2013), one could
expect stronger effects of prior beliefs in negative scenarios or contexts as compared
with positive scenarios. In the Bayesian Marginal Model discussed above, such prior
beliefs can be captured via values of α that overweight the frequent outcome relative to
other cells (e.g., α = 2, 2, 1, 1)). The simulated results in Figure 10 show that expecting
the frequent outcome twice as often as the infrequent outcome reduces the expected
pseudocontingency effect. Note, that the probability and strength of a pseudocontin-
gency is lower the stronger the prior beliefs. Assuming the prior beliefs are stronger
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when negative outcomes are more frequent (e.g., context C2), this could produce the
asymmetry in the strength of the inferred pseudocontingencies.
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Figure 10: Prior φ and posterior φ for the example of a total sample of 34 observations
comprising 23 occurrences of the frequent outcome and 24 occurrences of the frequent
option. The example priors reflect overweighting of the cells corresponding to the fre-
quent outcome relative to the infrequent outcome.
3.3 The Effect of Prior Expectations
Going beyond the analyses and results in Bott and Meiser (2020), beliefs about or eval-
uations of groups or options probably evolve over the course of time. (Pseudo-) Contin-
gencies inferred based on the current pool of experience may thus already influence fur-
ther (sampling) behavior. Likewise, it can even be assumed that (pseudo-)contingencies
inferred on the basis of passive information, when there are no prior direct experiences
with the groups or options, influence future judgments and choices. In order to investi-
gate the effect of prior beliefs experimentally, expectations about the options’ winning
probabilities, for instance, can be induced prior the learning phase. These expectations
may either correspond to the genuine contingency between options and outcomes or
correspond to the opposite, incorrect contingency. In order to differentiate between ef-
fects on the evaluation of options which can initially be explored without any conse-
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quences, and effects on the evaluation of options that have never been directly experi-
enced prior choice, a free sampling paradigm and a partial feedback paradigm can be
realized, respectively, as between-participants conditions.
Implementing this design using the stimulus material in Table 4, a new experiment
revealed that the options in the predominantly positive context were preferred to the
options in the predominantly negative context (Bott, 2019). Figure 11 shows the mean
relative choice frequencies in the final eight choices per context in each sampling-
expectation condition. When prior expectations corresponded to the true contingency
(i.e., higher winning probability of option X2 than option X1), the superior option X2
was chosen more frequently than option X1, during information sampling and in final
choices. This difference between options was greater given the predominantly positive
context. Even in the case of prior expectations that turn out to be wrong, over the course
of trials, participants were able to update evaluations accordingly with the result of at
least judging both options within a context as equally good or bad. Interestingly, this
pattern of choices was not only revealed when participants were free to explore all
choice options without consequences, but also when each choice was incentivized from
the outset. The results indicate that individuals can adjust prior and maybe premature
evaluations as long as they keep gathering information and experiences.
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Figure 11: Relative choice frequencies for options X1 and X2 per context and per
sampling-expectation condition: Participants were randomly assigned to one of two
sampling conditions (free vs. partial) and were either told the genuine contingency
between options and outcomes or the opposite, incorrect contingency (genuine vs. op-
posite).
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4 Conclusion
Contingency assessment has been widely recognized as essential for everyday life. Thus,
not surprisingly, many researchers are interested in the processes involved in contin-
gency learning, may it be in learning of associations between stimuli in conditioning
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) or between causes and effects in causal reasoning (Cheng
& Novick, 1992; Spellman & Mandel, 1999; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992). Initially, it
was assumed that individuals infer contingencies similar to computing ∆p by compar-
ing two conditional probabilities. However, various factors may influence which infor-
mation is used in order to asses contingencies. The environment itself may determine
which information is available in the first place and subjective causal models about asso-
ciations between variables, for instance, may influence which information is considered
and how it is used (Waldmann et al., 2006). On the one hand, researchers demonstrated
that individuals are able to assess genuine contingencies when considering joint fre-
quencies and are even able to take third variables, like a context variable, into account
when being aware of the third variable’s moderating role (Cheng & Novick, 1990, 1992;
Spellman et al., 2001; Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2001). On the other hand, it has been
shown that this is only the case as long as genuine contingency assessment is cogni-
tively manageable. Otherwise, simplifying strategies are employed, like using marginal
frequencies instead of pairs of observations to infer a contingency (e.g., Fiedler et al.,
2009).
This phenomenon is known as pseudocontingency (e.g., Fiedler et al., 2009). When
marginal frequencies are skewed, the pseudocontingency heuristic proposes that indi-
viduals associate frequent categories with each other as well as infrequent categories
and thereby infer a contingency; when marginal frequencies are uniformly distributed
individuals will assume that there is no contingency. Even though pseudocontingencies
are inferred on the basis of statistically inappropriate information (i.e., marginal fre-
quencies instead of joint frequencies), they are quite adaptive and useful, for instance,
when no co-occurrence information is available. Pseudocontingencies have addition-
ally been shown to facilitate detection of the sign of true contingencies (Kutzner et al.,
2011b). Moreover, in the second manuscript (Bott et al., 2020), we presented pseudocon-
tingencies as the expected output of updating prior beliefs about a contingency based
on the use of marginal frequencies, while following the norms of Bayesian belief up-
dating. Thus, the pseudocontingency heuristic as well as this Bayesian Marginal Model
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(Bott et al., 2020), as normative reconstruction of the pseudocontingency heuristic, as-
sume that contingencies are inferred on the basis of marginal frequencies. This implies
that basically joint frequencies are reconstructed by marginal frequencies. While more
recent research focuses more on probability judgments and choices, especially research
on pseudocontingencies in impression formation asks participants to estimate the fre-
quency of a certain type of behavior (e.g., desirable versus undesirable behavior) given
each group to be evaluated. However, in those experiments, participants are given the
total number of observations per group (i.e., marginal frequencies of group member-
ship) prior estimation. In order to investigate the reconstruction of joint frequencies
(e.g., the frequency of jointly observing Group A and desirable behavior), future re-
search should consider asking for estimates of certain joint frequencies without pre-
senting information on marginal frequencies.
Furthermore, pseudocontingency inferences are traditionally investigated using ex-
perimental paradigms that put individuals in the position of a passive observer of
information. Over the course of learning trials, predetermined information about the
(co-)occurrence of two variables is presented, sometimes in combination with a third,
context variable. Using various scenarios, researches demonstrated that when observing
skewed marginal frequencies of the two focal variables, individuals heuristically infer
that the frequent observations in each variable disproportionately co-occur as well as
the infrequent observations per variable (e.g., Fiedler & Freytag, 2004; Fleig et al., 2017;
Meiser & Hewstone, 2004; Meiser et al., 2018; Vogel et al., 2013). Even when it comes
to assigning events to each other, in case memory fails, individuals have been shown
to guess co-occurrences based on inferred pseudocontingency (e.g., Klauer & Meiser,
2000; Meiser & Hewstone, 2004, 2006). In the first manuscript (Bott et al., in press), we
corroborate this finding of guessing processes reflecting inferred pseudocontingencies
via parameter validation in a hierarchical MPT model disentangling memory processes
from guessing processes.
Extending empirical research on pseudocontingency inference, in a series of four ex-
periments, we investigated active information search as compared with passive obser-
vation of information and its role in pseudocontingency inference (Bott & Meiser, 2020).
We replicated earlier findings that skewed marginal frequencies are indeed used when
inferring a contingency. However, the results also revealed that the more freely informa-
tion are sampled by individuals themselves, the more discernible are later preferences
in the sample drawn and the more likely do they align with underlying genuine con-
tingencies between the variables at hand. Moreover, effects in information sampling
and choice differ in their strength depending on the observations’ predominant va-
lence: While negative experiences are avoided if possible, positive or positively evalu-
ated events are preferred during information sampling and later choices, even when
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information sampling has no direct consequences, but could be utilized for exploration
of all events possible.
The discrepancy in effects depending on the overall positivity/negativity of events
may be traced back to different prior expectations or beliefs that additionally may be
updated to varying degrees given a positive versus negative context, especially when
contrasting contexts are observed. In the Bayesian Marginal Model (Bott et al., 2020;
Klauer, 2015), prior beliefs about the presence of a contingency between variables are
captured via a prior probability distribution. In its current form, however, it only allows
to model a 2 x 2 design (e.g., two options and two outcomes), but a 2 x 2 x 2 design
with contrasting contexts only by considering them in parallel: Estimates are computed
per context. The integration of two 2 x 2 contingency tables to jointly consider all eight
cells, instead of two sets of four cells, poses an important challenge yet to be tack-
led. Furthermore, to test the hypothesis that the asymmetry between predominantly
positive contexts and predominantly negative contexts is due to the valence of events,
future research should explore differences in judgments and choices based on inferred
(pseudo-)contingencies between valenced stimuli and non-valenced stimuli as well as
differences to stimuli to which a valence will be allocated at a later point in time.
To conclude, the present thesis corroborates the notion that pseudocontingencies are
inferred on the basis of marginal frequencies and are considered a solid basis for judg-
ments and choices. Demonstrating that the pseudocontingency heuristic can be recon-
structed by a model following the norms of Bayesian belief updating and reporting
original evidence, I highlight that despite the prefix "pseudo", pseudocontingencies are
not necessarily wrong inferences. Instead, they often align with genuine contingencies,
especially when reasoners make the effort of actively searching for further information
and of gathering new experiences.
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Abstract
In traditional multinomial processing tree (MPT) models for aggregate frequency data,
parameters have usually been validated by means of experimental manipulations, thereby
testing selective effects of discrete independent variables on specific model parameters.
More recently, hierarchical MPT models which account for parameter heterogeneity be-
tween participants have been introduced. These models offer a new possibility of param-
eter validation by analyzing selective covariations of interindividual differences in MPT
model parameters with continuous covariates. The new approach enables researchers to
test parameter validity in terms of functional dissociations, including convergent validity
and discriminant validity in a nomological network. Here, we apply the novel approach
to a multidimensional source-monitoring model in the domain of stereotype formation
based on pseudocontingency inference. Using hierarchical Bayesian MPT models, we
test the validity of source-guessing parameters as indicators of specific source evalua-
tions on the individual level. First, analyzing experimental data on stereotype formation
(N = 130), we replicated earlier findings of biased source-guessing parameters while tak-
ing parameter heterogeneity across participants into account. Second, we investigated the
specificity of covariations between conditional guessing parameters and continuous direct
measures of source evaluations. Interindividual differences in direct evaluations predicted
interindividual differences in specific source-guessing parameters, thus validating their
substantive interpretation. Third, in an exploratory analysis, we examined relations of
memory parameters and guessing parameters with cognitive performance measures from
a standardized cognitive assessment battery.
Keywords: parameter validation; hierarchical MPT; continuous covariates; pseudo-
contingency
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Parameter Validation in Hierarchical MPT Models by Functional
Dissociation with Continuous Covariates: An Application to
Contingency Inference
Multinomial processing tree (MPT) models are statistical models used to estimate
probabilities of latent cognitive processes from observable frequency data (Batchelder &
Riefer, 1999; Erdfelder et al., 2009). In order to test assumptions about psychological
processes that jointly contribute to behavioral responses, MPT models were traditionally
fitted to data aggregated across participants. A good model fit to the data, though, is
insufficient to justify an interpretation of the model parameters in terms of the assumed
psychological processes. Besides model fit, the substantive interpretation of MPT model
parameters has to be validated via selective influence.
In traditional MPT modeling, parameters are validated by testing whether they
are selectively influenced by specific experimental manipulations (Erdfelder et al., 2009;
Hütter & Klauer, 2016). These experimental manipulations are discrete realizations of
factors assumed to enhance or impair specific cognitive processes. In validation studies,
the selective influence of an experimental manipulation on one specific model parameter
is tested. In contrast, none of the remaining parameters representing other cognitive
processes should be affected. Accordingly, using discrete experimental variables, con-
vergent validity and discriminant validity of MPT model parameters are evaluated via
model comparisons (e.g., Bayen, Murnane, & Erdfelder, 1996; Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998;
Klauer & Wegener, 1998; Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Meissner & Rothermund, 2013).
More recently, hierarchical MPT models have been developed to account for pa-
rameter heterogeneity between participants (Klauer, 2010; Matzke, Dolan, Batchelder, &
Wagenmakers, 2015; Smith & Batchelder, 2010). Instead of fitting MPT models using
aggregate data, model parameters are estimated at the level of individuals and are as-
sumed to follow a continuous distribution at the group level. In such hierarchical models,
interindividual differences in model parameters can be tested for covariations with contin-
uous variables. Across various substantive research areas, hierarchical MPT models are
increasingly being used to investigate such covariations. For instance, researchers relied
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on this approach to estimate associations of memory parameters in MPT models with
fluid and crystallized intelligence (Michalkiewicz, Arden, & Erdfelder, 2018), associations
between guessing parameters and the reliance on both stereotypes and inferred contin-
gencies (e.g., Arnold, Bayen, Kuhlmann, & Vaterrodt, 2013; Ernst, Kuhlmann, & Vogel,
2019; Kuhlmann, Bayen, Meuser, & Kornadt, 2016), and associations between personal-
ity traits and dishonest behavior (Heck, Thielmann, Moshagen, & Hilbig, 2018), moral
judgments (Kroneisen & Heck, in press), and environmental preferences (Klein, Hilbig,
& Heck, 2017). In a similar vein, Anders, Oravecz, and Alario (2017) and Boehm, Ste-
ingroever, and Wagenmakers (2018) proposed general regression frameworks for testing
covariations between continuous variables and model parameters in Bayesian hierarchical
cognitive models.
Besides testing covariations with theoretically relevant model parameters for which a
hypothesized effect is of substantive interest, however, hierarchical MPT models present a
new approach to parameter validation: instead of showing selective influence via (discrete)
experimental manipulations, the construct validity of parameters as valid measures of
cognitive processes can be tested by analyzing the specificity of (continuous) covariations.
To this end, continuous measures of psychological constructs or traits can be used which
are assumed to selectively correspond to the specific cognitive process underlying a given
MPT model parameter. Then, one can test for a functional dissociation in terms not
only of (a) substantial stochastic associations between interindividual differences in the
given MPT parameter and measures of the same construct (i.e., convergent validity), but
also in terms of (b) negligible or weak stochastic associations between interindividual
differences in the MPT parameter and measures of theoretically distinct constructs (i.e.,
discriminant validity). By testing convergent and discriminant validity, the approach
allows researchers to validate the parameters of an MPT model in a nomological network
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959).
MPT models can be flexibly tailored to various experimental paradigms. In the
present paper, we use an extended version of the classical source-monitoring MPT model
proposed by Batchelder and Riefer (1990) to disentangle memory processes and guessing
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processes. In source-monitoring experiments, participants have to discriminate between
target items presented in a preceding study phase and new distractor items. Additionally,
they have to assign items judged to be old to one out of two or more sources that have
been learned during the study phase (e.g., whether words judged as old were presented
in blue or red). Source-monitoring MPT models allow to disentangle and estimate three
types of processes contributing to task performance in those experiments (Bayen et al.,
1996; Bröder & Meiser, 2007): item memory, source memory, and guessing. Extending
this model to combinations of multiple sources (e.g., by presenting items in red/blue
crossed with a left/right position on the screen), multidimensional source-monitoring
MPT models account for memory for multiple, crossed dimensions of source information
(Meiser & Bröder, 2002).
In research on source memory, the focus is usually on measuring memory for sources
as well as memory for items in a process-pure way, that is, independently from guessing
processes (e.g., guessing that a word was shown in blue in the absence of source memory).
However, in MPT models, guessing parameters may not only represent perfectly random
and unbiased guessing, but can instead be interpreted as indicators of expectancy-based
guessing. In experimental studies, it has been shown that source-guessing parameters can
reflect, for instance, learned item-source contingencies in the experimental stimuli (e.g.,
Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Klauer & Wegener, 1998) or schemata and stereotypes asso-
ciated with the items and sources (Bayen, Nakamura, Dupuis, & Yang, 2000; Ehrenberg
& Klauer, 2005; Kuhlmann et al., 2016; Wegener & Klauer, 2004). Likewise, Klauer and
Meiser (2000) and Meiser and Hewstone (2004) interpreted source-guessing parameters
as reflecting evaluative biases in assigning positive versus negative items to sources of
different valence in the absence of source memory.
Evaluative biases are assumed to originate in inferred item-source contingencies.
Yet, the inferred contingencies do not necessarily correspond to genuine item-source con-
tingencies in the experimental design but may reflect illusory correlations or pseudocon-
tingencies. In general, pseudocontingencies denote contingencies that are inferred on the
basis of skewed base rates or joint covariations of two variables with a third one, rather
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than on the basis of genuine covariation information of the two focal variables (Fiedler &
Freytag, 2004; Fiedler, Freytag, & Meiser, 2009; Fiedler, Kutzner, & Vogel, 2013; Meiser,
Rummel, & Fleig, 2018). In source-monitoring experiments on pseudocontingencies in
stereotype formation (see Meiser & Hewstone, 2010, for an overview), positive behavioral
statements and negative behavioral statements (items) are paired with individual mem-
bers of two groups (sources). Usually, the base rates of (a) positive items versus negative
items and (b) Source A versus Source B are skewed in the stimulus distribution (e.g.,
by presenting a majority of positive items and a majority of items from Source A). A
pseudocontingency is observed if a contingency between the item categories and source
categories is inferred on the basis of the skewed base rates, such that participants asso-
ciate the more frequent item category (e.g., positive items) with the more frequent source
category (e.g., Source A) and the infrequent item category (e.g., negative items) with the
infrequent source category (e.g., Source B; Meiser & Hewstone, 2004, 2006). Because the
marginal base rates for item types and sources do not uniquely determine the item-source
contingency, however, subjectively inferred pseudocontingencies might not correspond to
the genuine item-source contingency (e.g., the proportion of positive versus negative items
can be higher for Source B than for Source A).
Coming back to source memory, if the source of an item is not remembered, indi-
viduals may guess the source on the basis of the inferred (pseudo-)contingency between
items and sources (Klauer & Meiser, 2000; Meiser & Hewstone, 2004). The inferred pseu-
docontingency, which mirrors a positive covariation between frequent items and frequent
sources in the example, should therefore be reflected by participants’ guessing parameters
in a source-monitoring MPT model. Accordingly, biased guessing parameters are taken
as evidence of inferred evaluative (pseudo-)contingencies. At the same time, inferred
pseudocontingencies are not expected to be related to any other parameters of the MPT
model (especially not to memory parameters). This line of reasoning highlights that,
in the domain of source monitoring, the substantive interpretation not only of memory
parameters but also of guessing parameters is of theoretical importance. Hence, the
goal of the present research is to analyze the association of guessing parameters with
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direct measures of source evaluations in a pseudocontingency paradigm. To this end,
hierarchical MPT models allow us to investigate the construct validity of parameters
by testing covariations of interindividual differences in source-guessing parameters with
interindividual differences in direct measures of inferred pseudocontingencies.
In the remainder of the article, we replicate previous results on multinomial model-
ing of pseudocontingency inference before applying the novel approach of parameter vali-
dation with continuous covariates. First, we used the framework of hierarchical Bayesian
MPT models (Heck, Arnold, & Arnold, 2018; Klauer, 2010) to analyze biases in source
guessing based on pseudocontingency inference while taking parameter heterogeneity into
account. Second, we tested the validity of source-guessing parameters by means of their
selective covariations with direct, continuous measures of source evaluations. Finally, in
an exploratory analysis, we investigated the associations of performance measures from
a standardized cognitive assessment battery with memory parameters and guessing pa-
rameters of the hierarchical MPT model in order to further exemplify the possibilities
of validating MPT model parameters in a nomological network. The joint analysis of
MPT parameters and other variables measuring general cognitive capacities also illus-
trates how cognitive modeling in experimental psychology can profit from combining
experimental data with psychometric assessment, an approach labeled cognitive psycho-
metrics by William Batchelder and David Riefer (Batchelder, 1998, 2010; Riefer, Knapp,
Batchelder, Bamber, & Manifold, 2002).
2 Experiment
In the experiment, we investigated stereotype formation on the basis of pseudo-
contingency inference. The study addressed the reliance on inferred pseudocontingencies
when reconstructing sources of positive and negative behavioral statements in a scenario
with two artificial groups and the context factor of town of residence (see Meiser & Hew-
stone, 2004). A first aim was to replicate the finding that source guessing is biased in
a pseudocontingency paradigm with skewed base rates. Previous studies used an MPT
model of source memory for two-dimensional source information (Meiser & Bröder, 2002)
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to estimate (1) item memory for behavioral statements, (2) source memory for town of
residence, (3) source memory for group membership, and (4) guessing processes from
data aggregated across participants (e.g., Meiser & Hewstone, 2004, 2006). However,
since MPT models were fitted to aggregate data, heterogeneity between participants
might have resulted in biased parameter estimates and erroneous statistical inference
(e.g., Klauer, 2006; Rouder et al., 2007). Therefore, we used a hierarchical Bayesian
MPT model to account for interindividual differences in item memory, source memory,
and guessing.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants and Design. A sample of N = 133 participants was re-
cruited from the University of Mannheim, from universities of applied sciences, and a
secondary school in Mannheim. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two ex-
perimental conditions with or without base rate information concerning the two groups in
the two towns (see below). Participants received course credit in the case of psychology
students or a financial compensation of 30 EUR for completing the pseudocontingency
experiment and the cognitive assessment.
The data of three participants were discarded from analyses because these partici-
pants reported that German was not their first language and either showed scores smaller
than 2 SD below the mean in the verbal subscale (see below) or had problems following
the instructions. The remaining sample size guaranteed a statistical power of at least
1−β = .90 to detect a difference in the direct evaluative ratings of the two target groups
with medium effect size f = .25 and α = .05 in a conventional frequentist analysis of
pseudocontingencies (e.g. Meiser & Hewstone, 2004). Of the N = 130 participants, 50%
were female and mean age was 23.12 years (SD = 4.97). Concerning level of education,
10% of the participants reported that they were attending secondary school or held an
exam from a basic or intermediate secondary school, 78% had graduated from high school,
and 12% held a university degree. 66 participants were tested in the condition without
base rate information, and 64 in the condition with base rate information.
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2.1.2 Material and Procedure. Experimental sessions consisted of the pseu-
docontingency experiment for about 30 min, a brief unrelated questionnaire for about
5 min, and a cognitive assessment for about 2.5 h. Participants were invited to take
breaks between the different sections of the session and between different subscales of the
cognitive assessment.
The pseudocontingency experiment started with a learning phase of behavioral
statements about members of two artificial groups, labeled Group A and Group B, in
two artificial towns, labeled Town X and Town Y. For each participant, 24 desirable
behaviors and 24 undesirable behaviors were randomly drawn from a larger pool of be-
haviors. The pool consisted of 76 moderately desirable and 76 moderately undesirable
behaviors that showed mean ratings of +1.5 or above for desirable behaviors, and -1.5 or
below for undesirable behaviors, on a scale from -3 to 3 in an independent pretest study
(N = 36; see Meiser, 2003, for details). Examples are “stays friendly and fair in discus-
sions” and “becomes angry when being delayed by an elderly pedestrian”. The randomly
selected behavioral statements were assigned to the groups and towns according to the
stimulus distribution in Table 1.
In the learning phase, each behavioral statement contained a male first name, group
membership in Group A or Group B, town of residence Town X or Town Y, and the actual
behavior. The behavioral statements were displayed for 6 s with an interstimulus interval
of 1.5 s. Behavioral statements describing group members of either group in Town X were
presented on the left-hand side of the computer screen and statements describing group
members of either group in Town Y on the right-hand side. The order of behavioral
statements was randomized per participant. Participants were instructed to read the
statements carefully and to form an impression of the two groups in the two towns. The
instructions did not ask participants to memorize the individual behaviors or the group
and town information for a later memory test.
In the stimulus distribution (see Table 1), Group B shows a larger proportion of
desirable behaviors than Group A within either town: In Town X, all members of Group B
but only 67% of the members of Group A were described as engaging in desirable behavior.
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Table 1
Stimulus Distribution of Desirable and Undesirable Behaviors for Group A and Group B
in Town X and Town Y
Town X Town Y
Group A Group B Group A Group B
Desirable 12 6 0 6
Undesirable 6 0 6 12
In Town Y, 33% of the members of Group B but none of the members of Group A engaged
in desirable behavior. The true contingency conditional on the context factor of town
of residence should thus give rise to a more positive impression of Group B. Moreover,
the higher proportions of Group A and of desirable behaviors in Town X relative to
Town Y imply true positive contingencies of town of residence with group membership and
desirability. The distributions of Group A and Group B and of desirable and undesirable
behaviors are skewed within each town, however, such that a pseudocontingency was
expected to be inferred by the participants. The pseudocontingency should associate
the frequent categories (i.e., Group A and desirable behaviors in Town X, Group B and
undesirable behaviors in Town Y) and the infrequent categories (Group B and undesirable
behaviors in Town X, Group A and desirable behaviors in Town Y), leading to a more
positive impression of Group A thus contrasting the true contingency in the stimuli. This
pseudocontingency inference should be strengthened by the covariation of the skewed
distributions of Group A versus Group B and desirable versus undesirable behaviors
across the context factor town of residence (Meiser et al., 2018).1
1 Given the fixed base rates of group membership and type of behavior, the stimulus distribution used
here (see Table 1) is the most extreme one consistent with those base rates. However, pseudocontin-
gency inferences have also been found with less extreme stimulus distributions that did not contain zero
frequencies in the stimulus distribution (cf. e.g., Fiedler & Freytag, 2004; Meiser et al., 2018, Experi-
ment 3).
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In order to manipulate attention to the context factor and the varying base rates,
explicit information concerning the base rates of the two groups within the two towns was
given to half of the participants: in the experimental condition without base rate infor-
mation, participants received no a priori information about the proportions of Group A
and Group B for either town. In the experimental condition with base rate information,
the instructions pointed out that in Town X, 75% of the persons belonged to Group A
and 25% to Group B, whereas in Town Y, 25% of the persons belonged to Group A and
75% to Group B. The proportions of Group A and Group B for either town were also
displayed throughout the learning phase in the condition with base rate information. We
assumed that the explicit information on the skewed base rates of group membership may
strengthen pseudocontingency inference, as alternative manipulations using a visualiza-
tion of base rates via bar charts (Meiser et al., 2018) or using changes of attentional focus
(Fleig, Meiser, Ettlin, & Rummel, 2017) have shown more pronounced pseudocontingency
effects.
The test phase of the pseudocontingency experiment included a rating task, a
source-memory test, and frequency estimates. The order of tasks followed standard prac-
tice (e.g. Meiser, 2003; Meiser & Hewstone, 2004) and avoided that numerical information
from the frequency estimation task contaminated judgment and guessing processes in the
trait ratings or memory test, respectively. To first assess the participants’ general im-
pressions about the groups per town, in the rating task, participants rated Group A and
Group B in Town X and Town Y on five positive and five negative trait attributes in a
fixed randomized order. Trait ratings were assessed on separate 10-point rating scales (0:
trait does not apply at all; 9: trait applies completely) for each of the four combinations
of group and town. The ratings were averaged across the ten traits after re-coding ratings
for negative trait attributes, so that larger trait scores reflect more positive judgments.
In the source-memory test, participants were presented with the 48 target behaviors
from the learning phase and 48 new distractor behaviors in random order. The distractor
items included 24 desirable and 24 undesirable behaviors that were randomly drawn
for each participant from the same pool as the target behaviors. In the memory test,
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participants had to decide for each behavior whether it was old (i.e., had occurred in the
learning phase) or new. If a behavior was judged old, participants had to decide whether
it occurred in Town X or Town Y in a second step, and whether it described a member of
Group A or Group B in a third step. The individual frequencies of judging desirable and
undesirable target and distractor behaviors as old and of assigning them to Town X or
Town Y and to Group A or Group B provided the data for the hierarchical MPT analysis.
Frequency estimates formed the final task of the pseudocontingency experiment, as
here participants were shown the total number of statements about each combination
of group and town in the learning phase (e.g., 18 for Group A in Town X, see Table 1).
Next, they had to estimate the number of undesirable behaviors for the given group within
the given town. The estimated numbers of undesirable behaviors were transformed to
proportions by dividing them by the total numbers of behavioral statements per group-
town combination, so that higher values reflect more negative evaluations.
After the pseudocontingency experiment, participants filled in a brief questionnaire
that was unrelated to the experiment and were then invited to have a break before
the cognitive test was administered. We used the computerized and adaptive INSBAT
test battery (Arendasy et al., 2009) to assess cognitive performance in the domains of
fluid intelligence, quantitative reasoning, short-term and long-term memory, as well as
crystallized intelligence. To assess fluid intelligence, we selected the subscales of figural
inductive reasoning and verbal deductive reasoning as part of our cognitive assessment.
Fluid intelligence measured by the INSBAT reflects the ability to recognize regularities
or to combine information and to draw logical conclusions from them. The phenomenon
of pseudocontingency inference might be traceable to this ability: pseudocontingencies
are based on inferences drawn from statistical regularities (i.e., skewed base rates). In a
similar vein, Fleig et al. (2017) demonstrated that even participants high in statistical
numeracy do infer pseudocontingencies when focusing on base rates. Since pseudocon-
tingencies are assumed to form the basis of source evaluations which in turn should be
reflected in source-guessing parameters, fluid intelligence and its subscales may poten-
tially relate to the source-guessing parameters. For the domain of quantitative reasoning,
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we chose the subscales of computational estimation and arithmetic competence. They
capture the ability to apply mathematical skills in problem-solving (see Arendasy et al.,
2009). Similarly to fluid intelligence, interindividual differences in quantitative thinking
might explain interindividual differences in inferring pseudocontingencies and thereby
in source-guessing parameters in our experiment. Memory performance was assessed
with the INSBAT subscales of verbal short-term and long-term memory. Participants’
cognitive ability to remember and recognize information could be related to memory pa-
rameters in the MPT model. Finally, subscales of general knowledge and verbal fluency
were assessed from the domain of crystallized intelligence. To measure general knowledge,
participants had to fill out a cloze test asking to complete word definitions, whereas they
had to solve anagrams in the verbal fluency task. Crystallized intelligence and its sub-
scales were thus not included in the following analyses, because these tests appeared less
relevant for experimental source memory and pseudocontingency inference. Nevertheless,
we did measure those subscales in order to comprehensibly assess participants’ cognitive
ability and to be able to give feedback to the individual participant on their cognitive
performance as measured by the INSBAT. For our analyses we used the specific scores
for each subscale as well as the total scores for each factor.
2.2 Results
We first report analyses of the rating scores and frequency estimates as direct mea-
sures of pseudocontingency inference. Next, we present the results of the hierarchical
MPT analyses of source monitoring. All analyses were conducted in R (R Core Team,
2018).
2.2.1 Direct measures of pseudocontingency inference. In order to ana-
lyze mean rating scores and frequency estimates, we conducted Bayesian hypothesis tests
for the 2×2×2 mixed ANOVA design with condition as between-participants factor and
town of residence and group membership as within-participant factors (Rouder, Morey,
Speckman, & Province, 2012). For this purpose, we used the BayesFactor package (Morey
& Rouder, 2018). In a Bayesian ANOVA, the Bayes factor B1,0 quantifies the relative
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evidence for the alternative hypothesis H1 (e.g., an ANOVA model with two main effects
and no interaction) against the null hypothesis H0 (e.g., the intercept-only model). Sim-
ilarly, the inverse B0,1 = 1/B1,0 quantifies the relative support for the null hypothesis.
Besides the intercept-only model, we included all models comprising one or more main
effects, whereas models with interactions were only included if they comprised all cor-
responding main effects. We compared all models to the intercept-only model (i.e., by
using the option “withMain” in the BayesFactor package). In order to report the results
more concisely, we additionally computed posterior probabilities for subsets of models
(e.g., all models including the effect of condition) by means of model averaging (Hoeting,
Madigan, Raftery, & Volinsky, 1999). When assuming uniform prior probabilities over
all models, the posterior probability of a single model can be calculated by dividing its
Bayes factor B1,0 (i.e., the evidence compared to the intercept-only model) by the sum
of Bayes factors Bi,0 for all models i (including the intercept-only model itself, for which
B0,0 = 1). The posterior probability of a subset of models can then be computed by
summing the posterior probabilities of the corresponding models.
The mean rating scores per combination of group and town are displayed in Ta-
ble 2. The analyses revealed the strongest evidence for the ANOVA model including main
effects of town of residence and group membership only, with a corresponding Bayes fac-
tor of B(group+town),null = 6.26 · 1034 compared to the intercept-only model (the Bayes
factor comparing this model to the second-best model which additionally included their
interaction was B(group+town),(group+town+group:town) = 2.44; Bayes factors for all models are
reported in Table A1). Town X was evaluated more positively than Town Y correspond-
ing to the genuine item-source contingency between behavioral statements and town of
residence in the stimulus distribution. Moreover, reflecting a pseudocontingency between
behavioral statements and group membership, Group A received higher evaluative ratings
than Group B. Descriptively, this effect was weaker within Town Y than within Town X.
Concerning the experimental manipulation of base rate information, the prior probability
of 73.7% for the subset of ANOVA models including experimental condition as an effect
(i.e., 14 out of 19 models) decreased to a posterior probability of 12.7%, thus indicating
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no evidence for an effect of explicit base rate information during the instruction and
learning phase.2
Table 2
Rating Scores and Estimated Proportions of Undesirable Behaviors for each
Combination of Town of Residence and Group Membership
Town X Town Y
Group A Group B Group A Group B
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Rating score 5.77 1.29 4.95 1.19 4.27 1.04 3.77 1.29
Estimated frequency 0.36 0.17 0.47 0.22 0.53 0.21 0.60 0.19
Note. Rating scores were calculated for each participant by averaging
across all trait ratings after ratings on negative traits were re-coded.
Higher rating scores indicate more positive evaluations. Estimated
frequencies were computed by dividing the estimated number of negative
behaviors by the total number of behavioral statements per town-group
combination presented during the learning phase. They refer to the
estimated probability of negative behavior on a scale from 0 to 1 with
higher values indicating more negative evaluations.
The mean frequency estimates are also shown in Table 2. As for the rating scores,
the Bayes factors favored the model including main effects for town of residence and
group membership only, B(group+town),null = 2.48 · 1019 (the Bayes factor comparing this
model to the second-best model that additionally included their interaction was
B(group+town),(group+town+group:town) = 3.87; Bayes factors for all models are reported in Ta-
ble A2). The estimated frequencies of negative behavior for Town X were lower than for
2 The absence of an effect of the experimental manipulation in this experiment may be due to the fact
that the manipulation highlighted the varying skewed base rate of only one variable (i.e., group
membership), whereas other manipulations have focused on the skewed base rates of both proximal
variables of a pseudocontingency inference (Fleig et al., 2017; Meiser et al., 2018).
16 MPT PARAMETER VALIDATION WITH CONTINUOUS COVARIATES
Town Y, and negative behavior was also estimated to be less frequent for members of
Group A as compared to Group B. Again, descriptively, the effect of group membership
was stronger in Town X than in Town Y. Although the genuine item-source contingency
between behavioral statements and group membership favored Group B (see Table 1), the
estimated frequencies as well as the rating scores thus reflected an inferred pseudocontin-
gency in favor of Group A. Again, there was no evidence for any effect of experimental
condition: the prior probability of the subset of 14 ANOVA models including condition
as a factor declined from 73.7% to a posterior probability of 17.9%.
2.2.2 Source memory and source guessing. We used the MPT source-
memory model for crossed source dimensions (Meiser & Bröder, 2002) to separately esti-
mate source memory for the source dimension town of residence, source memory for the
source dimension group membership, and source guessing. The model specifies the prob-
abilities of source-memory decisions by means of eight parameters (see Figure 1). The
parameter D denotes the probability to recognize a target item as old and a distractor
item as new. An item is not recognized with the complementary probability 1 − D. If
item memory fails, a participant guesses that an item is old with probability b or that an
item is new with the complementary probability 1−b. The dtown parameter measures the
probability of remembering the town of residence as one source attribute of the item. If
the town of residence is not remembered, with the complementary probability 1− dtown,
participants have to guess. The parameter gtown describes the probability of guessing
Town X, whereas 1−gtown is the probability of guessing Town Y. If the town of residence
is remembered, group membership is remembered with the probability dgroup; if source
memory for town of residence fails, group membership is remembered with the probabil-
ity egroup. Thus, the model reflects the assumption that the probability of remembering
group membership may vary over items for which town of residence is retrieved versus
not retrieved. Differences between dgroup and egroup thereby reflect stochastic depen-
dency in multidimensional source memory. The source memory parameters in the MPT
model were specified in the order in which the source dimensions were prompted in the
memory test (i.e., town followed by group) and thus reflected the sequence of retrieval
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processes required for the responses. If source memory for group membership fails, with
either probability 1− dgroup or probability 1− egroup, a behavioral statement assigned to
Town X is attributed to Group A with probability ggroup|X or to Group B with probability
1−ggroup|X . Likewise, a behavioral statement assigned to Town Y is attributed to Group A
with probability ggroup|Y and to Group B with probability 1 − ggroup|Y . The specification of
guessing parameters for the group assignment conditional on town assignment reflected
the order of responses in the source-memory test and allowed for differential guessing
tendencies that mirror the actual contingency between groups and towns in the stimuli
(Meiser, 2003; Meiser & Hewstone, 2004). While the parameters D, dtown, dgroup, and
egroup measure genuine memory performance, the source-guessing parameters are assumed
to reflect evaluative judgments on the basis of inferred (pseudo-)contingencies between
behavioral statements and town of residence or group membership.
As we expected the inference of a pseudocontingency between group membership
and type of behavior, the assignment of positive behavioral statements to sources might
differ from the assignment of negative statements when guessing is not random but in-
formed. If the pseudocontingency is inferred and reflected in the MPT model’s guessing
parameters, the probabilities ggroup|X and g
group
|Y of choosing Group A will be higher for
positive statements than for negative statements. Moreover, the probability gtown of
guessing Town X may be influenced by the actual contingency between town of residence
and desirability, such that positive behaviors are more likely to be assigned to Town X
than negative behaviors. Therefore, we estimated separate sets of parameters for pos-
itive target and distractor behaviors and for negative target and distractor behaviors,
respectively.
Using the hierarchical latent-trait approach (Klauer, 2010), all MPT parameters
were modeled using random effects to account for differences between individuals. Bayesian
estimation of hierarchical MPT models was conducted with the TreeBUGS package us-
ing default priors (Heck, Arnold, & Arnold, 2018). For the slope parameters, we z-
standardized the predictors and assumed a normal distribution N (µ = 0, σ = √2/2) as
a prior distribution of each slope parameter on the latent probit scale. Figure 2 displays
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Figure 1 . Multinomial processing-tree model of source monitoring for 2 × 2 crossed
sources: town of residence i ∈ X, Y and group membership j ∈ A,B. Distractor items
are referred to as New. D = probability to recognize a target item; dtown = probability
to remember Town i; dgroup = probability to remember Group j given Town i was
recollected; egroup = probability to remember Group j given Town i was not
remembered; b = probability to guess that an item is old; gtown = probability to guess
Town X; ggroup|X = probability of guessing Group A given assignment of item to Town X;
ggroup|Y = probability of guessing Group A given assignment to Town Y.
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Figure 2 . Median (solid black line) and prediction intervals (areas shaded in gray) of
the prior predictive distribution for a probit regression of an MPT parameter on a
covariate as implied by the prior distribution on the slope parameter, β ∼ N (µ = 0,
σ =
√
2/2). The left and right panels show the prior predictive distribution when
testing a directional hypothesis (H1: slope parameter β > 0 or β < 0, respectively). The
middle panel shows the prior predictive distribution when testing a non-directional
hypothesis (H1: β Ó= 0).
the prior predictive distribution that is implied when regressing an MPT parameter on a
covariate.3
We ensured convergence of all models by visual inspection of the trace plots. Pa-
rameter convergence was evaluated by means of Gelman-Rubin statistics of Rˆ ≤ 1.1.4
The model goodness of fit was assessed graphically as well as by posterior predictive
p-values. We tested the model fit to the means and covariance matrix of the observed
category frequencies across participants by using the T1 and T2 test statistics (Klauer,
3 We additionally ran the analyses using a normal distribution N (µ = 0, σ = 1) as prior on the slope
parameters. As this prior is less informative, the Bayes factors generally indicated more evidence in favor
of the null hypothesis (i.e., for the absence of an effect of a covariate on an MPT parameter). Beyond
these differences, the results lead to substantive conclusions identical to those reported in the main text
below. Detailed results using the less informative prior can be found on OSF (https://osf.io/a6fcz/).
4 Except for a few ρ parameters (correlations between MPT model parameters), all parameters actually
met the standard criterion of Rˆ ≤ 1.05.
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2010), respectively. T1 quantifies the discrepancy between the observed and the expected
means of response frequencies, whereas T2 relates to the discrepancy between the ob-
served and the expected covariance matrix of individual response frequencies. Both are
conceptually similar to Pearson’s X2. If the corresponding posterior-predictive p-values
pT1 and pT2 are close to zero, this indicates model misfit.5
First of all, we fitted two separate hierarchical MPT models for the two experimental
conditions without versus with explicit information about the base rates of Group A
and Group B in either town. Model fit was adequate as indicated by pT1 = 0.245 and
pT2 = 0.264 as well as pT1 = 0.090 and pT2 = 0.201, for the condition without and with
explicit base rate information, respectively. Second, as there was little support for an
effect of experimental condition in the previous analyses, we fitted one single hierarchical
MPT model to the whole data set, thus assuming that the means and covariances of all
parameters were not affected by this manipulation. The joint model showed less adequate
fit to the average observed frequencies than the two separate models, pT1 = .021, but still
accounted for variances and covariances satisfactorily, pT2 = .311. In a final step, we
restricted the parameters representing source memory for group membership, dgroup and
egroup, to be equal. Thereby, the assumption that memory for group membership may
be stochastically dependent on memory for town of residence is removed to yield a more
parsimonious model. Again, the T1 and T2 test statistics revealed a less adequate fit of
the restricted model to means, pT1 = .025, than to variances and covariances, pT2 = .322.
In light of these results, all validation analyses reported below were conducted using
the restricted, more parsimonious model while controlling for effects of the experimental
condition on theoretically relevant MPT model parameters. More precisely, we accounted
for mean differences in the parameters by adding the discrete predictor experimental
5 The aim of using posterior-predictive p-values was to reduce the number of free parameters and MPT
models in order to use a model as parsimonious as possible for the analyses of main interest. However,
if model selection among MPT models was of central theoretical interest, it would be preferable to
compute Bayes factors, for instance, using bridge sampling for nested hierarchical MPT models (Gronau,
Wagenmakers, Heck, & Matzke, 2019). Below, we report Bayes Factors for testing our key theoretical
questions regarding the selective influence of continuous covariates on MPT parameters.
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condition in the latent probit regressions for all guessing parameters (i.e., gtown, ggroup|X ,
ggroup|Y ). This allowed us to account for the reduced model fit to the observed mean
frequencies as indicated by the posterior-predictive checks above, while fitting a single
model to the full data set instead of separate models per condition. As we included
experimental condition only as control factor, we do not report the corresponding Bayes
factors.
Table 3 displays the estimated parameters of the restricted hierarchical MPT model
for crossed source dimensions. To compare parameter estimates for positive versus neg-
ative behavioral statements, we computed the corresponding differences in item-memory
and source-memory parameters at the group level. Looking at the posterior means,
memory for negative behavioral statements was, if at all, slightly higher than memory
for positive behavioral statements: ∆D = −0.08 (with a 95% Bayesian credibility inter-
val of [−0.11,−0.05]), ∆dtown = −0.08 [−0.18, 0.01], and ∆dgroup = −0.04 [−0.10, 0.02].
Moreover, Table 3 shows that the parameters of source memory for group membership
were low thus replicating previous findings (Meiser & Hewstone, 2004, 2006).
The parameters of greater interest to research on pseudocontingency inference are
the guessing parameters gtown, ggroup|X , and g
group
|Y as they are assumed to reflect informed
guessing. If participants guessed the source of a statement at chance, guessing parameters
should be at 50%. However, if the parameters are to mirror inferred non-zero item-
source contingencies, they should at least differ depending on the statements’ desirability.
Thus, consistent with the genuine item-source contingency between behavioral statements
and town of residence in the stimulus distribution, we tested whether the probability
gtown of guessing Town X was higher for positive behavioral statements than for negative
behavioral statements. Additionally, in line with a pseudocontingency between behavioral
statements and group membership within each town of residence, we tested whether the
probabilities ggroup|X and g
group
|Y of guessing Group A were higher for positive statements in
comparison to negative statements. If participants instead based their source guessing
on the true contingency between group membership and type of behavior within each
town, they should estimate positive behaviors to be less likely for Group A than negative
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behaviors (i.e., ggroup|X and g
group
|Y should be higher for negative statements). We computed
the differences between the estimated guessing parameters for positive items and negative
items at the group level. The probability of guessing Town X was higher for positive items
than for negative items, ∆gtown = 0.27 [0.20, 0.34]. Likewise, the probability of guessing
Group A was higher for positive statements as compared to negative statements which
were assigned to Town X, ∆ggroup|X = 0.13 [0.03, 0.23], and for those that were assigned to
Town Y, ∆ggroup|Y = 0.12 [0.03, 0.21].
Taken together, the direct rating scores and frequency estimates reflected a pseu-
docontingency effect on source evaluations: whereas judgments of towns corresponded to
the genuine contingency between town of residence and behavior, the biased judgments of
groups within towns indicated a reliance on the base rates of behavioral statements and
group membership within each town. Evaluative judgments were in favor of Town X and
in favor of Group A as compared to Town Y and Group B, respectively. Similarly, the
(conditional) source-guessing parameters of the hierarchical MPT model differed depend-
ing on the desirability of the behavioral statements: replicating previous MPT analyses
of aggregate data (Meiser & Hewstone, 2004, 2006), positive behavioral statements were
more likely attributed to Town X and Group A. The estimated guessing probabilities
paralleled differences in the rating scores and frequency estimates. Therefore, the results
corroborate the interpretation of the guessing parameters as reconstructive processes mir-
roring inferred evaluative contingencies.
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Table 3
MPT Model Parameter Estimates (Posterior Means) and 95% Bayesian Credibility
Intervals (BCI)
Group-Level Median Standard Deviation
(probability scale) (probit-scale)
Posterior Mean 95% BCI Posterior Mean 95% BCI
Dn 0.58 [0.55, 0.61] 0.38 [0.30, 0.46]
Dp 0.50 [0.46, 0.53] 0.38 [0.31, 0.47]
bn 0.25 [0.21, 0.29] 0.56 [0.45, 0.69]
bp 0.22 [0.18, 0.26] 0.67 [0.54, 0.80]
dntown 0.50 [0.43, 0.57] 0.43 [0.17, 0.73]
dptown 0.42 [0.35, 0.49] 0.28 [0.03, 0.56]
dngroup 0.05 [0.00, 0.11] 0.57 [0.03, 1.40]
dpgroup 0.01 [0.00, 0.05] 1.03 [0.10, 1.90]
gntown 0.36 [0.32, 0.41] 0.47 [0.35, 0.60]
gptown 0.63 [0.59, 0.68] 0.46 [0.34, 0.58]
gngroup|X 0.52 [0.44, 0.59] 0.84 [0.66; 1.05]
gpgroup|X 0.65 [0.60, 0.70] 0.61 [0.48; 0.75]
gngroup|Y 0.40 [0.36, 0.45] 0.55 [0.44; 0.67]
gpgroup|Y 0.53 [0.46, 0.59] 0.66 [0.50; 0.85]
Note. D = probability of item recognition; b = probability of guessing that
an item is old; dtown = probability of remembering town of residence;
dgroup = probability of remembering group membership, whether source
memory for town failed or not (dgroup = egroup); gtown = probability of
guessing Town X; ggroup|X = probability of guessing Group A given that the
item was assigned to Town X; ggroup|Y = probability of guessing Group A
given that the item was assigned to Town Y. n and p denote parameter
estimates for negative items and positive items, respectively.
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3 Parameter Validation Using Continuous Variables
The framework of hierarchical MPT models allows to test this psychological inter-
pretation. Construct validity of MPT model parameters can be tested via functional
dissociations in terms of selective relations of specific model parameters with other mea-
sures of psychological constructs. So far, the MPT model for crossed source dimensions
used here has been validated by fitting it to aggregate data and showing selective influ-
ences on specific model parameters. For instance, Meiser and Bröder (2002) reported
selective effects of varying item location and item font size on the source-memory param-
eters d for location and font size, respectively. Meiser and Hewstone (2006), using similar
stimuli as in the present experiment, demonstrated that differences between Town X and
Town Y with regard to the relative frequency of desirable behaviors in the stimulus distri-
bution were reflected in the guessing probability gtown. Furthermore, a quasi-experimental
comparison between participants who inferred the true contingency between group mem-
bership and behavior versus those who inferred the pseudocontingency indicated that the
guessing parameters ggroup, too, echoed evaluations (Meiser & Hewstone, 2004).
To further establish the parameters’ validity, we applied the new approach of pa-
rameter validation using hierarchical MPT models. We first analyzed the relations of
interindividual differences in source-guessing parameters with interindividual differences
in direct measures of source evaluations. For this purpose, we computed differences in
individual source evaluations. Differences in rating scores between Town X and Town Y
were computed by first averaging individual rating scores across Group A and Group B
per town, before subtracting rating scores for Town Y from rating scores for Town X
(i.e., reflecting a main effect of town). Differences in rating scores between Group A and
Group B were computed separately for Town X and for Town Y (i.e., reflecting simple
effects of group for either town) according to the conditional specification of guessing pa-
rameters for group membership in the MPT model. The same three evaluative differences
were calculated for the estimated proportions of negative behaviors, resulting in a total of
six covariates. We fitted separate latent-trait MPT models for each covariate which was
included as predictor of the memory parameters and guessing parameters. As higher rat-
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ing scores indicate more positive evaluations and source-guessing parameters are assumed
to reflect source evaluations, we expected interindividual differences in rating scores to
have a positive effect on source-guessing probabilities for positive behavioral statements
and a negative effect for source guessing of negative statements. The opposite was ex-
pected for interindividual differences in frequency estimates, since they reflect estimated
proportions of negative behaviors. Put differently, differences in evaluations of Town X
and Town Y should be selectively related to the guessing probabilities gntown and gptown.
Evaluative differences between Group A and Group B in Town X should specifically
predict the guessing parameters gngroup|X and gp
group
|X , while differences between groups in
Town Y should specifically predict the probabilities gngroup|Y and gp
group
|Y . We expected no
effects on item memory parameters, source-memory parameters, and the probability of
guessing “old”. Moreover, we included experimental condition (i.e., whether participants
were informed about base rates or not) as additional predictor for the source-guessing
parameters to control for any effects of the experimental manipulation. As discussed
above, this allowed us to estimate a joint model for both conditions while controlling for
effects of experimental condition on the theoretically relevant guessing parameters (see
Section 2.2.2). Posterior estimates of the guessing parameters per experimental condition
and per estimated MPT model are reported in Table 4.
Furthermore, the framework of hierarchical MPT models, in general, allows to also
test parameters’ construct validities in a wider context of continuous measures of psy-
chological constructs. Convergent validity is supported if interindividual differences in
specific MPT parameters match interindividual differences in related psychological con-
structs, while discriminant validity is indicated by the specificity of such associations.
Therefore, in a final step, we aimed at further establishing construct validity of the MPT
model parameters in the context of pseudocontingency research. In exploratory analyses,
we analyzed whether interindividual differences in MPT parameters are accounted for by
cognitive performance measures which may reflect cognitive processes that are potentially
relevant for source monitoring: memory performance, fluid intelligence, and quantitative
thinking. Again, we fitted separate latent-trait MPT models for each of the eight co-
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Table 4
Posterior Estimates of Source Guessing Parameters per Experimental Condition (1 and
2) and Estimated MPT Model.
gntown gptown gngroup|X gp
group
|X gn
group
|Y gp
group
|Y
MPT model with predictor: 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
RatingXY 0.36 0.36 0.65 0.61 0.44 0.60 0.68 0.62 0.41 0.39 0.56 0.49
FrequencyXY 0.36 0.36 0.65 0.62 0.44 0.61 0.68 0.61 0.41 0.39 0.55 0.50
RatingAB|X 0.36 0.37 0.65 0.61 0.45 0.59 0.67 0.63 0.41 0.39 0.56 0.49
FrequencyAB|X 0.36 0.37 0.66 0.61 0.45 0.59 0.67 0.63 0.41 0.40 0.56 0.49
RatingAB|Y 0.35 0.37 0.66 0.61 0.44 0.60 0.68 0.62 0.41 0.40 0.56 0.48
FrequencyAB|Y 0.36 0.37 0.66 0.61 0.44 0.60 0.68 0.62 0.41 0.39 0.56 0.49
Long-term memory 0.35 0.37 0.68 0.59 0.45 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.44 0.37 0.58 0.47
Verbal short-term memory 0.35 0.38 0.68 0.58 0.46 0.58 0.65 0.66 0.44 0.37 0.58 0.47
Fluid intelligence 0.35 0.37 0.68 0.59 0.45 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.44 0.3 0.58 0.47
Figural inductive reasoning 0.35 0.37 0.67 0.59 0.45 0.59 0.64 0.66 0.44 0.37 0.58 0.47
Verbal deductive reasoning 0.35 0.37 0.67 0.59 0.45 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.44 0.37 0.58 0.47
Quantitative reasoning 0.35 0.37 0.68 0.59 0.45 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.44 0.37 0.58 0.47
Computational estimation 0.35 0.37 0.68 0.59 0.45 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.44 0.37 0.58 0.47
Arithmetical competence 0.35 0.37 0.69 0.58 0.45 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.44 0.37 0.58 0.47
Note. XY denotes differences between Town X and Town Y, while AB|X denotes differences
between Group A and Group B in Town X and AB|Y denotes differences between Group A
and Group B in Town Y. Participants in experimental condition 1 received no information about
the groups’ base rates per town, while participants in experimental condition 2 did receive
base rate information.
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variates (four factors and four of their subscales) and included the factor experimental
condition as additional predictor of source-guessing parameters to control for potential
effects.
Besides estimating the regression slopes, for all models, we computed Bayes factors
quantifying the relative support for positive slope parameters, negative slope parameters,
or slope parameters unequal to zero against the hypothesis of slope parameters equal to
zero. The resulting Bayes factors are indicated by B>,0, B<,0, and BÓ=,0, respectively, and
were computed using the Savage-Dickey ratio (Heck, 2019; Wagenmakers, Lodewyckx,
Kuriyal, & Grasman, 2010).
3.1 Results
3.1.1 Direct Measures of Source Evaluation as Covariates. Tables 5
and 6 summarize the validation results using the direct measures of source evaluation
(i.e., trait ratings and frequency estimates) as predictors. Figures 3 to 5 display the rela-
tionships of trait ratings and frequency estimates with respective model parameters. In
line with our prediction, we found strong evidence for the relation of differences in rating
scores between towns with the guessing probabilities gntown and gptown, B<,0 = 6.60 · 104
and B>,0 = 109.84, respectively. Contrarily, the rating score differences between towns
did not predict either of the other parameters as indicated by Bayes factors between
B0, Ó= = 2.28 and B0, Ó= = 15.16, with a median ofMdB0,Ó= = 6.89. Likewise, interindividual
differences in gntown and gptown were related to interindividual differences in frequency
estimates of negative behaviors given towns, B>,0 = 26.32 and B<,0 = 4.38 · 103, respec-
tively. No other parameters were affected, 1.95 ≤ B0, Ó= ≤ 15.91, MdB0, Ó= = 5.98.
Moreover, there was strong support for rating score differences between Group A
and Group B in Town X to specifically predict the guessing parameters gngroup|X , B<,0 =
3.71, and gpgroup|X , B>,0 = 90.18. All other parameters were not affected, 1.64 ≤ B0, Ó= ≤
16.23, MdB0,Ó= = 7.35. Likewise, the difference in frequency estimates of negative be-
haviors between Group A and Group B in Town X only affected gngroup|X and gp
group
|X ,
B>,0 = 54.23 and B<,0 = 2.24 · 105, respectively. Equivalent results were found for
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differences between Group A and Group B in Town Y: the rating score difference be-
tween Group A and Group B in Town Y selectively predicted gngroup|Y , B<,0 = 5.11 · 103,
and gpgroup|Y , B>,0 = 68.34, but no other model parameters, 1.87 ≤ B0, Ó= ≤ 16.31,
MdB0,Ó= = 8.44. Finally, the difference in estimated frequencies between Group A and
Group B in Town Y predicted the probability to guess Group A in Town Y for negative
behaviors (gntown|Y ), B>,0 = 29.00, as well as for positive behaviors (gptown|Y ) , B<,0 = 12.54.
All other parameters were again not affected, 2.40 ≤ B0, Ó= ≤ 11.66, MdB0,Ó= = 6.02.
Figure 3 . Regression of MPT model parameters gntown and gptown on direct measures of
source evaluations: The upper panels show the covariations with trait rating differences
between Town X and Town Y, while the lower panels show the covariations with the
difference between towns in estimated frequencies of negative behavior. The solid lines
depict the posterior median of the prediction function including the respective direct
measure as predictor of gntown or gptown. Corresponding 95% Bayesian credibility
intervals are shown in gray. Individual-level predictions are depicted by the gray points.
Vertical dashed lines show the group mean of the respective covariate.
MPT PARAMETER VALIDATION WITH CONTINUOUS COVARIATES 31
Overall, the results show selective covariations of interindividual differences in (con-
ditional) source-guessing parameters with interindividual differences in continuous mea-
sures of evaluations of either towns or groups. All remaining MPT model parameters,
including other source-guessing parameters, were not affected, thus indicating not only
convergent validity, but also discriminant validity. This suggests that the source-guessing
parameters can indeed be interpreted as indicators of inferred evaluative contingencies.
Figure 4 . Regression of MPT model parameters gngroup|X and gp
group
|X on direct measures
of source evaluations: The upper panels show the covariations with trait rating
differences between Group A and Group B in Town X, while the lower panels show the
covariations with differences in estimated frequencies of negative behavior between
Group A and Group B in Town X. The solid lines depict the posterior median of the
prediction function including the respective direct measure as predictor of gngroup|X or
gpgroup|X . Corresponding 95% Bayesian credibility intervals are shown in gray.
Individual-level predictions are depicted by the gray points. Vertical dashed lines show
the group mean of the respective covariate.
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Figure 5 . Regression of MPT model parameters gngroup|Y and gp
group
|Y on direct measures
of source evaluations: The upper panels show the covariations with trait rating
differences between Group A and Group B in Town Y, while the lower panels show the
covariations with differences in estimated frequencies of negative behavior between
Group A and Group B in Town Y. The solid lines depict the posterior median of the
prediction function including the respective direct measure as predictor of gngroup|Y , or
gpgroup|Y . Corresponding 95% Bayesian credibility intervals are shown in gray.
Individual-level predictions are depicted by the gray points. Vertical dashed lines show
the group mean of the respective covariate.
3.1.2 Cognitive Performance Measures as Covariates. Tables 7 and 8
summarize the results of testing interindividual differences in the cognitive performance
measures as predictors of differences in MPT model parameters. First, analyzing memory
performance, there was only support for an effect of long-term memory on item memory
for positive behavioral statements (parameter Dp), BÓ=,0 = 5.33, and for an effect of
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verbal short-term memory on the probability to remember the source dimension town of
residence for negative items (parameter dngroup), BÓ=,0 = 22.52. All other BÓ=,0 ≤ 1.11 and
BÓ=,0 ≤ 1.04 for long-term memory and verbal short-term memory, respectively, indicating
no support for an influence on any other memory parameter or guessing parameter.
Second, we fitted hierarchical MPT models with figural inductive reasoning scores and
verbal deductive reasoning scores as well as a total score of fluid intelligence as predictors
of model parameters. In our analyses, we found no evidence for an effect of figural
inductive reasoning, BÓ=,0 ≤ 0.52, verbal deductive reasoning, BÓ=,0 ≤ 1.26, or the total
score of fluid intelligence, BÓ=,0 ≤ 0.78. Finally, we also found no support that quantitative
thinking or its subscales predict any MPT model parameter, BÓ=,0 ≤ 0.58.
4 Discussion
Traditionally, parameters of a multinomial processing tree (MPT) model are ex-
perimentally validated by means of discrete experimental manipulations: the selective
influence of certain experimental conditions on a specific model parameter is tested by
setting this parameter equal across experimental conditions. Parameter validity is then
analyzed by subsequently comparing the resulting model to a model with separate pa-
rameters for each condition (e.g., Bayen et al., 1996). Alternatively or additionally,
correlational analyses can be conducted based on parameter estimates that are obtained
separately for each individual in a first step: selective covariations can then be assessed
between the parameter estimates and measures of the assumed psychological process or
other theoretically relevant constructs or behavior (e.g., Meissner & Rothermund, 2013).
This two-step procedure requires, however, that model parameters are estimated at the
level of individual participants with sufficient reliability which is often not feasible due to
the small number of observations per participant. The rationale of selective covariations
can also be applied in the recently developed framework of hierarchical MPT models
that accommodate parameter heterogeneity across participants by assuming random ef-
fects for individuals. Arnold et al. (2013), for instance, estimated a source-monitoring
model using a hierarchical beta-MPT approach (Smith & Batchelder, 2010) to account
34 MPT PARAMETER VALIDATION WITH CONTINUOUS COVARIATES
Table
7
Estim
ated
Slope
Param
eters,95%
Bayes
Credibility
Intervals,and
Bayes
Factors
for
Cognitive
Perform
ance
M
easures
as
Predictors
of
Source
G
uessing
Param
eters
g
n
to
w
n
g
p
to
w
n
g
n
g
r
o
u
p
|X
g
p
g
r
o
u
p
|X
g
n
g
r
o
u
p
|Y
g
p
g
r
o
u
p
|Y
Long-term
m
em
ory
0.01
[-0.11,0.12]
-0.02
[-0.12,0.09]
0.10
[-0.08,0.28]
-0.01
[-0.13,0.11]
0.05
[-0.06,0.17]
-0.07
[-0.23,0.09]
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.08
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.08
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.23
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.09
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.13
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.17
Verbalshort-term
m
em
ory
-0.02
[-0.15,0.10]
0.04
[-0.06,0.15]
0.16
[-0.03,0.34]
-0.04
[-0.17,0.09]
-0.03
[-0.15,0.08]
0.01
[-0.15,0.17]
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.10
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.11
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.54
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.11
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.10
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.11
Fluid
intelligence
-0.07
[-0.19,0.04]
0.02
[-0.09,0.14]
-0.01
[-0.20,0.17]
-0.03
[-0.16,0.11]
-0.01
[-0.13,0.10]
0.07
[-0.09,0.22]
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.18
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.09
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.14
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.10
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.09
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.16
Figuralinductive
reasoning
-0.01
[-0.13,0.11]
-0.01
[-0.12,0.11]
0.00
[-0.18,0.19]
-0.06
[-0.20,0.07]
0.03
[-0.09,0.15]
0.02
[-0.14,0.17]
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.09
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.08
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.13
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.15
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.09
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.11
Verbaldeductive
reasoning
-0.10
[-0.22,0.01]
0.04
[-0.07,0.15]
0.01
[-0.18,0.20]
0.02
[-0.11,0.15]
-0.04
[-0.16,0.08]
0.08
[-0.09,0.24]
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.37
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.10
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.14
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.10
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.11
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.18
Q
uantitative
reasoning
0.00
[-0.12,0.11]
0.07
[-0.04,0.18]
0.02
[-0.16,0.20]
-0.01
[-0.14,0.12]
-0.03
[-0.15,0.09]
-0.08
[-0.24,0.07]
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.08
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.17
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.13
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.10
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.10
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.19
C
om
putationalestim
ation
0.00
[-0.11,0.12]
0.03
[-0.08,0.14]
0.07
[-0.10,0.25]
0.00
[-0.14,0.13]
-0.04
[-0.16,0.07]
-0.11
[-0.27,0.04]
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.08
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.10
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.18
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.10
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.11
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.31
A
rthim
eticalcom
petence
-0.02
[-0.14,0.09]
0.10
[0.00,0.21]
0.00
[-0.18,0.18]
-0.03
[-0.16,0.10]
-0.01
[-0.13,0.10]
-0.04
[-0.20,0.12]
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.09
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.47
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.13
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.10
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.09
B
Ó=
,0 =
0.13
N
ote.
Bayesian
credibility
intervals
are
reported
in
brackets.
R
eported
Bayes
factors
quantify
the
relative
support
for
slope
param
eters
unequalto
zero
against
slope
param
eters
equalto
zero.
MPT PARAMETER VALIDATION WITH CONTINUOUS COVARIATES 35
Ta
bl
e
8
Es
tim
at
ed
Sl
op
e
Pa
ra
m
et
er
s,
95
%
Ba
ye
s
Cr
ed
ib
ili
ty
In
te
rv
al
s,
an
d
Ba
ye
s
Fa
ct
or
s
fo
r
Co
gn
iti
ve
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
M
ea
su
re
s
as
Pr
ed
ic
to
rs
of
M
em
or
y
Pa
ra
m
et
er
s
an
d
Ite
m
G
ue
ss
in
g
D
n
D
p
d
n
to
w
n
d
pt
o
w
n
d
n
g
r
o
u
p
d
pg
r
o
u
p
bn
bp
Lo
ng
-t
er
m
m
em
or
y
0.
10
[0
.0
2,
0.
19
]
0.
13
[0
.0
5,
0.
21
]
-0
.1
3
[-0
.3
1,
0.
03
]
0.
01
[-0
.1
6,
0.
18
]
0.
24
[-0
.1
4,
0.
67
]
0.
17
[-0
.3
5,
0.
70
]
-0
.0
2
[-0
.1
4,
0.
11
]
0.
02
[-0
.1
2,
0.
16
]
B
Ó=,
0
=
1.
11
B
Ó=
,0
=
5.
33
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
41
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
12
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
57
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
46
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
09
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
10
Ve
rb
al
sh
or
t-
te
rm
m
em
or
y
0.
07
[-0
.0
2,
0.
15
]
0.
07
[-0
.0
1,
0.
16
]
0.
25
[0
.1
0,
0.
41
]
0.
11
[-0
.0
5,
0.
27
]
0.
39
[-0
.2
3,
0.
92
]
0.
26
[-0
.3
7,
0.
84
]
0.
02
[-0
.1
0,
0.
14
]
0.
00
[-0
.1
4,
0.
13
]
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
20
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
28
B
Ó=
,0
=
22
.5
2
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
30
B
Ó=,
0
=
1.
04
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
62
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
09
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
10
Fl
ui
d
in
te
lli
ge
nc
e
0.
05
[-0
.0
3,
0.
14
]
0.
05
[-0
.0
3,
0.
14
]
0.
04
[-0
.1
3,
0.
21
]
0.
10
[-0
.0
6,
0.
27
]
0.
30
[-0
.1
4,
0.
78
]
0.
02
[-0
.5
3,
0.
56
]
0.
01
[-0
.1
1,
0.
13
]
-0
.0
1
[-0
.1
5,
0.
12
]
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
13
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
12
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
14
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
25
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
78
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
39
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
09
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
10
Fi
gu
ra
li
nd
uc
tiv
e
re
as
on
in
g
-0
.0
1
[-0
.0
9,
0.
07
]
0.
05
[-0
.0
4,
0.
13
]
0.
15
[-0
.0
2,
0.
33
]
-0
.0
1
[-0
.1
8,
0.
16
]
0.
21
[-0
.2
4,
0.
63
]
-0
.0
9
[-0
.6
4,
0.
43
]
0.
01
[-0
.1
1,
0.
13
]
-0
.0
1
[-0
.1
4,
0.
13
]
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
06
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
11
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
52
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
12
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
49
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
40
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
09
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
10
Ve
rb
al
de
du
ct
iv
e
re
as
on
in
g
0.
09
[0
.0
1,
0.
18
]
0.
03
[-0
.0
6,
0.
11
]
-0
.0
5
[-0
.2
2,
0.
12
]
0.
18
[0
.0
2,
0.
35
]
0.
22
[-0
.1
8,
0.
61
]
0.
14
[-0
.3
6,
0.
62
]
0.
01
[-0
.1
1,
0.
13
]
-0
.0
2
[-0
.1
6,
0.
11
]
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
64
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
08
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
14
B
Ó=,
0
=
1.
26
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
51
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
41
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
09
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
10
Q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e
re
as
on
in
g
-0
.0
1
[-0
.0
9,
0.
07
]
0.
00
[-0
.0
9,
0.
08
]
0.
05
[-0
.1
0,
0.
21
]
-0
.0
4
[-0
.2
0,
0.
12
]
0.
06
[-0
.3
6,
0.
53
]
-0
.2
4
[-0
.7
9,
0.
29
]
0.
01
[-0
.1
2,
0.
13
]
-0
.0
2
[-0
.1
6,
0.
11
]
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
06
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
06
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
14
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
13
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
32
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
58
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
09
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
10
C
om
pu
ta
tio
na
le
st
im
at
io
n
-0
.0
1
[-0
.0
9,
0.
08
]
0.
01
[-0
.0
7,
0.
10
]
0.
05
[-0
.1
1,
0.
21
]
0.
04
[-0
.1
3,
0.
20
]
0.
03
[-0
.4
4,
0.
48
]
-0
.2
1
[-0
.7
9,
0.
32
]
0.
02
[-0
.1
1,
0.
14
]
0.
00
[-0
.1
4,
0.
13
]
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
06
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
06
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
14
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
13
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
33
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
53
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
09
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
10
A
rt
hi
m
et
ic
al
co
m
pe
te
nc
e
0.
01
[-0
.0
8,
0.
09
]
0.
00
[-0
.0
9,
0.
09
]
0.
03
[-0
.1
3,
0.
20
]
-0
.1
4
[-0
.3
1,
0.
02
]
0.
09
[-0
.3
9,
0.
58
]
-0
.2
2
[-0
.7
6,
0.
30
]
0.
00
[-0
.1
3,
0.
12
]
-0
.0
6
[-0
.2
0,
0.
08
]
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
06
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
06
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
13
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
48
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
36
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
53
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
09
B
Ó=,
0
=
0.
14
N
ot
e.
Ba
ye
sia
n
cr
ed
ib
ili
ty
in
te
rv
al
s
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.
R
ep
or
te
d
Ba
ye
s
fa
ct
or
s
qu
an
tif
y
th
e
re
la
tiv
e
su
pp
or
t
fo
r
slo
pe
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
un
eq
ua
lt
o
ze
ro
ag
ai
ns
t
slo
pe
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
eq
ua
lt
o
ze
ro
.
36 MPT PARAMETER VALIDATION WITH CONTINUOUS COVARIATES
for interindividual differences in model parameters. In a second step, they investigated
the correlation of estimated model parameters with manifest measures of perceived item-
source contingencies.
Meanwhile, hierarchical MPT models (Klauer, 2010) enable researchers to estimate
covariations between model parameters and extraneous measures simultaneously with the
MPT model parameters in a one-step procedure (for illustrations, see Klein et al., 2017
and Michalkiewicz et al., 2018). Thereby, using hierarchical MPT models even allows the
assessment of convergent and discriminant parameter validity by testing specific continu-
ous variables as selective predictors of interindividual differences in specific MPT model
parameters.6 By integrating cognitive modeling through MPT models and psychometric
assessment of interindividual differences, the novel approach to parameter validation pro-
vides an instantiation of the perspective of “cognitive psychometrics” that was envisaged
by William Batchelder (1998). In the present article, we applied this new procedure of
parameter validation to data collected in an experiment on biased stereotype formation
based on pseudocontingency inferences.
In the experiment, positive behavioral statements and negative behavioral state-
ments were presented in combination with information on two source dimensions, group
membership (Group A vs. Group B) and town of residence (Town X vs. Town Y).
Base rates of behavioral statements and group membership were skewed and co-varied
across the source dimension town of residence, which should give rise to the inference of a
pseudocontingency between behavioral statements and group membership. Source eval-
uations were assessed by trait ratings, frequency estimates, and behavior assignments.
Replicating earlier results (Meiser & Hewstone, 2004, 2006), participants’ trait ratings
and frequency estimates for Town X and Town Y mirrored the genuine item-source con-
tingency as indicated by more positive evaluations of Town X. Furthermore, indicating
6 With this approach, differences in model parameters between individuals are explained by the contin-
uous variable and additional between-subjects variance. Alternatively, one could drop the random effect
and assume that all of the variance in individual MPT parameters is explained by the covariates (Coolin,
Erdfelder, Bernstein, Thornton, & Thornton, 2015). Yet, in our case, it seemed theoretically implausible
that the covariates perfectly explained interindividual differences in MPT model parameters.
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a pseudocontingency, Group A was evaluated more positively than Group B within both
towns of residence. The data on behavior assignments were analyzed with a multidi-
mensional source-monitoring MPT model (Meiser & Bröder, 2002) using the latent-trait
hierarchical MPT approach (Klauer, 2010) implemented in the R-package TreeBUGS
(Heck, Arnold, & Arnold, 2018). The analyses revealed better item memory for nega-
tive items than for positive items. Moreover, not only the probability to guess Town X
versus Town Y was higher for positive items as compared with negative items, but also
the probability to guess Group A versus Group B, even though the genuine contingency
between items and the source dimension group membership was opposite in sign.
Contrary to traditional research on source monitoring, the present research mainly
focused on guessing processes as opposed to memory processes: the guessing parame-
ters are assumed to reflect evaluative biases originating in inferred item-source (pseudo-)
contingencies. Thus, besides the validity of the memory parameters, the substantive in-
terpretation of source-guessing parameters is essential. Assessing construct validity, we
tested the selective relationship between direct measures of source evaluations (i.e., rat-
ing scores and frequency estimates) and corresponding guessing parameters. To this end,
we included the participants’ evaluations as predictors of all hierarchical MPT model
parameters. Indicating convergent validity, differences in evaluations between Town X
and Town Y only accounted for differences in the probability of guessing Town X versus
Town Y. Likewise, differences in evaluations between Group A and Group B per town of
residence only predicted differences in the probability of guessing Group A versus Group B
given the respective town. Each of the remaining guessing and memory parameters was
not associated with the continuous covariates, thereby indicating discriminant validity.
In a further step, we analyzed whether interindividual differences in MPT model
parameters may be accounted for by interindividual differences in cognitive performance
measures. Apart from long-term memory predicting item memory for negative items and
short-term memory predicting source memory for town of residence of negative items,
there were no effects of cognitive measures on the MPT model parameters. The results
suggest that at least guessing processes based on pseudocontingency inferences are rather
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independent of general cognitive performance as assessed by the cognitive tests.
To conclude, following William Batchelder’s idea of “cognitive psychometrics”
(Batchelder, 1998, 2010; Riefer et al., 2002), hierarchical MPT models provide a new
approach to parameter validation through the combination of cognitive modeling in ex-
perimental psychology and the psychometric assessment of relevant constructs. Being
a powerful tool in itself, MPT models thereby offer additional means of measurement
validation and theory testing in a nomological network. Last but not least, assessing
parameter validity with continuous measures of interindividual differences in criterion
constructs may also be fruitful for gaining a better theoretical and empirical understand-
ing of the cognitive processes and psychological phenomena that are captured by MPT
parameters.
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Appendix
Bayes Factors of Bayesian ANOVA analyzing rating scores and frequency estimates
See Tables A1 and A2.
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Abstract
When learning about the joint occurrence of different variables, individuals often manifest
biases in the associations they infer. In some cases they infer an association when none is
present in the observed sample. Other times they infer an association that is contrary to
the one that is in fact observed. These illusory correlations are often interpreted as being
the byproduct of selective processing or as the outcome of an ‘illogical’ pseudocontingency
heuristic. More recently, a normative account of illusory correlations has been proposed,
according to which they result from an application of Laplace’s Rule of Succession. The
present work will discuss the empirical and theoretical limitations associated with this
normative account, and argue for its dismissal. As an alternative, we propose a normative
account that casts illusory correlations as the expected outcome of a Bayesian reasoner
relying on marginal frequencies. We show that this account succeeds in capturing the
qualitative patterns found in a corpus of published studies.
Keywords: probability, rationality, biases, illusory correlation, pseudocontingencies
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Normative Accounts of Illusory Correlations
Assessments of explanatory sufficiency play an essential role in theoretical debates.
At a minimum, any candidate theory or model needs to be able to accommodate an
established body of empirical results (i.e., “save the phenomena”, Bogen & Woodward,
1988). Such arguments are particularly impressive when they are associated with nor-
mative frameworks, as norms often have limited descriptive power. Take the case of
the Kolmogorov axioms of probability (e.g., DeGroot, 1975): people’s choices and judg-
ments often deviate from them, for instance, when the probability of the conjunction of
two events (e.g., “Linda is a feminist and a secretary”) is judged to be larger than the
probability of any single event (e.g., “Linda is a secretary”).
Erroneous inferences of this kind are commonly perceived to be “irrational” and have
long motivated the development of alternative theoretical accounts that do not conform
to probability theory (e.g., representativeness heuristic, Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; con-
figural weighting, Nilsson, Winman, Juslin, & Hansson, 2009) or modal logic (e.g., model
theory, Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, & Goodwin, 2015). In fact, the non-negligible failure
rates of normative accounts have been one argument of proposals to dismiss normative
accounts in favor of more descriptive research programs (see Elqayam & Evans, 2011).
Another reaction has been to call for the adoption of extended or alternative normative
frameworks (e.g., Buchak, 2013; Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012; Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2016;
Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Skovgaard-Olsen, Kellen, Hahn, & Klauer, 2019; Spohn, 2012).
Yet another group of researchers has argued that certain normative axioms can be upheld
when assuming that they are realized by systems that are subjected to different sources
of noise (Costello & Watts, 2014, 2016; Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999; Fiedler, 1996;
Hilbert, 2012).
In this paper, we will focus on one specific class of effects in probability judgments,
which we will broadly refer to as illusory correlations. These illusory correlations are
shown to occur when individuals attempt to infer the probabilities associated with differ-
ent variables based on the observation of skewed samples (e.g., Fiedler, 2000; Hamilton
& Gifford, 1976; Kareev, 1995; McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1994; Sherman et
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al., 2009). Consider the 2 × 2 contingency subtable reported at the top of Table 1.
This subtable consists of M joint realizations of two binary random variables X and
Y , each taking on values 0 and 1. These joint realizations are assumed to be samples
k = (k00, k01, k10, k11) taken from a multinomial distribution with the (unknown) prob-
ability vector p = (p00, p01, p10, p11). The association between the two variables can be
quantified by the Phi coefficient φ with −1 ≤ φ ≤ 1:
φ = k11k00 − k10k01√
k1•k0•k•0k•1
(1)
The value φ = 0 indicates that there is no association between X and Y in the sample,
whereas positive/negative φ values indicate a positive/negative relation betweenX and Y .
Another way of quantifying associations is through the ∆p rule (Cheng & Novick, 1990),
which compares the probability distribution of a binary random variable conditional on
the two possible values of another binary random variable. In the case of variables X
and Y in Table 1, we can define
∆p = P (Y = 0 | X = 0)− P (Y = 0 | X = 1). (2)
As in the case of φ, ∆p will be zero when there is no association, and positive/negative
when there is a positive/negative relationship.
Illusory Correlations
We will classify the illusory correlations discussed into two types, Type-1 and Type-
S. This distinction is a direct reference to the idea of Type-1 and Type-S inference errors
discussed in the statistical literature (Gelman & Carlin, 2014). Type-1 illusory cor-
relations (IC1) occur when individuals infer an association between variables when no
association whatsoever can be found in the observed sample, while Type-S illusory cor-
relations (ICS) correspond to cases in which individuals infer an association that has the
opposite sign of the one found in the observed sample.
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Table 1
General contingency table (with joint frequencies/probabilities kij/pij and marginal
frequencies ki• and k•j) and examples of tables used to elicit Type-1 and Type-S illusory
correlations
2× 2 Contingency Table
Y = 0 Y = 1
X = 0 k00 (p00) k01 (p01) k0•
X = 1 k10 (p10) k11 (p11) k1•
k•0 k•1
Type-1 Illusory Correlation (IC1)
Outcome
+ −
Group A 27 9 36B 9 3 12
36 12 (M = 48)
Type-S Illusory Correlation (ICS)
Outcome
+ −
Group A 16 8 24B 8 0 8
24 8 (M = 32)
Type-1 Illusory Correlations
First, consider subtable IC1 in Table 1, which lists the joint and marginal frequen-
cies of variables ‘Group’ and ‘Outcome’. Inspection of the marginal frequencies shows
that the majority of the observations comes from Group A, and that ‘+’ is the most
common outcome (each majority event is found in 36 of the 48 total instances). Al-
though most observations correspond to outcomes ‘+’ coming from Group A, there is no
association between Group and Outcome (φ = 0; note that P (+|A) = k00
k0•
= 2736 = .75
and P (+|B) = k10
k1•
= 912 = .75). When people encounter a sample of instances such as
the ones summarized in that table, they tend to infer a group-outcome association at the
population level, such that the ‘+’ outcome is judged as being more probable under the
majority group A than under the minority group B (φˆ > 0 and ∆pˆ > 0). As an example,
consider Experiment 2 of Hamilton and Gifford (1976): participants were shown a sample
of group-outcome instances, with the outcomes being desirable and undesirable behaviors.
6 ILLUSORY CORRELATIONS
Group A was the majority group and undesirable behavior the most common outcome
(each majority event was found in 24 out of 36 total instances). Although the relative
frequency of undesirable behaviors was 23 in both groups, the estimated probabilities of
undesirable behaviors in Groups A and B were pˆA = .66 and pˆB = .45, respectively, with
φˆ = .20 and ∆pˆ = .21.
Pseudocontingency Heuristic
Early proposals of illusory correlations include the differential processing of fre-
quent and infrequent events (e.g., distinctiveness accounts; see Chapman & Chapman,
1969; Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; E. A. Wasserman, Dorner, & Kao, 1990), but have
not found considerable empirical support (e.g., Bulli & Primi, 2006; Fiedler, Russer, &
Gramm, 1993; Klauer & Meiser, 2000; Meiser, 2003; Meiser & Hewstone, 2001, 2004,
2006). A prominent alternative explanation for the occurrence of illusory correlations is
that individuals’ correlational inferences are based on the observed marginal frequencies
(e.g., Fiedler, Freytag, & Meiser, 2009; Fiedler, Kutzner, & Vogel, 2013). When observing
skewed marginal frequencies of two variables, participants are assumed to infer heuristi-
cally that the most frequent observations in each variable are associated with each other
(e.g., Group A and + in subtable IC1 of Table 1) as well as the infrequent observations
(e.g., Group B and −). This pseudocontingency heuristic account is supported by results
showing that the inferred associations reflect the skewness found in the marginals, in-
dependent of whether joint observations are actually presented (e.g., Fiedler & Freytag,
2004; Meiser, 2006; Meiser & Hewstone, 2004; Meiser, Rummel, & Fleig, 2018; Vadillo,
Blanco, Yarritu, & Matute, 2016; Vogel, Kutzner, Fiedler, & Freytag, 2013).
Type-S Illusory Correlations
According to the pseudocontingency account, the inference of an illusory correlation
should also not depend on the true contingency between the two focal variables. In
line, Fiedler (2010) demonstrated that the inferred associations between two variables
were based on the marginal frequencies, independent of their actual contingencies, which
were zero (IC1), consistent with the inference based on marginals, or inconsistent with
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the inference based on marginals (ICS). Additionally, consider, for example, the ICS
subtable in Table 1: once again, Group A is the majority group and ‘+’ is the most
common outcome. In this case, however, there is a negative group-outcome association
(φ = −.33, ∆p = −.33) due to the fact that the proportion of ‘+’ outcomes is larger
in Group B (88 = 1) than in Group A (
16
24 = .67). Yet, participants tend to judge the
probability of ‘+’ under majority group A to be higher than under minority group B. For
example, Meiser et al. (2018, Experiment 1, within-subject condition Casino X) found
the average probability estimates to be pˆA = .57 and pˆB = .46, which indicate a positive
association (∆pˆ = .11).
Illusory correlations have been shown to increase in strength with decreasing work-
ing memory capacity (Eder, Fiedler, & Hamm-Eder, 2011), the more salient marginal
frequencies are (Meiser et al., 2018) and the more attention is paid to them (Fleig,
Meiser, Ettlin, & Rummel, 2017). Accordingly, many studies on ICS effects use more
complex stimulus distributions including a third (context) variable: Typically, the focal
variables’ marginal frequencies are skewed within one context and co-vary across the con-
texts. By implication, the focal variables are each associated with the context variable.
The use of contrasting contexts is assumed to increase the salience of the co-occurrence of
skewed marginal frequencies and to thereby increase illusory correlation effects (Fiedler
& Freytag, 2004).1
1 As pointed out by a reviewer, it is possible that this association between focal and context variables
is behind the observed Type-S illusory correlations. However, there are good reasons to believe that this
is not the case. First, we can find the ICS effect in published studies in which there is no association
between focal and context variables. For example, Fiedler (2010) found an ICS effect in a study in
which participants were presented with fictitious students described in terms of four binary variables
(sex, city, university major, and hobby) and subsequently asked to judge conditional probabilities
associated with each pair of variables (e.g., “What is the % of persons coming from Mannheim, given
that they study psychology?”). Moreover, an unpublished study by the first author found an ICS effect
in an experimental design in which there was no association between focal and contextual variables. In
this study, the two contexts (Machine X and Machine Y) involved two exclusive and distinct pairs of
buttons (A/B and C/D, respectively), with one context having a negative button/outcome association
(P (+|A,X) = 1824 = .75 and P (+|B,X) = 1012 = .83), whereas the other context had no such association
(P (+|C, Y ) = 418 = .22 and P (+|D,Y ) = 418 = .22). While Machine Y trials were only used as filler
items, an ICS effect was found in Machine X, with ∆pˆ = .04, t(100) = 2.04, p = .044.
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Two Opposing Accounts of Illusory Correlations
Both types of illusory correlations have been shown to occur across numerous studies
using a wide variety of stimulus materials (for reviews, see Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler et
al., 2009). Several of these studies involve real-world groups (e.g., occupational groups,
Hamilton & Rose, 1980), such that stereotypes are in all likelihood affecting the observed
estimates. However, illusory correlations have also been shown to occur with abstract
stimuli (e.g., geometric shapes and colors), for which stereotypes are unlikely to exist (e.g.,
Primi & Agnoli, 2002, Experiment 2). These results suggest that illusory correlations
are by and large a byproduct of the general way in which individuals infer associations
between sampled variables.
The assumed use of marginal frequencies to infer contingencies is described by some
of its proponents as “logically unwarranted but useful and smart” (Fiedler et al., 2013,
p.328). Simply put, joint frequencies cannot be deduced from marginal frequencies. Yet,
the heuristic of associating frequent categories and infrequent categories turns out to have
considerable adaptive value: it often succeeds in capturing actual contingencies while
relying on a simpler data format (Kutzner, Vogel, Freytag, & Fiedler, 2011). Like with
many other heuristics, the case made for the inferences based on marginals is couched
in the notion that they are highly successful in real-world environments in which they
are applied as compared to in experiments (i.e., the notion of ecological rationality, e.g.,
Gigerenzer, 2019; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002).
In comparison, a normative account of illusory correlations has recently been pro-
posed by Costello and Watts (2019). Rather than reflecting some heuristic use of marginal
frequencies, the occurrence of Type-1 illusory correlations is attributed to the updating of
prior information as captured by the Rule of Succession proposed by Laplace (1820/1951).
When outcome ‘+’ is observed k times in N independent samples coming from a given
group, the inferred probability p of ‘+’ occurring is:
pˆ = k + 1
N + 2 . (3)
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Applying this rule to the example in subtable IC1 of Table 1, pˆA = 27+136+2 = .74 and
pˆB = 9+112+2 = .71 result as probability estimates, with ∆pˆ = pˆA − pˆB = 0.03 indicating
the presence of an association between group membership and outcomes. Costello and
Watts (2019) reported simulations showing that the application of the Rule of Succes-
sion to probability estimation outperforms the use of sample proportions or observed
relative frequencies in producing Type-1 illusory correlations. Consequently, they argue
that Type-1 illusory correlations are in fact the “mathematically correct” response when
estimating probabilities based on observed frequencies.
These recent developments present two distinct interpretations of illusory correla-
tions. On the one hand, we have a heuristic account of illusory correlations suggesting
that the effects cannot be accommodated within the tenets of probability theory. On the
other hand, the newly proposed normative account makes the opposite case, with Type-1
illusory correlations being framed as rational responses that follow the presumably op-
timal Rule of Succession. In the remainder of this paper, we will argue against these
two interpretations. First, we will show that the Rule of Succession has some important
limitations, theoretical as well as empirical. Second, we will show that the presumably
heuristic pseudocontingency inferences can be seen as a rational consequence of a Bayesian
updating of beliefs when the updates are based on (skewed) marginal frequencies. We
will then show that a Bayesian Marginal Model that realizes this theoretical insight is
able to accommodate the patterns found in the data at large. Finally, we show that the
model is fruitful in generating new predictions, some of which can be tested on existing
data and turn out to hold when inspecting previously-published data.
Deconstructing the Rule of Succession
No other formula in the alchemy of logic has exerted more astonishing pow-
ers. For it has established the existence of God from total ignorance, and it
has measured with numerical precision the probability that the sun will rise
tomorrow. (Keynes, 1921, p. 89)
Consider a scenario in which only two events are possible, namely a ‘success’ and a
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‘failure’ event. Assume that you encounter k success events in a total of N independent
observations. What is the probability that a success will be observed in the (N + 1)th
observation? Laplace (1820/1951) showed that, when assuming no prior preference for
any probability value, one can reach the solution known as the Rule of Succession:
pˆ =
∫ 1
0
pk+1(1− p)N−k dp∫ 1
0
pk(1− p)N−k dp
= k + 1
N + 2 . (4)
According to Costello and Watts (2019), the Rule of Succession presents a rationalization
of IC1 effects. Specifically, when asked to judge the probability of a success in a population
based on a sample, the Rule of Succession provides a mathematically correct way to
estimate the probability p. IC1 effects are then a byproduct of this rule: the +1 and +2
terms in the numerator and denominator, respectively, will regress the inferred probability
towards 12 for each group. The more observations one has of one group, the smaller
the deviation from k
N
, which is caused by the +1 and +2 terms. This means that the
estimates for a majority group A will be less regressive towards 12 than estimates for
a minority group B. Hence, the estimates will conform to the inequality pˆA > pˆB > 12
when p > 12 , or pˆA < pˆB <
1
2 when p <
1
2 . In both cases, the estimates imply a
group-outcome contingency when none is present in the data. In other words, Type-1
illusory correlations are predicted. Going beyond, Costello and Watts (2019) developed
different computational accounts that implement the Rule of Succession (Algorithms 1
and 2) and showed that they can approximate the IC1 effects reported by Hamilton and
Gifford (1976, Experiment 1) and Van Rooy, Vanhoomissen, and Van Overwalle (2013,
Experiment 1).
When discussing the Rule of Succession, it is useful to frame it as a specific solution
within the broader context of Bayesian inference (Jeffreys, 1939): Beliefs are represented
by probability distributions that are updated in light of the data using Bayes’ Theorem,
with the estimated probability pˆ corresponding to a point-summary of the posterior be-
liefs. In their presentation of the Rule of Succession, Costello and Watts (2019) state,
for instance, that it is not reasonable for participants to “conclude” that pˆ = 0 when
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k = 0 in a total of N = 2 observations (p. 439). Indeed, also when framing the Rule of
Succession within the context of Bayesian inference, it would be unreasonable for some-
one to place all probability mass on 0 given a sample size of N = 2. However, under no
set of reasonable priors is that the case. The point estimate pˆ = 0, in whatever way it
is computed, is only a summary of a distribution that places non-zero probability mass
over the unit interval. It does not follow that all other values are deemed impossible or
implausible, especially when N = 2. Yet, it does not follow, either, that pˆ = 0 might not
be a reasonable point estimate.2
Elaborating on the framing of the Rule of Succession within the context of Bayesian
inference, let p be the rate parameter of a Binomial distribution. The parameter p
indicates the probability of the occurrence of a ‘success’ event among N independent
and identically-distributed observations. Assuming a prior distribution over p, we can
capture a reasoner’s preconceptions regarding the probability of a success. We will assume
a Beta distribution as a prior given its flexibility in capturing beliefs through its shape
parameters α and β. The parameters’ values can be interpreted as ‘pseudocounts’ in terms
of ‘successes’ and ‘failures’. The Beta distribution is a conjugate prior of the Binomial
distribution. This implies that the posterior beliefs, resulting from the application of
Bayes’ Theorem when observing k successes out of N observations, will follow a Beta
distribution with parameters α∗ = α + k and β∗ = β + N − k. The mean of this
posterior distribution is α+k
α+β+N . Consequently, when α = β = 1, we are assuming the
prior observations of one success and one failure. This prior distribution is uniform over
the [0, 1] interval, indicating no preference for any specific range of probability values.
The posterior mean under this prior is α+k
α+β+N =
1+k
2+N , which corresponds to the Rule of
Succession (see Equation 4).
The shape of the prior distribution will affect the posterior mean. Specifically, the
2 This statement is a good reflection of Costello and Watts’ (2019) ambiguity regarding the concept
of ‘probability’ that they are relying on. The Bayesian foundation of the Rule of Succession explicitly
calls for a subjectivist interpretation, according to which the strength of our beliefs are represented by
probability distributions. However, Costello and Watts’ focus on point estimates and argument against
specific values such as pˆ = 0 speak directly against that. Also of note is the fact that their argument
for the rationality of the Rule of Succession (which we will discuss in detail later on) focuses on the
frequentist properties of pˆ.
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posterior mean is shifted towards the prior mean, an effect known as shrinkage. Figure 1
illustrates the updating under different priors such as Jeffrey’s prior (α = β = 12). The
amount of shrinkage will depend on the prior distribution as well as on the amount of
data. The fewer data the greater the shrinkage will be, or put differently, by virtue of a
larger sample size, the data are more successful in overwhelming the prior. The ability
of the Rule of Succession to account for Type-1 illusory correlations rests on this fact:
Because the minority group B is less often observed than the majority group A, the
respective posterior mean for Group B will be closer to the prior mean of 12 (cf. middle
panels in Figure 1).
The possibility to vary the prior distribution allows for a generalization of the Rule
of Succession. Without loss of generality, let α = λ · pip and β = λ · (1 − pip), with
0 ≤ pip ≤ 1 and λ ≥ 0. The posterior mean of p under this parametrization is
pˆ = λ · pip + k
λ+N . (5)
Parameter λ describes the number of pseudocounts α+β implied by the prior and thus, its
informativeness. Parameter pip introduces skew into the prior distribution to the extent to
which it deviates from 0.5.3 This generalization of the Rule of Succession corresponds to
Carnap’s Method of Updating (Carnap, 1952), which has been proposed in the decision-
making literature to account for a number of phenomena (e.g., Viscusi, 1989; Wakker,
2002). Viscusi (1989), for instance, showed that its incorporation into the Expected
Utility model (Savage, 1954; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) enables the model to
accommodate the paradoxes of Allais. More recently, it has been used to characterize
decisions based on experienced options and the ‘description-experience gap’ (Aydogan,
2019; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; see also Wakker, 2002).
The Rational Status of the Rule of Succession
Costello and Watts (2019) motivated the use of the Rule of Succession by arguing
that it minimizes errors when estimating the probability of a feature or outcome based
3 In the special case of the Rule of Succession, α = β = 1 and hence, λ = 2, pip = .5.
ILLUSORY CORRELATIONS 13
Figure 1 . Posterior Beta distributions (middle and lower panels) that result from
updating the prior distributions (upper panels), parametrized by different shape
parameters α and β, when observing the frequencies in Table 1 for Type-1 and Type-S
illusory correlations. The vertical lines represent posterior means. While the lower
segment lines represent posterior medians, the upper segment lines represent posterior
modes.
on a limited sample. Under the notion that a rational approach is one that minimizes
errors, they justify the occurrence of a Type-1 illusory correlation by stating that “the
mathematically correct and hence rational response is to judge the rare feature as more
likely in the Minority than the Majority population” (p. 447). This argument is based
on (a) a simulation (Costello & Watts, 2019, Algorithm 1) that computes the posterior
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mean as an estimate of p given a uniform prior, leading to the conclusion that a “reasoner
who makes this estimate for the underlying probability will be, on average, closest to the
true population probability that generated the observed sample” (p. 440) and on (b) the
observation that the use of the posterior mean predicts Type-1 illusory correlations due
to shrinkage.
Even when taking for granted that accuracy is a yardstick for rationality, we have
to take a closer look at Algorithm 1 they use to establish the rationality of the Rule of
Succession, which goes as follows:
1. Set integers k and N , with k ≤ N .
2. Generate a probability p from a uniform distribution.
3. Generate binomially distributed data with probability p and sample size N . When-
ever k successes occur in the binomial data, record p.
4. Repeat steps 2-3 many times and compute the average of the recorded ps.
The average values coming from this simulation very closely match the values obtained
with the Rule of Succession, that is k+1
N+2 . Costello and Watts (2019) interpret this result
as support for the rationality of the rule. However, the simulation algorithm effectively
samples from the posterior distribution of p given k
N
and a flat prior over p. The aver-
age of these posterior samples has to match the Rule of Succession (excusing sampling
variability) given that the latter is nothing more than the closed-form expression of the
posterior mean of p under the same data and prior. In other words, the two values being
compared refer to the exact same quantity.
Moreover, note that the mean of the posterior distribution is only one of many
legitimate summary descriptions of a posterior distribution’s central tendency, given the
observed sample. For instance, it would have been perfectly legitimate to use the posterior
mode ormaximum a posteriori estimate (MAP), which in the case of the Beta distribution
corresponds to α+k−1
α+β+N−2 . Under the prior parameters α = β = 1, that yield the Rule
of Succession, the posterior mode equals the sample proportion k
N
, which means that no
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IC1 effect would be predicted, an absence that Costello and Watts (2019) consider to be
incorrect.
The justification for the use of a given estimator and the discussion of its merits
in terms of error minimization requires us to establish how errors are quantified. In
other words, it requires a loss function. Let C(θ, θˆ) be a loss function quantifying the
discrepancy between a true value θ and its estimate θˆ (for an overview, see L. Wasserman,
2004, Chap. 12). Among the many possible loss functions, we find the following popular
options (with q > 0 being a scaling parameter):
• Quadratic Loss: C(θ, θˆ) = q · (θ − θˆ)2,
• Linear Loss: C(θ, θˆ) = q · | θ − θˆ |,
• All-or-Nothing Loss: C(θ, θˆ) =

0, if θ = θˆ,
q, otherwise.
Under a quadratic loss function, the optimal estimator is the posterior mean. The
only case in which illusory correlations are not expected using posterior means is when
the completely uninformative, so-called Haldane prior (α = β = 0) is used. In the
case of linear loss, the optimal estimate corresponds to the posterior median, which is
approximated by α+k−1/3
α+β+N−2/3 (Kerman, 2011). If α = β <
1
3 , a reversed IC1 effect is
predicted, such that the estimated posterior median of the majority group is closer to
1
2 than the minority group’s (.751 and .754 respectively, in the IC1 example in Table 1
when α = β = 14). Finally, an all-or-nothing loss function is optimized by the posterior
mode, which predicts a reversed IC1 for α = β < 1 and no IC1 effect under the uniform
prior α = β = 1. Type-1 illusory correlations are only expected when α = β > 1. Based
on these cases, we see that the Rule of Succession and the illusory correlations that it
can predict are only rational/optimal if one takes for granted that pˆ corresponds to the
posterior mean and a quadratic loss function is assumed. In fact, the estimator pˆ deemed
optimal differs according to the assumed prior and loss function, with illusory correlations
being expected under some but not others.
The optimality results above describe a reasoner who moves in an ecology in which
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s/he randomly encounters N samples from groups with different true probabilities p that
follow the assumed prior distribution. In this context, optimality refers to a minimization
of the average estimation error across groups. This, however, is at odds with the con-
ceptual characterizations that Costello and Watts (2019) allude to. They conceptualize
the prior and posterior distributions as epistemic probability distributions or as descrip-
tions of the reasoner’s prior and posterior beliefs, respectively, about the unknown value
p underlying the observed group frequencies. Accordingly, the group in question is fixed
and the true probability that generates the data is the unknown p value in force for that
group. Let us call this fixed value pG. The uniform prior describes the assumption that
in the absence of data, the reasoner considers each admissible value for the unknown true
pG value as equally likely a priori. An estimate pˆG is in error to the extent to which it
deviates from the true value pG of the group under scrutiny, irrespective of one’s prior
beliefs. The expected estimation error or loss must be computed as what is to be expected
when sampling N observations from group G, that is relative to the binomial distribu-
tion with parameters N and pG. If the sample proportion kN is taken as estimate, then
the expected quadratic loss corresponds to its variance under the binomial distribution,
namely 1
N
pG(1− pG). In the case of the Rule of Succession, k+1N+2 , the expected quadratic
loss is N2(N+2)2
1
N
pG(1−pG)+ 1(N+2)2 (2pG−1)2. The latter expectation is larger (i.e., worse)
than the former when |pG − 12 | >
√
N+1
8N+4 , and smaller otherwise. This means that the
question of which of these estimators is the best depends on both pG and N and cannot
be answered in the absence of knowledge about pG.
The Empirical Status of the Rule of Succession
Even if one cannot make a compelling case for the Rule of Succession or its gen-
eralization à la Carnap, theoretically, they might nevertheless succeed in capturing the
effects found in the data at large. In this section, we will show that this is not the case.
The Case of Type-S Illusory Correlations. Costello and Watts (2019) dis-
cussed the Rule of Succession within the context of IC1 effects. However, there is no
reason to not consider ICS effects as well, especially given that the difference between
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both types can be boiled down to the relative frequencies observed in each group (namely,
whether they are the same or not). It turns out that the Rule of Succession has trouble
capturing ICS effects: First, consider the simulation reported in Figure 2 that displays
the probability inferred by the Rule of Succession as a function of the number of obser-
vations across the different groups. Note that in order to illustrate these predictions, we
replaced k with N · p (see also Viscusi, 1989; Wakker, 2002). The top panel of Figure 2
shows that the Rule of Succession generally expects IC1 effects to occur. But as shown in
the center and bottom panels, an ICS effect is only expected under the Rule of Succession
for very specific frequencies, and/or extremely small samples (e.g., when P (+|A) = .75,
P (+|B) = .83, and NA < 4). Otherwise, according to the Rule of Succession, the es-
timate pˆ is expected to be higher for the minority group(s), in line with the genuine
group-outcome relationship.
Qualitative Misses in Illusory Correlations. The ability to capture an effect,
a difference between two estimated values, does not imply the ability to accommodate
the values from which the effect is computed. Considering the absolute values of people’s
probability judgments more closely, it turns out that beyond the result pˆA > pˆB, data on
IC1 and ICS effects show a recurring pattern of pˆB < 12 : In other words, the majority event
for Group B is in fact perceived as the minority event for that group. These recurring
qualitative misses cannot be explained by any regression-to-the-mean account with prior
mean 12 , as they are unable to cross over the
1
2 -midpoint. We checked the occurrence of
these qualitative misses in a corpus of previously-published studies, which are listed in
Table 2.
The study corpus was built by searching the databases PSYNDEX and PsycInfo
(on 08/20/2019) using the terms “illusory correlation” and “pseudocontingencies” and
restricting the search to manuscripts published in academic journals in the period 2000-
2019. Of the articles identified, we only considered experiments that additionally met the
following criteria: (1) the experimental stimuli consisted of binary variables, (2) partici-
pants had to judge the frequency or probability of an outcome given one group, (3) the
groups were artificial, without any stereotypical information associated with them, (4)
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Figure 2 . Probability of success predicted by Rule of Succession as a function of
number of observations (N) per option.
the frequency estimates or probability estimates are reported and were not converted into
a ∆p measure, (5) the effect addressed (i.e., IC1 or ICS) was present in the data and de-
termined to be reliable using some statistical test,4 and (6) only non-clinical participants
took part in the study. The application of those inclusion criteria amounted to a set of
43 experimental conditions in 14 articles. We additionally included data from Fiedler et
4 In several cases, application of this criterion resulted in including only one of two within-subject
conditions.
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al. (1993), Spears, van der Pligt, and Eiser (1985), and Hamilton and Gifford (1976).5
The aim was not to provide an exhaustive literature review, but rather to illustrate the
general pattern of empirical findings in contemporary research.
Checking the data corpus for the occurrence of qualitative misses described above
(pˆB < 12), we found these misses in 55% of the cases. The magnitude of the qualitative
misses is additionally displayed in the right panel of Figure 3: in more than half of the
cases, participants’ estimates for the minority group do not only reflect an underesti-
mation, but a reversal in which outcome is most frequent. Importantly, note that the
qualitative misses are found in both IC1 and ICS studies, as can be seen in Table 2, so
that they cannot be attributed to the different designs used to study Type-1 and Type-S
illusory correlations (see Footnote 1).
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Figure 3 . Observed and estimated relative frequencies in the majority (A) and minority
(B) groups in the data corpus. In order to improve the discriminability between data
points, we jittered the observed proportions.
Fitting the Rule of Succession to the Data Corpus. To corroborate the
above assessments, we fitted the Rule of Succession as well as Carnap’s generalization to
the corpus of studies reported in Table 2. In the case of the Rule of Succession, for each
study, we applied the Rule of Succession to the observed frequencies k and N for both
groups A and B. In the case of Carnap’s generalization, we fixed pi to 12 and estimated λ
5 Note that applying the stated criteria resulted in not including the two data sets used by Costello and
Watts (2019).
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freely. For each study, we assumed a single λ parameter for both Group A and Group B
when computing estimates. Models were estimated by minimizing squared errors, with
the constraint that ICS and qualitative misses were to be predicted if they were present,
and the model able to produce them. These fits tell us how well the models can capture
the qualitative patterns in the data, irrespective of their magnitude.6 The best-fitting
predictions are illustrated in Figure 4.
It is clear that the Rule of Succession cannot provide a reasonable account of the
data, especially when it comes to ICS effects and qualitative misses.7 The fact that it has
no free parameters also compromises the model’s ability to successfully capture differences
between studies in which participants observed the same joint events. The generalized
rule performs somewhat better, although some of the effects are barely captured at the
expense of extreme prior parameters (e.g., α = β = 50).8
6 A purely quantitative comparison between observed and predicted values is not really useful here as we
first and foremost want to know whether the model can capture the qualitative patterns (reproducing
a qualitative pattern is not guaranteed when simply minimizing misfit). Also, one should keep in mind
that these data are an amalgamation of different strategies and beliefs that are unlikely to be successfully
captured by any single model. In this situation it is best to focus on the qualitative aspects of models
(for discussions, see Kellen, 2019; Navarro, 2019).
7 As a sanity check, we investigated the possibility that qualitative misses may be caused by sampling
noise and/or forgetting. We simulated probability estimates produced by the Rule of Succession including
forgetting rates for the two example distributions in Table 1 and the less extreme ICS-event distribution
from Meiser et al. (2018, Experiment 3). Following Algorithm 2 of Costello and Watts (2019), each
observation is recalled with probability 1− f . This is achieved by comparing a number randomly drawn
from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1, against a fixed value f . If the random number is larger
than f , the observation is recalled, otherwise forgotten. We simulated 1000 probability estimates for
each combination of forgetting rate and outcome probability. Overall, qualitative misses were found to
be extremely unlikely, only occurring (at a low rate) when forgetting rates were extremely high.
8 Equivalent results were observed when introducing random forgetting via a probability parameter f
(see Costello & Watts, 2019) instead of estimating the weight λ on the prior. The reason for the similar
results is that both λ and f serve the same role of modulating the weight of the prior probability relative
to the observed sample and therefore the regressive effect toward 12 .
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Table 2
Overview of the Data Corpus
Study N Effect Qualitative Miss
1 Berndsen, McGarty, Van Der Pligt, and Spears (2001, E2) 22 IC1 6
2 Bulli and Primi (2006) 158 IC1 3
3 Eder et al. (2011, E1, online-prediction) 24 IC1 3
4 Eder et al. (2011, E2, no-load) 33 IC1 3
5 Eder et al. (2011, E2, load) 33 IC1 3
6 Eder et al. (2011, E3, negative) 21 IC1 3
7 Eder et al. (2011, E3, positive) 21 IC1 3
8 Fiedler et al. (1993, no-valence-group) 15 IC1 3
9 Fiedler et al. (1993, no-valence-person) 15 IC1 6
10 Fiedler et al. (1993, valence-group) 15 IC1 6
11 Fiedler et al. (1993, valence-person) 15 IC1 3
12 Hamilton and Gifford (1976, E2) 70 IC1 3
13 Klauer and Meiser (2000, E2) 20 IC1 6
14 Madey and Chasteen (2004, younger) 22 IC1 6
15 Meiser and Hewstone (2001, group) 20 IC1 3
16 Meiser and Hewstone (2001, town) 20 IC1 6
17 Meiser (2003, E1, impression) 33 IC1 6
18 Meiser (2003, E1, memory) 33 IC1 3
19 Meiser and Hewstone (2006, (a), town X) 35 IC1 3
20 Meiser and Hewstone (2006, (a), town Y) 35 IC1 3
21 Mutter (2000, distraction-older) 24 IC1 3
22 Mutter (2000, distraction-younger) 24 IC1 3
23 Primi and Agnoli (2002, E1) 253 IC1 6
24 Primi and Agnoli (2002, E2) 106 IC1 3
25 Rodríguez-Ferreiro and Barberia (2017) 240 IC1 3
26 Spears et al. (1985) 141 IC1 6
Subtotal (Qualitative Misses) 1726 (65%)
27 Fleig et al. (2017, E1, negative) 56 ICS 6
28 Fleig et al. (2017, E1, positive) 56 ICS 3
29 Fleig et al. (2017, E2, base-rate, positive) 36 ICS 6
30 Fleig et al. (2017, E2, standard, positive) 39 ICS 3
31 Meiser (2003, E2, impression, negative) 38 ICS 6
32 Meiser (2003, E2, impression, positive) 38 ICS 6
33 Meiser (2003, E2, memory, negative) 38 ICS 6
34 Meiser (2003, E2, memory, positive) 38 ICS 6
35 Meiser and Hewstone (2004, E1, negative) 39 ICS 6
36 Meiser and Hewstone (2004, E1, positive) 39 ICS 3
37 Meiser and Hewstone (2004, E2, group, negative) 39 ICS 6
38 Meiser and Hewstone (2004, E2, group, positive) 39 ICS 6
39 Meiser and Hewstone (2004, E2, town, negative) 39 ICS 6
40 Meiser and Hewstone (2004, E2, town, positive) 39 ICS 3
41 Meiser and Hewstone (2004, E3, negative) 66 ICS 6
42 Meiser and Hewstone (2004, E3, positive) 66 ICS 6
43 Meiser et al. (2018, E1, positive) 66 ICS 3
44 Meiser et al. (2018, E2, visualization, negative) 30 ICS 6
45 Meiser et al. (2018, E2, visualization, positive) 30 ICS 3
46 Meiser et al. (2018, E3, pc, positive) 39 ICS 3
47 Meiser et al. (2018, E3, pc-salience, positive) 40 ICS 3
48 Meiser et al. (2018, E4, computer, positive) 64 ICS 3
49 Meiser et al. (2018, E4, self, positive) 63 ICS 3
Subtotal 1023 (43%)
Total 2749 (55%)
Note. Column "N" reports the number of participants in a given study. Column “Effect”
indicates the specific illusory correlation being tested. Finally, column “Qualitative Miss”
indicates whether participants estimated the majority outcome in the minority group as being
the minority outcome in that group.
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Generalized Rule of Succession (Carnap's)
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Bayesian Marginal Model
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Figure 4 . Model fits for the studies listed in Table 2. The ‘model failure’ quadrants
correspond to regions in which there is a qualitative mismatch between model
predictions and participants’ judgements.
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Interim Discussion
The case for the Rule of Succession as a successful normative account stands on two
legs. The first one is the notion that it constitutes an optimal solution to an inference
problem. The second is its ability to capture the observed effects in the data. What our
investigation shows is that the optimality of the Rule of Succession and the prediction of
illusory correlations only holds under very specific circumstances and conceptualizations
that are not well justified. The Rule of Succession often failed to account for Type-S
illusory correlations. Indeed, we applied the rule to cases outside the domain of IC1
effects for which it was originally proposed. Yet, it is not clear what kind of rationale
would permit a demarcation between IC1 and ICS effects. Additionally, the rule also fails
to account for the qualitative misses that are often found in the minority-group estimates.
These misses show that illusory correlations involve something more than a regression to
the 12 -midpoint. Altogether, the theoretical and empirical issues discussed here raise the
question whether a normative account of illusory correlations is possible. In the section
below, we will answer this question affirmatively.
A Bayesian Marginal Account
As previously discussed, Fiedler and colleagues proposed that the observed illusory
correlations are due to the use of a simple pseudocontingency heuristic that can be ap-
plied to marginal frequencies (for an overview, see Fiedler et al., 2013): If two things
occur often then assume that they are associated. Because most instances come from
Group A and most outcomes are ‘+’, Group A is thus assumed to be associated with the
occurrence of ‘+’. According to Fiedler et al. (2009), this heuristic is broadly used and
is claimed to underlie several phenomena, like the perception of ecological correlations
(Hammond, 1973). The case for this heuristic typically revolves around its merits under
the lens of ecological rationality: Even though one cannot conclude the presence of an as-
sociation between the variables based on the marginal frequencies, this heuristic succeeds
in capturing the sign of actual contingencies found in different environments (Kutzner et
al., 2011).
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The goal of this section is to show that one can make a case for this so-called heuris-
tic within the tenets of Bayesian inference and to demonstrate its ability to overcome the
limitations of the Rule of Succession. For this purpose, we will elaborate on an early
proposal by Klauer (2015), which we will refer to as the Bayesian Marginal Model. We
will explore the model’s viability vis-a-vis the corpus of data collected. The reason for
using Bayesian inference as a normative framework is that it provides us with a way to
coherently represent beliefs regarding latent quantities such as population-level probabili-
ties, and how these beliefs should be informed by incoming data (Griffiths & Tenenbaum,
2005; Knill & Richards, 1996; Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Tauber, Navarro, Perfors, &
Steyvers, 2017). Importantly, note that the assumed reliance on Bayesian inference is
predicated on the assumption that the reasoning processes used when generating prob-
ability estimates approximates the process of taking samples from a distribution (for an
overview, see Sanborn & Chater, 2016). Also note that Bayesian accounts like the one
developed below are rational in the sense that they lead to coherent sets of beliefs that
cannot be exploited by an outsider through ‘Dutch-Book’ scenarios (Teller, 1973). This
coherence is independent of whether they are optimal or not, which is something that
will ultimately hinge on the match between the priors and the environment, among other
aspects.
The model proposed explicitly adopts a subjectivist view of probability, representing
the relative strength of (rational/coherent) beliefs in terms of probability distributions.
This contrasts with the Rule of Succession as advocated by Costello and Watts (2019),
who focused on point estimates and utilized their relative accuracy in known environments
as a yardstick for rationality. These differences are reflected in our discussion of the
Bayesian Marginal Model’s IC predictions, which focuses on the emergence of IC effects
at the level of the posterior distributions of pA and pB. Thus, if participants base their
probability estimates on a sample from the posterior distribution (and their frequency
estimates on a sample of the posterior predictive distribution for the cell frequencies),
then our predictions apply for the observed data without the need to postulate that people
use a loss function of any kind or that groupwise proportions p in people’s environment
ILLUSORY CORRELATIONS 25
follow a uniform distribution.
The model, its properties, and its performance
According to the pseudocontingency account (e.g., Fiedler et al., 2009), contingen-
cies are inferred based on the association of skewed marginal frequencies. Even though
marginal frequencies do not determine cell frequencies and thus the contingency, they
do restrict the range of possible values (Duncan & Davis, 1953). Therefore, our model
jointly considers the four cells of a 2 × 2 contingency table (see Table 1). It takes all
possible cell distributions, with cell frequencies k = (k00, k01, k10, k11) and cell proba-
bilities p = (p00, p01, p10, p11), into account that are in line with the observed marginal
frequencies. These potential cell distributions and thus contingencies are weighted de-
pending on the marginal frequencies and the reasoner’s prior beliefs. The resulting output
is a (posterior) belief about the contingency, or broadly speaking, the four cells will be
reconstructed by the marginals.
Like any Bayesian account, our model can be broken down into three main compo-
nents:
• A prior distribution P (p) over the probability vector p,
• a likelihood, here given by the multinomial probability mass function P (k | p), and
• a posterior distribution P (p | k) of the probability vector p given the data k.
The prior distribution captures our beliefs regarding the probabilities p before encoun-
tering data k. Although infinitely many priors are possible, we will focus our discussion
on ‘uninformed’ priors that do not establish a predominance of any of the four table cells.
Given the assumption that the data follow a multinomial distribution, we use a Dirichlet
distribution to capture prior beliefs:
g(p) = Γ(
∑
αij)∏Γ(αij)
∏
p
αij−1
ij , (6)
where α = (α00, α01, α10, α11) , with all αij > 0, is a vector of concentration parameters
that can be interpreted as pseudocounts on each of the table cells. The expected prior
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pij under this distribution is αij∑αij . Setting all αij to the same value for all i and j
yields a prior distribution in which all joint outcomes are expected to be equiprobable.
The larger this common value is, the stronger the prior beliefs will be (just as in the
case of α and β parameters in the Beta distribution). The use of prior beliefs that are
unbiased towards one group and/or outcome are reasonable, when studies use variables
for which little to no prior information is given, as is the case of the studies included in
our corpus. The motivation for using the Dirichlet distribution is twofold: First, it is
an extremely flexible distribution, able to capture a multitude of beliefs via α. Second,
while in the Rule of Succession estimates are computed per group, our model considers all
four cell frequencies jointly and thus contingencies. Therefore, the generalization of the
Beta distribution discussed earlier is needed. The Dirichlet distribution is the conjugate
prior of the multinomial distribution. This means that when encountering multinomial-
distributed data with probability mass function
P (k | p) =
(
M
k00, k01, k10, k11
)∏
p
kij
ij , (7)
the updated posterior beliefs P (p | k) will also be Dirichlet distributed, with parameter
vector α∗ = α+ k.
The prior and posterior Dirichlet distributions implicitly capture the reasoner’s
beliefs about the presence of an association between the variables (i.e., φ). The left panel
of Figure 5 shows the case of α = (1, 1, 1, 1), which yields a prior φ distribution whose
mass is dispersed over the [-1,1] range but still more concentrated around zero. The center
and right panels of Figure 5 illustrate the posterior φ distributions that are obtained when
individuals update their beliefs based on the joint frequencies reported in Table 1. In the
case of the middle panel (IC1 example), we see that the posterior distribution is more
peaked around φ = 0, consistent with the fact that P (+|A) = 2736 = P (+|B) = 912 . In the
right panel (ICS example), most of the posterior mass is on the negative range, consistent
with the fact that P (+|A) = 1624 < P (+|B) = 88 and that the sample’s φ is −0.33.
Now, let us turn to the updating of beliefs based on the observation of marginal
frequencies. Although marginals are insufficient to determine the underlying joint fre-
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Figure 5 . Prior φ under α = (1, 1, 1, 1) and the subsequent posterior distributions when
updating the prior with the joint frequencies reported in Table 1.
quencies, they nevertheless constrain the range of possibilities. To see this, note that
given some set of marginal frequencies, the joint frequencies are completely determined if
one of the joint frequencies is known. For instance, if we know k00, then k01 = k0• − k00,
k10 = k•0−k00, and k11 = M −k0•−k•0 +k00. It follows that we can generate all possible
sets of joint frequencies by varying k00 between max(0, k0• + k•0 −M) and min(k0•, k•0).
Given this relationship between joint and marginal frequencies, the probability of any set
of marginal frequencies corresponds to:
P (k0•, k1•, k•0, k•1 | p) =
min(k0•,k•0)∑
k00=max(0,k0•+k•0−M)
P (k00, k0•−k00, k•0−k00,M−k0•−k•0+k00 | p),
(8)
where the probabilities on the right side are given by Equation 7.
Table 3 reports all possible joint frequencies under the marginals of the examples
in Table 1. The associations (quantified by the φ-statistic) observed in most possible sets
of joint frequencies turn out to be positive and the range of possible associations to be
asymmetric, as associations can be as high as φ = 1 but cannot go below φ = −0.33. As
shown in Figure 6, this asymmetry in possible associations across the range of possible
joint frequencies will be greater the more skewed the base rates are (see also Fiedler et
al., 2013; Kareev, 1995).
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Table 3
Possible joint frequencies and associations (φ) under the marginals of the IC1 and ICS
examples in Table 1
Type-1 Illusory Correlation Example (True φ = 0)
Index k00 k01 k10 k11 φ
1 24 12 12 0 -0.33
2 25 11 11 1 -0.22
3 26 10 10 2 -0.11
4 27 9 9 3 0.00
5 28 8 8 4 0.11
6 29 7 7 5 0.22
7 30 6 6 6 0.33
8 31 5 5 7 0.44
9 32 4 4 8 0.56
10 33 3 3 9 0.67
11 34 2 2 10 0.78
12 35 1 1 11 0.89
13 36 0 0 12 1.00
Type-S Illusory Correlation Example (True φ = −0.33)
Index k00 k01 k10 k11 φ
1 16 8 8 0 -0.33
2 17 7 7 1 -0.17
3 18 6 6 2 0.00
4 19 5 5 3 0.17
5 20 4 4 4 0.33
6 21 3 3 5 0.50
7 22 2 2 6 0.67
8 23 1 1 7 0.83
9 24 0 0 8 1.00
Using Bayes’ Theorem, we can combine Equations 6 and 8 to obtain the density of
p conditional on the marginal frequencies and prior belief distribution:
g(p | k0•, k1•, k•0, k•1,α) ∝
min(k0•,k•0)∑
k00=max(0,k0•+k•0−M)
(
M
k00, k0• − k00, k•0 − k00,M − k0• − k•0 + k00
)
×
∏
Γ(αi,j + ki,j)
Γ(∑(αi,j) +M) × g(p | α∗(k00)). (9)
This posterior density is a mixture of the posterior Dirichlet distributions g(p | α∗) with
α∗(k00) = α+k′(k00), where k′(k00) corresponds to the vector of joint frequencies in the
contingency table consistent with the given marginals and the given k00. Each mixture
ILLUSORY CORRELATIONS 29
25 30 35 40 45
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
Minimum, average, and maximum associations
across marginal frequencies
k0⋅ = k⋅0, with M=48
φ
Maximum
Average
Minimum
Figure 6 . Minimum, average, and maximum associations (quantified by the φ statistic)
across different marginal frequencies (k0• = k•0, with M = 48). When computing the
average association for a given set of marginals, we attributed equal weights to all
possible φ values.
weight (which is proportional to the first two multiplicative terms) is a function of the
marginal frequencies and prior α. The second row of panels in Figure 7 illustrates the
weights associated with the IC1 example in Table 3 under different priors. The differ-
ent joint-frequency sets are equally weighted when all αi,j = 1. Moving away from this
prior leads to differential weighting. For instance, when all αi,j < 1, the more ‘extreme’
joint frequencies are overweighted, with particular emphasis on the joint-frequencies that
produce the largest φ. The reason behind this asymmetric overweighting is the fact low
αi,j values push most mass to extreme probabilities (Figure 1 provides an illustrative
example, namely a Beta distribution with α = β = 12). Because the marginal frequen-
cies are skewed, there is only one possible table that is consistent with these extreme
probabilities, hence its overweighting.
Taking a single sample from this mixture density is straightforward: We first sam-
ple from a discrete distribution, with probabilities corresponding to the mixture weights.
The sampled integer determines the component Dirichlet distribution from which to sub-
sequently sample probabilities from. Finally, one can use these probabilities to sample
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Figure 7 . Illustration of the Bayesian Marginal Model and its predictions under
different priors for the IC1 example given in Table 1.
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a set of joint frequencies of size M . Multiple samples can be taken by repeating these
steps.9 The third row of panels in Figure 7 illustrates the posterior φ distributions for
the IC1 example in Table 1 under different priors. We see that illusory correlations will
be most prevalent in cases where the reasoner does not have strong prior beliefs against
an association (e.g., when all αij = 1). When such beliefs do in fact exist (e.g., when
all αij = 50), the propensity and magnitude of illusory correlations will be reduced. For
example, consider a reasoner who learns that a) most students in a classroom perform
well in tests, and b) that most of these students do their homework. Under the notion
that an association is not implausible, the reasoner is likely to infer a positive associa-
tion. In contrast, it seems somewhat implausible a priori that either of these observations
are associated with students liking chocolate, which would justify a prior φ that is more
strongly peaked on zero. Under such prior, it is unlikely that one would subsequently infer
an association between student performance and liking chocolate, even after learning that
most students like chocolate. Moreover, note that the occurrence of qualitative misses is
far from rare. Instead, its occurrence is quite robust across priors (see the bottom row
of Figure 7 depicting posterior probabilities for the minority group B). This follows from
the fact that k10
k1•
< 12 in 46% of the possible joint frequencies that are consistent with
marginals found in the IC1 example (see Table 3). A ‘problematic’ phenomenon under
the Rule of Succession turns out to be an expected result under the Bayesian Marginal
Model.
Given the potential of the Bayesian Marginal Model, we investigated its ability to
capture the illusory correlations and qualitative misses observed in our study corpus. We
restricted the αij priors to take on the same value, which means that the model only has
one free parameter. This is analogous to the constraint imposed in the generalization of
the Rule of Succession when fitting it to the same study corpus. In fact, our parameter
restriction can be represented in the exact same way, with αij = λ · piij, with piij = 14
9 Note that the output of the Bayesian Marginal Model is a posterior distribution, not a point estimate.
As the model is concerned with epistemic rationality as compared with optimality, it is not committed
to the use of a specific loss function or any loss function at all. Also note, we focus our model evaluation
on the ability to capture qualitative patterns rather than the relative precision of point predictions,
wherefore our analysis is also not committed to some specific point estimator.
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for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, where λ is a free parameter quantifying the concentration or
peakedness of the prior.10
The results depicted in Figure 4 show that, overall, the Bayesian Marginal Model
performs better than the Rule of Succession and its generalization in the sense that it
can capture qualitative misses. Taken together, the assumption that individuals estimate
probabilities based on marginal frequencies is able to account for the qualitative patterns
found in the data. Put differently, one can make a rational as well as an empirical case
for the pseudocontingency account proposed by Fiedler and colleagues.
Dependencies Across Probability Estimates, Skewed Beliefs, and New Data
Formats
One of the main virtues of normative models is the fact that they often introduce
new testable predictions that would have not been considered otherwise. We explore a
number of such predictions concerning dependencies between the frequency estimates,
the role of skewed beliefs, and new data formats.
Dependencies. As previously stated, the samples taken under the Bayesian Marginal
Model come from a mixture of Dirichlet distributions, each associated with one possible
contingency table. Across these tables, the joint frequencies are negatively correlated as
they sum to M , such that whenever k00 is small/large, k10 is likely to be large/small. As
an example, we generated posterior samples for the IC1 example in Table 1. We used a
different α prior per sample (once again, with all αij being equal), which was taken from
a mixture between a Gamma distribution with shape and rate parameters 1.26 and 1.16,
respectively, and a uniform distribution between 0 and 50. The mixture weights were .63
and .37, respectively. This mixture distribution was found to be the one best fitting the
α estimates obtained with the study corpus. We found the resulting pˆA and pˆB samples
to be negatively correlated (Spearman’s r = −0.67).
In contrast, the probability estimates pˆ coming from the Rule of Succession are
10 For the sake of comparability, we fitted the Bayesian Marginal Model in exactly the same way as
the Rule of Succession, using a constrained least-squares algorithm based on the model’s predictions for
posterior means.
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assumed to be computed separately for each group, with no presumption of any kind
of crosstalk. This means that pˆA and pˆB should be stochastically independent (i.e., the
expected correlation is 0). We tested these differing predictions by fitting a regression
model to the ICS data coming from Klauer and Meiser (2000) and Meiser et al. (2018,
see Table 2).11 In addition to having pˆA as a predictor of pˆB, we also introduced the
predictor ‘Experiment’. The estimated coefficient was βpˆA = −0.25 (SE = 0.08, p =
.001), supporting the predictions made by the Bayesian Marginal Model.12
Skewed Beliefs. So far, we assumed that all parameter values of prior α are
equal, which is reasonable when participants know nothing about the relative frequency
of groups and/or outcomes beforehand. However, when skewed frequencies are expected a
priori, illusory correlations are only expected under certain conditions. Figure 8 shows the
posterior φ distributions under different priors that respect the 3:1 ratio found in the IC1
example in Table 1. The figure contains examples involving skewed outcome priors with
outcome ‘+’ cells being overweighted relative to outcome ‘−’ cells (e.g., α = (3, 1, 3, 1))
and skewed group-membership priors (e.g., α = (3, 3, 1, 1)). As can be seen, the positive
bias in the posterior φ distribution, indicating an IC1 effect, vanishes the more informative
the α becomes. Consequently, illusory correlations are expected to be reduced or even
absent whenever individuals have clear prior beliefs regarding the actual skewness of
the event distributions that is to be experienced. Similarly, no IC1 effect is expected,
when prior beliefs correspond to the actual frequencies (e.g., α = (9, 3, 3, 1)). Finally,
Figure 8 also depicts posterior φ distributions under priors that overweight the ‘wrong’
cells (e.g., α = (1, 1, 3, 3) and α = (1, 3, 1, 3)) which are expected to increase illusory
correlations. Therefore, future work should consider systematically investigating the role
of prior beliefs in the occurrence of illusory correlations.
11 We thank Thorsten Meiser for making the data from Meiser et al. (2018) available.
12 As a caveat, note that the prediction assumes (a) equal αi,j and (b) that respondents do not differ
in their propensities or response biases to produce generally high or low frequency estimates. The first
assumption is plausible where groups and outcomes are abstract or novel. The second assumption is
more plausible when looking at intraindividual correlations across several IC tasks administered to the
same person.
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Figure 8 . Posterior φ for the IC1 example in Table 1 according to the Bayesian
Marginal Model under different skewed priors.
Asymmetry. Asymmetric illusory correlation effects are documented in the lit-
erature, with IC effects tending to be greater in contexts that are mostly comprised of
positive outcomes (e.g., Fleig et al., 2017; Meiser et al., 2018). These asymmetries are ob-
served in experimental designs in which the overall positivity/negativity is manipulated
within participants. In such scenarios, there are two contexts (e.g., Town X and Town Y).
The marginal frequencies of groups and outcomes are skewed within each context, and
co-vary across contexts: what is frequent within one context is infrequent within the other
context and vice versa. One possible explanation for this asymmetry is that the overall
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positivity/negativity of each context is detected quickly by the participants, which leads
them to subsequently make inferences about each group in each context using skewed
priors: In both contexts, the most frequent outcome will be overweighted relative to the
cells corresponding to the infrequent outcome. In terms of the Bayesian Marginal Model,
such priors would reduce the magnitude of the ICS effects (see the first row of Figure
8). Given people’s tendency to attend more to losses than gains (Yechiam & Hochman,
2013), one would expect a greater skew in the context where negative outcomes are most
frequent, which in turn would produce the observed asymmetry.
New Response Formats. Given that the output of the Bayesian Marginal Model
is a posterior distribution, the model readily generates predictions for alternative response
formats for which the Rule of Succession, relying on one particular point estimate, remains
silent. For example, participants should not only be able to generate point estimates for
the probabilities P (+|A) and P (+|B), they should also be able to estimate the prob-
abilities that each probability falls into given ranges, and these range estimates should
correspond to the model’s predictions derived from the posterior distribution. Again,
algorithmically, the range estimate could be based on mental sampling from the posterior
distribution.
New Data Formats. A final prediction illustrates that the model is readily ex-
tended to account for findings using new data formats. For instance, the model can be
adapted to the case where data from just one cell of the contingency table is presented.
Consider a scenario in which participants learn that 21 of 49 cases under study are de-
sirable behaviors of Group A members. This information necessitates neither skewed
marginals nor a contingency. Yet, under flat priors, it should bias posterior beliefs to-
wards an illusory correlation.
Taken together, the Bayesian Marginal Model does not only show explanatory suffi-
ciency (it accounts for the major qualitative patterns in the data corpus) and a normative
backing, it is also a fruitful theory, readily generating new predictions, including the ef-
fects of prior beliefs (see Coenen et al., 2018).
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General Discussion
Theoretical work on illusory correlations has relied on one of two main interpre-
tations. On the one hand, illusory correlations have been argued to reflect biased or at
least normatively unjustified information processing. On the other hand, Costello and
Watts (2019) argued that illusory correlations reflect optimal, mathematically correct
and hence rational responses. The present work raises a number of issues that ultimately
speak against both theoretical interpretations: First, a sensible account of a specific illu-
sory correlation (e.g., IC1) should also be able to accommodate closely-related variants
(e.g., ICS). Second, any successful theoretical account needs to go beyond a single effect
and consider other qualitative patterns in the data. By focusing on illusory correlation
effects in isolation, one is ignoring the fact that the data often show qualitative misses
that cannot be accommodated by models that assume some kind of regression towards
the mean/prior. Third, we nevertheless disagree that illusory correlations reflect an ir-
rational, normatively unjustified kind of information processing: The Bayesian Marginal
Model provides a normative reconstruction of the pseudcontingency heuristic, predict-
ing IC1 and ICS effects based on the use of marginal frequencies following the norms
of Bayesian belief updating. Furthermore, this model turned out to be able to account
for the qualitative patterns in the study corpus and successfully predict the presence of
dependencies across individual probability estimates. The results demonstrate that a
successful normative account of illusory correlations is possible.
The occurrence of illusory correlations in Figure 7 should be sufficient to dispel the
notion that the pseudocontingency heuristic proposed by Fiedler and colleagues (e.g.,
Fiedler et al., 2009) is logically invalid. Marginal frequencies do carry valid information
about the joint frequencies, otherwise, in the Bayesian Marginal Model, the posterior
beliefs would match the priors. Under weakly informative priors, skewed marginal fre-
quencies are expected to result (via Bayes’ theorem) in the belief that both variables are
associated.
Between the two contrary interpretations of illusory correlations as irrational and
unjustified versus ‘mathematically correct’ and rational, we therefore argue for a third
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possibility, namely that they reflect an instance of bounded rationality (Simon, 1990). Ac-
cording to this view, limitations of the human information-processing system introduce
constraints that (a) prevent human reasoners and decision makers from reaching over-
all optimal solutions, but (b) do not prevent them from finding normatively adequate
solutions within the smaller search space of solutions consistent with these constraints.
In the present case, an optimally tuned information-processing system would make full
use of the presented joint frequencies instead of only the marginal frequencies. A human
decision maker’s memory limitations, however, constrain the number of cases in which
the realization of two variables in an event are bound together (e.g., Bays, Wu, & Husain,
2011; Treisman, 1998; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002), which might discourage individuals
to use them in inferential judgments. Eder et al. (2011) have reported results supporting
this hypothesis, in which they show that the impairment of working memory exacerbates
the occurrence of illusory correlations. In other cases, a reasoner might often encounter
the different variables separately, sometimes even at different points in time. Given these
limitations, the Bayesian Marginal Model holds that boundedly rational reasoners fall
back on the marginal frequencies from which illusory correlations are predicted as an
outcome of a normatively adequate, Bayesian use of the information in these marginal
frequencies.
According to Marr’s (1982) classification, the Bayesian Marginal Model provides
a characterization at the computational level. It is assumed that individuals have the
capacity to perform or mimic the normatively appropriate computations and use the
normative prescriptions to guide their choices and behaviors. At no point does it make
any claims at the algorithmic level, that is, claims regarding the mechanisms by which the
aforementioned computations are performed or mimicked (for a relevant discussion, see
Van Rooij, 2008). We find modeling at the computational level to be the most appropriate
here given the nature of the data available: In illusory-correlation experiments, each
participant contributes very few judgments. This means that one does not have sufficient
degrees of freedom to test theoretical accounts that make fine-grained algorithm-level
claims. To make matters worse, aggregating data across participants is very likely to
38 ILLUSORY CORRELATIONS
introduce distortions that can spuriously reject models and lead researchers astray (for
recent discussions, see Kellen & Klauer, 2019; Regenwetter & Robinson, 2017).
Addressing Concerns on Model Flexibility, Evaluation, and Comparison
The minimal requirement for any candidate model is that it succeeds in capturing
the data at hand (Bogen & Woodward, 1988). Given that we are dealing with aggre-
gate data, it is reasonable to focus our evaluation on the models’ ability to capture the
qualitative patterns found in the data (for discussions, see Kellen, 2019; Navarro, 2019;
Shiffrin & Nobel, 1997). It turns out that the Rule of Succession (as well as its general-
ization) cannot fulfill this requirement. This reason alone is why the Rule of Succession
has to be dismissed; not because our comparison between the Rule of Succession and the
Bayesian Marginal Model might place the former model at a disadvantage due to not
taking potential differences in flexibility into account (e.g., Kellen, Klauer, & Bröder,
2013; Myung & Pitt, 2018). Note also that in our fits of the Rule of Succession and the
Bayesian Marginal Model to the data corpus, we used only one free parameter, governing
the peakedness of the prior.
The Bayesian Marginal Model succeeded where the Rule of Succession failed. How-
ever, Bayesian models are notorious for their extreme flexibility, due to the possibility of
establishing priors and likelihoods in so many different, arbitrary ways. This may render
their eventual success as nothing short of certain (Bowers & Davis, 2012; see also Co-
enen, Nelson, & Gureckis, 2019). We argue that the development history of the Bayesian
Marginal Model successfully addresses this concern. First, the model is a formal instanti-
ation of the pseudocontingency heuristic proposed much earlier by Fiedler and colleagues
(e.g., Fiedler et al., 2009, 2013). This means that the likelihood function of the model
was constrained from the onset. As sketched out by Klauer (2015), the model is able
to yield IC1 effects under non-informative priors, introducing the notion that the occur-
rence of illusory correlations does not require any kind of bias in people’s prior beliefs. In
the present paper, we went beyond Klauer’s first proof of concept and tested the model
against a large corpus of published studies while keeping the basic components of the
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model fixed. The only part of the model that was ‘free to vary’ across studies was a
single concentration parameter λ, which determines the strength of the prior (here non-
informative beliefs, i.e., prior beliefs that are kept unbiased towards any specific group or
outcome).13 Moreover, the Bayesian Marginal Model successfully predicted the presence
of (a) qualitative misses and (b) negative dependencies across probability estimates. The
model is fruitful in generating a host of new predictions, as illustrated in the section
“Dependencies Across Probability Estimates, Skewed Beliefs, and New Data Formats”.
Decisions from Experience and Skewed Sampling
The learning phase in illusory-correlation experiments shares important similarities
with some of the paradigms used in the study of experience-based decisions (e.g., Hertwig
et al., 2004; Kellen, Pachur, & Hertwig, 2016). As an example, consider the following
options:
A = ( $120 $0.70 .30 ) B = ( $1001 )
Option A is a lottery stating the yields $120 with probability .70, otherwise nothing.
Option B always yields $100. Note that B has a greater expected value than A ($100
and $84, respectively). In a typical sampling paradigm, both options’ outcomes and
outcome probabilities are learned by sampling random draws from each of them before
the participant makes a final, consequential choice (Hertwig et al., 2004).
If option A is sampled more often than option B, one might infer an association
between the majorly-sampled option and monetary gains that would increase A’s relative
attractiveness. Note that a preference for A over B would deviate from people’s choices
when options are described (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004). The potential effects of skewed
sampling in experience-based choices has received minimal attention by researchers so
far (e.g., Bott & Meiser, in press).14 This situation is partly due to participants being
13 Note that the use of non-informative priors was accompanied by a focus on studies in which such
priors are deemed highly plausible. As previously discussed, the studies included in the corpus involved
variables for which little to no prior information is available.
14 Mostly, investigated effects referred to how representative or veridical the options’ sampled
probabilities are (e.g., Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008; Hilbig & Glöckner, 2011), rather than
testing the effect of sample sizes per option on preferences.
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allowed to freely sample both options as often and in any order they desire. However,
this freedom ignores the fact that in realistic settings, some options are experienced more
often than others, without any control on the decision-maker’s part.
Final Thoughts
Finally, let us highlight the fact that the Bayesian Marginal Model proposed here
attributes a passive observer role to the reasoner. This situation implies that many
phenomena attributed to the actions of the reasoner in a given environment, such as the
way in which different options are actively sampled, or to the environment explored, are
outside its current scope (for an overview on the topic of information search, see Todd,
Hills, & Robbins, 2012). For instance, Le Mens and Denrell (2011) considered the case
in which two options are objectively equally attractive, but asymmetric with regard to
information: We can learn about one of the options only when choosing it (selective
access), whereas we can learn about the other irrespective of whether it is chosen or not
(systematic access). This asymmetry will lead to a preference for the latter option, even
if the decision maker is rational and knows the structure of the environment.
Likewise in naturalistic settings, different groups differ in how informational access
is controlled. For some, we are bombarded with relevant samples in the news media
almost everyday; for others, we have to make an effort to gather the relevant bits of
information. Such informational asymmetries and active sampling biases (e.g., Fiedler
&Wänke, 2009) likely interact with the formation of illusory correlations. The integration
of different Bayesian accounts thereof into a single, comprehensive account constitutes
an important theoretical challenge that is yet to be tackled.
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2 PEUDOCONTINGENCIES AND INFORMATION SAMPLING
Abstract
Pseudocontingencies are inferences of correlations between variables, like two options and
two outcomes, drawn on the basis of their skewed base rates covarying across a third vari-
able (e.g., two contexts). Here, we investigated the effect of pseudocontingency inference
on choice behavior. When choices between two options are not based on the actual con-
tingency between options and outcomes, but instead on a pseudocontingency, the latter
may override the existing contingency resulting in potentially suboptimal choice behav-
ior. Whereas research has mainly focused on investigating the pseudocontingency effect
by presentation of predetermined learning trials, we examined the role of free information
sampling for the pseudocontingency effect as compared with predetermined learning. Ex-
periment 1 replicated previous findings of a pseudocontingency effect in choice behavior.
In Experiment 2, we compared predetermined information and free information sampling
in a bivariate decision scenario with only two options and two outcomes. Experiments 3
and 4 aimed at investigating the inference of a pseudocontingency when sampling in-
formation by context or by context and option in the trivariate scenario. The results
revealed an asymmetry between positive contexts with predominantly gains and negative
contexts with predominantly losses. Within a negative context we found no differences
between options, neither during information sampling nor for subsequent choices. Within
the positive context, when information sampling was self-determined, participants sam-
pled skewed base rates of options and preferred the predominant option. The findings
underline the influence of self-determined information sampling on the pseudocontingency
effect on choice behavior.
Keywords: pseudocontingency, information sampling, choice, contingency inference,
decision making
PEUDOCONTINGENCIES AND INFORMATION SAMPLING 3
Pseudocontingency Inference and Choice: The Role of
Information Sampling
Most decisions are based on some kind of evaluation of the choices available. In
many laboratory studies, decision making is investigated via choice between (two) options
typically resulting in gains and/or losses with different probabilities. In research on risky
choice, for example, paradigms often comprise two options differing in their outcomes’
magnitudes and probabilities of occurrence: The task is to choose between one option,
very likely or for sure resulting in a medium outcome, and another option yielding a
rare extreme outcome (Ashby & Rakow, 2016; Barron & Erev, 2003; Wulff, Hills, &
Hertwig, 2015). The options’ winning probabilities may be stated or experienced over
the course of several experimental trials. Either way, in those tasks, options’ evaluations
and thereby choices are ideally derived from the underlying winning probability of each
option. In line with this reasoning, provided that the options’ expected values do differ,
the option with the higher expected value is chosen in the majority of cases (e.g., Hilbig
& Glöckner, 2011). At least, the option that has the higher expected value based on an
observed sample is predominantly chosen, regardless whether the sample properly maps
the options’ actual winning probabilities (Fiedler, 2000; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev,
2006). In other words, the stronger an option is associated with positive outcomes (e.g.,
gains), the more likely it is chosen. Correspondingly, evaluations can also be considered
as inferred contingencies between options and their outcomes.
In the following series of experiments, we were interested in which information is
considered for contingency learning and subsequent choice. We investigated information
sampling behavior and so called pseudocontingency inference across various experimental
conditions.
Contingency Between Binary Variables
In order to correctly determine a contingency between two binary variables math-
ematically, information on event co-occurrences is needed. In terms of a two-by-two
contingency table, all four cell frequencies have to be taken into account to express a
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contingency. Take, for instance the 2 x 2 contingency table labeled Context C1 in Ta-
ble 1. It contains 34 events of joint occurrences of the two binary variables option X and
outcome Y , taking values X1 and X2 (option) or Y 1 (gain) and Y 2 (loss; outcome). One
way to measure the contingency between options and outcomes is ∆p which compares
two conditional (winning) probabilities (Allan, 1980):
∆p = P (Y = “gain”|X = X1)− P (Y = “gain”|X = X2) (1)
In the example, P (“gain”|X1) = 1515+9 = .625 and P (“gain”|X2) = 88+2 = .80. There-
fore, ∆p = −.175 indicating an association between options and outcomes with a lower
probability of option X1 to result in a gain as compared with option X2.
The ability to assess contingencies has been widely recognized as essential for ev-
eryday life. Whether, for instance, in conditioning, between conditioned and uncondi-
tioned stimuli (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), or in causal reasoning, between causes
and effects (Cheng & Novick, 1992; Spellman & Mandel, 1999; Waldmann & Holyoak,
1992), researchers are interested in the cognitive process of assessing the contingency.
Not surprisingly, various measures or rules have been proposed on how individuals in-
tegrate information into a contingency judgment all of which suggest that (estimated)
cell frequencies or conditional probabilities constitute the input (Perales, Catena, Cán-
dido, & Maldonado, 2017). Accordingly, for a long time, it was assumed that individuals
infer contingencies in a similar way as the ∆p-measure is computed, by taking joint fre-
quencies (i.e., cell frequencies) into account. Yet, contingency inference does not merely
reflect co-occurrences or covariation knowledge, but instead subjective causal models may
guide which covariation information is used and how (Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Blaisdell,
2006). However, under certain conditions, decision makers might also employ simplifying
strategies.
Pseudocontingencies in Judgment and Choice
Empirical evidence suggests that cell frequencies are not necessarily used for con-
tingency inference. As a consequence, options’ evaluations may be based on information
other than cell frequencies, like marginal frequencies or base rates of options and out-
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comes (e.g., Fiedler, Freytag, & Meiser, 2009). When a contingency between two options
and two outcomes is indeed inferred based on their skewed base rates, the phenomenon
is referred to as pseudocontingency (Fiedler & Freytag, 2004; Fiedler et al., 2009; Fiedler,
Freytag, & Unkelbach, 2007; Kutzner, Freytag, Vogel, & Fiedler, 2008). Broadly speak-
ing, provided that there is one frequent category per variable, frequent categories may be
associated with each other as well as infrequent categories.
Pseudocontingency inferences are usually investigated with an experimental paradigm
comprising not only two options and two outcomes but also two contexts. Typically, one
option and one outcome are the frequent categories in one context, but the infrequent
categories in the other context. In that case, the options’ and outcomes’ base rates are
skewed within a context and covary across the contexts. By implication, the option vari-
able and the outcome variable are each correlated with the context variable. This gives
rise to the inference of a pseudocontingency between options and outcomes within each
context (Fiedler & Freytag, 2004; Meiser & Hewstone, 2004). Basically, the frequent
option is associated with the frequent outcome as well as the infrequent option with the
infrequent outcome within each context. Concisely, pseudocontingencies between two
variables are inferred on the basis of their skewed base rates or their pairwise contingen-
cies with a third variable (Fiedler et al., 2009, 2007; Fleig, Meiser, Ettlin, & Rummel,
2017; Meiser, Rummel, & Fleig, 2018).
The prefix pseudo does not mean that the inferred contingency is necessarily wrong,
instead, it merely indicates that the inference is based on aggregate information, like base
rates, rather than pairs of observations. Actually, pseudocontingency inferences are quite
adaptive and useful. For instance, when no information about the co-occurrence of two
options and two outcomes is available, but instead only their base rates, inferences about
their contingency can still be estimated based on the pseudocontingency heuristic. Ad-
ditionally, skewed base rates of two variables restrict the range of possible contingencies
between them (Duncan & Davis, 1953; Kline, 2011, p. 50; Meiser, 2006). Hence, pseu-
docontingencies can facilitate detecting the sign of true contingencies (Kutzner, Vogel,
Freytag, & Fiedler, 2011a). This is corroborated by a Bayesian algorithm with unbiased
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priors that provides increased posterior probabilities for contingency coefficients that are
in accordance with inferred pseudocontingencies when feeding in information on skewed
bases rates only (Klauer, 2015). Therefore, pseudocontingencies prove to be fairly good
estimates for genuine contingencies (Fiedler, Kutzner, & Vogel, 2013).
Nevertheless, in a contingency table, base rates do not determine cell frequencies,
wherefore the exact same marginal distribution can result from various cell frequencies.
Accordingly, an inferred pseudocontingency may differ and even be opposite in sign rel-
ative to the true contingency. Such scenarios, in which pseudocontingency and genuine
contingency contradict, are usually created for experimental studies investigating pseudo-
contingency inferences. Several experiments using various scenarios have demonstrated
that pseudocontingencies are inferred from skewed or covarying base rates and may in-
deed override existing contingencies (e.g., Fiedler, 2010; Fiedler & Freytag, 2004; Fiedler
et al., 2007; Meiser & Hewstone, 2004; Vogel, Freytag, Kutzner, & Fiedler, 2013). More
recently, it has been shown that the inference of a pseudocontingency may lead to sub-
optimal choice behavior even in situations of direct relevance for the respondent and free
choice (Fleig et al., 2017; Kutzner, Vogel, Freytag, & Fiedler, 2011b; Meiser et al., 2018).
These results suggest that decision makers perceive pseudocontingencies as solid basis for
their choice.
Those results, however, do not suggest that individuals cannot engage in genuine
contingency assessment. Cheng and Novick (1990, 1992), for instance, already argued
that covariations between multiple variables, like outcomes, options, and contexts, can
be assessed when considering the proportions of outcomes given all combinations of op-
tions and contexts (i.e., joint frequencies). Indeed, individuals are capable of assessing
genuine conditional probabilities or contingencies and may also consider a relevant third
(context) variable when being aware of its moderating role and if cognitively manageable
(Spellman, Price, & Logan, 2001; Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2001). Likewise, in studies on
pseudocontingencies discussed, participants are able to correctly infer contingencies be-
tween outcomes and contexts and also conditionalize their assessment of the contingency
between options and outcomes on the context variable (e.g., Fleig et al., 2017; Meiser et
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al., 2018). Still, under certain conditions, individuals fall back to using a more heuristic
account and infer pseudocontingencies, in the example between options and outcomes
within each context, even if the cell frequencies could in theory be used.
Context-Dependent Inference of Pseudocontingencies
In some experiments, an asymmetry in the strength of the inferred pseudocontin-
gency was observed between predominantly positive and predominantly negative domains
(Fleig et al., 2017; Meiser & Hewstone, 2004; Meiser et al., 2018). The experiments by
Fleig et al. (2017) and Meiser et al. (2018) too comprised two options resulting in either
a positive outcome or a negative outcome within two contexts. Option X1 and gains
were predominant within one context, with their base rates covarying across contexts, so
that option X1 and gains were the infrequent categories within the second context. This
suggested the inference of a pseudocontingency between options and outcomes which,
however, contradicted the genuine contingency within each context.
In the context of predominantly positive outcomes, Fleig et al. (2017) and Meiser et
al. (2018) could consistently observe the inference and use of the pseudocontingency, re-
sulting in participants preferring the option with the lower underlying winning probability.
Yet, in the second context of predominantly negative outcomes, the pseudocontingency
effect was weaker or even absent, so that participants preferred neither option. This asym-
metry might be explained by participants considering the predominantly negative context
as less important for subsequent choices as they would avoid choosing within that con-
text at all. Whenever participants learned that negative outcomes result predominantly
within a context, further regularities within that context, like the options’ base rates,
would hardly be learned. The genuine contingency between options and outcomes would
be detected even less likely. On the contrary, the asymmetry between predominantly pos-
itive contexts and predominantly negative contexts might also arise from allocating more
attention to the task at hand when negative outcomes are possible or likely (Yechiam &
Hochman, 2013, 2014). This might increase performance with the result that the genuine
contingency between options and outcomes is learned within the negative context and
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competes with the inferred pseudocontingency. Anyway, the asymmetry in the strength
of the inferred pseudocontingency may indicate that attention is allocated to available
information differently in a predominantly negative context and that contingencies are
learned differently in comparison with a mostly positive context.
Information Sampling
One possibility to examine which information is actually considered for contingency
learning is to leave information sampling to the participants themselves. So far, pseudo-
contingency inferences have primarily been investigated by presenting predetermined in-
formation to participants during a learning phase. Subsequently, in a decision phase, par-
ticipants had to evaluate and/or choose between the options that were presented during
the learning phase. In contrast, in typical experiments on information sampling, different
types of experimental paradigms have been employed (Wulff, Mergenthaler-Canseco, &
Hertwig, 2018). In the sampling paradigm, usually there are two options representing two
different payoff structures. To investigate self-directed information sampling participants
are free to sample any number of single events of any option in any order they desire.
No draw is incentivized except one final choice to be made after information sampling
(e.g., Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004). A learning phase, in which participants
have the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the options’ winning probabilities is
thus separated from a consequential decision phase. Hence, the basic structure of the
information sampling task is similar to experimental tasks investigating the inference of
(pseudo-)contingencies in which participants observe sequences of learning trials before
choosing between options.
However, research on free information sampling suggests that typically small sam-
ples are drawn when learning trials are self-determined. Hertwig et al. (2004) reported
a median total sample size of Md = 15 for sampling two options. Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer,
and Hertwig (2008) found even smaller total sample sizes of Md = 11. This in itself
may already be sufficient for a sample of options to become a less veridical representa-
tion of underlying winning probabilities (e.g., Hau et al., 2008; Hilbig & Glöckner, 2011).
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Although choices during free information sampling do not have direct consequences, in-
formation sampling may still depend on various factors, like the valence of potential
events or outcomes. On the one hand, it has been shown that larger total samples of
all options are drawn the higher the outcomes’ magnitudes (Hau et al., 2008), the more
likely losses are (Lejarraga, Hertwig, & Gonzalez, 2012; Wulff et al., 2018), and the more
similar the options’ expected values are (Wulff et al., 2018). On the other hand, research
is inconclusive whether individual options are also sampled to varying degrees. Although
it has been found that two options are sampled equally often independent of how risky
they are (Hau et al., 2008; Hertwig et al., 2004), Lejarraga et al. (2012) reported higher
samples of risky options as compared with safe options if the variance of a risky option
was encountered. Finally, Fiedler, Wöllert, Tauber, and Hess (2013) found that already
during learning, larger samples are drawn from positively evaluated options. Likewise,
Wulff et al. (2018) showed that over the course of trials participants were more likely to
sample the one option which they ultimately selected for their final, consequential choice.
Consequently, even for a rather simple scenario with only two options, results are
inconclusive. It is therefore unclear whether both options would be sampled to varying
degrees and whether thereby conditions for pseudocontingency inferences, in terms of
skewed base rates, would be created by self-determined, free information sampling. By
implication, it is an open question whether a freely drawn sample gives rise to the inference
of pseudocontingencies and whether they will contradict genuine contingencies. Most of
aforementioned research on information sampling uses two options that vary in their
outcomes’ magnitudes and probabilities of occurrence, but have similar expected payoffs
(nondominated choice problems). Studies on free information sampling reported that if
the two options do differ in their expected value (dominated choice problem) the option
with the higher expected value is preferred after learning provided that it also has the
higher expected value in the drawn sample (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2006; Hilbig & Glöckner,
2011). Contrarily, research on pseudocontingency inference suggests that this option
may only be preferred if it was the most frequently observed option when gains are
more likely than losses or if it was the least frequently observed option when losses
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are most common (cf. e.g., Fiedler et al., 2009). Fiedler et al. (2007), for example,
restricted the options to sample from. As a result, participants sampled skewed base
rates and inferred a pseudocontingency. Still, for a pseudocontingency to arise, skewed
base rates do not only have to be sampled, but they also have to be used for contingency
inference. Alternatively, sampling options freely, without any restrictions, may draw
the focus of attention away from base rates toward joint occurrences. In that case,
free information sampling might foster utilizing cell frequencies and genuine contingency
assessment, similarly to an experiment by Fleig et al. (2017) where participants had to
make a tally recording cell frequencies. Moreover, to the extent to which information
is sampled based on evaluations, these might already be the result of inferred (pseudo-)
contingencies based on the current sample. For those reasons, a systematic investigation
of the interplay between information sampling and contingency inference is needed.
Overview of Present Research
For this purpose, the present research investigated information sampling behavior
as well as its impact on the inference of pseudocontingencies in a decision scenario that
induces pseudocontingency inferences. All experiments were implemented in OpenSesame
(Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012) using the mousetrap plug-in to record mouse clicks
(Kieslich & Henninger, 2017). In Experiment 1, we implemented a new experimental
paradigm to replicate previous findings of pseudocontingency inference in self-relevant
choice (Fleig et al., 2017; Meiser et al., 2018). We tested whether a pseudocontingency
is inferred and used for actual and voluntary choices, thereby setting the stage for in-
vestigating effects of free information sampling on pseudocontingency inference in Ex-
periments 2 to 4. More specifically, in Experiment 2, differences between predetermined
information and self-determined information sampling were investigated in a bivariate
scenario comprising two options and two outcomes. Besides choices during a learning
phase, we analyzed choice behavior after learning, also as a function of the individual
sample drawn during learning. A trivariate decision scenario with the addition of two
contexts was used in Experiments 3 and 4. Experiment 3 aimed at the asymmetry be-
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tween predominantly positive contexts and predominantly negative contexts reflected by
stronger pseudocontingency inferences in predominantly positive contexts (Fleig et al.,
2017; Meiser & Hewstone, 2004; Meiser et al., 2018). We realized a sampling by context
condition, in which participants were allowed to choose which context to observe in each
learning trial, in order to test whether predominantly positive contexts are more or less
frequently observed than predominantly negative contexts. Due to such a potential bias
in attentional focus a (pseudo-)contingency might be learned to varying degrees. Exper-
iment 4, finally, extends Experiments 2 and 3. By implementing a sampling by context
and option condition we investigated whether a pseudocontingency is even inferred and
used when free information sampling is completely self-determined.
Experiment 1
The first experiment aimed at replicating the pseudocontingency effect on choice
behavior in relevant decisions. The experimental task was to evaluate two shares (options
X1 and X2). They were traded at two times of a day (contexts C1 and C2) and yielded
either a gain or a loss (outcomes Y1 and Y2) with different probabilities varying over the
time of day. Similar to earlier studies on pseudocontingencies, the underlying base rates
of options and outcomes were skewed within each context and covaried across contexts
resulting in pairwise contingencies with the context variable. After a series of learning
trials, participants traded the shares themselves while playing for points. If a pseudocon-
tingency between options and outcomes is inferred and used, participants should prefer
the predominant option within the predominantly positive context and the infrequent
option within the predominantly negative context.
Method
Participants. Forty-three participants were recruited at a German University to
take part in Experiment 1 (37 female, Mage = 25.98, SDage = 10.33). In return, they
received a compensation of e2.
Material and Procedure. Computerized instructions informed the participants
that the experiment was about assessment and trading of shares and that it comprised a
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learning phase as well as a subsequent decision phase. In the learning phase, participants
observed a total of 68 trials. In each trial, one context (i.e., either labeled as morning or
labeled as evening), one option (i.e., share hat or share pig), and the respective outcome
(i.e., gain or loss of 10 points) were presented. The two contexts and two options were
displayed at different positions on the screen and, additionally, were distinguishable by
their appearance (see Figure 1).
Table 1 shows the frequencies of occurrence for all single events during the learn-
ing phase. The respective winning probabilities were assigned to contexts and options
counterbalanced across participants. Over the course of the 68 learning trials, within
one context (C1) gains were more frequent than losses (23 × gains, 11 × losses) and
vice versa within the second context (C2; 11 × gains, 23 × losses). Thus, the con-
tingency between contexts and outcomes was ∆pY C = 2323+11 − 1111+23 = .353. Addi-
Figure 1 . Two sample displays during the learning phase of Experiments 1, 3, and 4.
The left example shows an event of the right share "pig" in the context "morning" that
results in a loss (-10). The right example displays an event of the left share "hat" in the
context "evening" that results in a gain (+10). The bar charts visualize context-
dependent base rates of options (upper bar chart per context) and outcomes (lower bar
chart per context) observed on previous trials within the respective context. The
display during the decision phase was similar, with the exception of neither showing
context-dependent base rates nor displaying the outcomes of each individual trial.
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tionally, one option (X1) was more frequent than the other option (X2) within con-
text C1 (24 × X1, 10 × X2) and vice versa within context C2 (10 × X1, 24 × X2).
The contingency between contexts and options was ∆pXC = 2424+10 − 1010+24 = .412.
Aggregated across contexts, a zero correlation between options and outcomes resulted
(∆pY X = 15+215+2+9+8 − 8+98+9+2+15 = .00). However, within each context, the contingency
between options and outcomes was ∆pY X|C1 = 1515+9 − 88+2 = −.175 and ∆pY X|C2 =
2
2+8 − 99+15 = −.175, respectively. Therefore, conditional on context, option X2 had a
higher winning probability than option X1. However, the options’ and outcomes’ base
rates were skewed within each context and covaried across contexts suggesting instead the
association of option X1 with gains and the association of option X2 with losses within
each context according to a pseudocontingency.
The 68 learning trials summarized in Table 1 were presented in random order over
the course of the learning phase. In an individual learning trial, first, the context (morning
vs. evening) was displayed. After 650 ms an option (pig or hat) was highlighted by
increasing its size and decreasing its transparency (cf. Figure 1). After another 650 ms
the respective outcome (gain vs. loss) was additionally presented. Context, option, and
Table 1
2 x 2 Contingency Tables Representing Probability Distributions and Contingencies
Between Contexts, Options, and Outcomes Underlying All Experiments.
Context C1 Context C2
Option X1 Option X2 Option X1 Option X2
Outcome Y1 15 (.44) 8 (.24) 23 (.68) 2 (.06) 9 (.26) 11 (.32)
Outcome Y2 9 (.26) 2 (.06) 11 (.32) 8 (.24) 15 (.44) 23 (.68)
24 (.71) 10 (.29) 10 (.29) 24 (.71)
Note. Absolute frequencies are shown, as well as context-specific probabilities in
parentheses. ∆pY X|C1 = −.175; ∆pY X|C2 = −.175 ; ∆pXC = .412; ∆pY C = .353;
∆pY X = .00
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outcome were displayed together for another 650 ms. After an intertrial interval of 500 ms
the next learning trial started. In addition to the individual events of contexts, options,
and outcomes, context-dependent base rates of options and outcomes within each context
were visualized and updated in each learning trial. Below each context, one pair of bars
depicted the current frequencies of option X1 events versus option X2 events within the
respective context. A second pair of bars represented the total number of gains and losses
observed within the context so far (cf. Figure 1). Visualizing context-dependent base
rates might enhance the salience of skewed base rates varying across contexts and thereby
the predicted pseudocontingency effect (Meiser et al., 2018).
Following the learning phase, participants had to repeatedly choose between the
options. The first half of 24 choice trials were forced choice trials, the second half were free
choice trials. In each of the 12 forced choice trials, the experimental program determined
the context which then was displayed including the options. Then, participants had to
choose between the two options while aiming at maximizing points. After participants
selected one of the options via mouse click, the next decision trial started. Each option
could either result in a gain of 10 points or a loss of 10 points. The options’ winning
probabilities within each context were identical to the learning phase (cf. Table 1), but
participants did not receive feedback on the obtained outcome or their performance until
the very end of the experiment. In the 12 subsequent free choice trials, participants had
the additional opportunity to skip a trial by clicking on a field labeled skip instead of
an option after the context was set by the experimental program. In the forced choice
trials as well as in the free choice trials, both contexts were presented six times each, in
randomized order.
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to estimate the contexts’
and options’ winning probabilities. They should indicate the winning probability of each
option within each context as well as the overall winning probabilities of the contexts and
the options across contexts. For this purpose, first, each context-option combination was
presented in random order. Afterwards, each option and each context were presented
separately and again in random order. Participants were asked to state the winning
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probability on a scale from 0 to 100.
Based on previous research on pseudocontingencies, we expected participants to in-
fer the genuine contingency between contexts and outcomes. Therefore, they should skip
more free choice trials given context C2 of predominantly losses as compared with context
C1 of predominantly gains and give higher winning probability estimates for context C1
than for context C2. Moreover, we expected participants to also take the context into
account when inferring the contingency between options and outcomes. If a pseudocon-
tingency was inferred on the basis of the options’ and outcomes’ base rates within each
context, participants should prefer option X1 to option X2, even though this pseudo-
contingency contradicted the genuine contingency in each context (i.e., P (“gain”|X1) <
P (“gain”|X2); ∆pY X|C1 = ∆pY X|C2 = −.175). As Wulff et al. (2015) showed that re-
peatedly choosing between options may alter choice behavior in order to maximize gains
in the long run as compared with one single choice, we expected option X1 to be chosen
more frequently than option X2 as the participants’ task was to maximize points while
no feedback on the outcome of each individual trial was given. Equivalently to choice,
participants should estimate the winning probability of option X1 to be higher than the
winning probability of option X2, even though option X2 had a higher true winning
probability.
Results
Choice Behavior. First, to analyze the relative frequencies of decisions to play
a trial within a given context in free choice trials, we conducted a paired t-test predicting
the relative frequencies by context. In accordance with the contexts’ underlying winning
probabilities, participants made more choices in the predominantly positive context C1 as
compared with the predominantly negative context C2, t(42) = 5.49, p < .001, d = 0.84.
On average, participants played in M = 5.35 (SD = 1.02) out of six free choice trials
in the predominantly positive context, but in only M = 3.28 (SD = 2.12) trials in the
predominantly negative context. Six participants skipped all six free choice trials in the
predominantly negative context C2.
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For all remaining free choice trials as well as for all forced choice trials, according
to our hypotheses, we expected a pseudocontingency effect on choice behavior resulting
in a preference for option X1 within both contexts. Therefore, the primary dependent
variable was dichotomous (choosing option X1 coded as 1, choosing option X2 coded
as 0). Furthermore, owing to the additional opportunity to skip a free choice trial, we
faced different numbers of observations per participant for free choices between options.
On these grounds, we used generalized linear mixed models to analyze the probability
to choose option X1 over option X2 in individual trials, as they use the available data
through a full-information approach and are appropriate for modeling binary dependent
variables (e.g., McCulloch, Searle, & Neuhaus, 2008; Snijders & Bosker, 2012).1
In Experiment 1, we analyzed the probability that participant i chooses option X1
in trial j as a function of the trial-level predictors context and trial type. The predictor
context contrast-coded the decision context with the predominantly positive context C1
coded as 1 and the predominantly negative context C2 coded as -1. For the contrast-
coded predictor trial type, forced choice trials were coded as 1 and free choice trials
were coded as -1. Additionally, we accounted for between-participants differences in the
propensity to choose option X1 through a random intercept. Differences in the effects
of context and trial type were analyzed by specifying random slopes. The probability to
choose option X1 and the resulting linear prediction model, with γ denoting fixed effects
and u denoting random effects, were related with a logit link function:2
ln
(
p(Yij = “X1”)
1− p(Yij = “X1”)
)
= γ00 + (γ10 + u1j) · context+ (γ20 + u2j) · trial (2)
+(γ30 + u3j) · context · trial + u0j
All analyses were conducted in R (R Core Team, 2018) using the lme4 package
(Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) for estimating generalized linear mixed models.
1 In all experiments, two ANOVAs predicting relative frequencies of choices in forced choice trials and in
free choice trials separately provided results equivalent to those of the generalized linear mixed models.
2 The random effects were uncorrelated. A model estimating correlations among the random effects
failed to converge. Although its results should be interpreted with caution, they were equivalent to the
reported model without estimating correlations among random effects.
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Table 2 summarizes relative frequencies of choices aggregated across choice trials and
participants. The descriptive statistics imply a preference for option X1, as opposed
to option X2. In line, the generalized linear mixed model yielded a significant positive
intercept, γ00 = 0.68, SE = 0.21, p = .001, indicating an above chance probability to
choose option X1 in individual choice trials. Neither context nor trial type did have
significant effects, p ≥ .439. All parameter estimates of the generalized linear mixed
model are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix.
Probability Estimations. With regard to the estimated winning probabilities
of options within contexts, a within ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of con-
text, F (1, 42) = 16.75, p < .001, η2 = 0.06. In line with participants’ choice behavior,
the results indicated higher winning probability estimates within the predominantly pos-
itive context C1 (cf. Table 2). The main effect of option fell short of significance,
F (1, 42) = 3.27, p = .078, η2 = 0.02, but was in the direction of the pseudocontingency,
preferring option X1. The interaction between context and option was nonsignificant,
F (1, 42) < 1, p = .655. Analyzing the estimated unconditional winning probabilities of
contexts, likewise, participants gave significantly higher winning probability estimates
for the predominantly positive context C1 (M = 63.88, SD = 13.49) as compared
with the predominantly negative context C2 (M = 41.23, SD = 17.82), t(42) = 5.70,
p < .001, d = 0.87. Finally, a paired t-test comparing the estimated winning prob-
abilities of options across contexts showed significantly higher estimates for option X1
(M = 54.53, SD = 13.96) as compared with option X2 (M = 43.95, SD = 14.33),
t(42) = 3.23, p = .002, d = 0.49.
Discussion
Experiment 1 aimed at replicating the pseudocontingency effect on choice behavior.
To this end, participants had to evaluate two options, each presented within two con-
texts. A pseudocontingency effect should be reflected in the preference of the frequent
option within the predominantly positive context and a preference of the infrequent option
within the predominantly negative context (i.e., option X1 within both contexts). Taken
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Table 2
Relative Frequencies of Choices and Winning Probability Estimates of Options Within
Contexts in Experiment 1
Context C1 Context C2
Option X1 Option X2 Option X1 Option X2
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Relative choice frequency 61.33 32.31 38.67 32.31 60.07 31.03 39.93 31.03
Estimated probabilities 54.95 20.36 46.95 22.31 42.60 21.32 37.84 19.42
Note. Data in percent.
together, the results of Experiment 1 demonstrate that participants indeed inferred and
used the pseudocontingency between options and outcomes as basis for their judgments
and choices. Even though they correctly identified the context with the higher underlying
winning probability, participants did not learn the genuine contingency between options
and outcomes within a context. Instead, they preferred the option with the actually lower
winning probability within each context, independent of whether in forced choices or free
choices.
Yet, literature on information sampling might render learning situations like, for
instance, in Experiment 1 artificial. When learning trials are not predetermined, free
information sampling might create learning situations in which decision makers do not
(need to) fall back on a pseudocontingency to make a choice. Instead, they might be
able to detect genuine contingencies between options and outcomes in order to inform
their decisions. If pseudocontingencies were also inferred and used when engaging in
self-determined information sampling, however, this could be a further indication that
pseudocontingencies are a robust and even more relevant effect. Hence, building on
Experiment 1, we investigated free information sampling behavior and its impact on
pseudocontingency inference and choice behavior, in a bivariate scenario in Experiment 2
and in a trivariate scenario in Experiments 3 and 4.
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Experiment 2
Research on free information sampling suggests that the total sample size drawn
might be influenced by certain factors such as the options’ expected values (e.g., Wulff et
al., 2018). Yet, research is inconclusive whether there is a bias in sample sizes per option
or whether a drawn sample comprises all options evenly. In addition, regarding choice in
a subsequent decision phase, studies on free information sampling reported a preference
of the option with a higher expected value (Hertwig et al., 2006; Hilbig & Glöckner, 2011).
By contrast, in accordance with literature on pseudocontingency inference, a preference
for the option with the higher underlying winning probability would only be expected if
it was the predominant option within a decision scenario of mostly positive outcomes or
if it was the infrequent option when mostly negative outcomes result and just as long as
only the base rates are taken into account (e.g., Fiedler et al., 2009).
Consequently, Experiment 2 used the decision scenario introduced in Experiment 1
and investigated whether two options are sampled to varying degrees if information sam-
pling is free and not predetermined. Most research on free information sampling compares
two options, wherefore we reduced the decision scenario to only two options within one
context for Experiment 2. The variable context (predominantly positive context C1 vs.
predominantly negative context C2) was realized as a between-participants factor. More-
over, because literature on free information sampling is inconclusive whether options will
be sampled to varying degrees and whether skewed base rates of options will result, we
analyzed sampling behavior and pseudocontingency inference in a free information sam-
pling condition as compared with a condition with predetermined learning trials. When
participants are allowed to engage in information sampling, they may sample the option
with the lower underlying winning probability more frequently, less frequently, or as often
as the other option. Therefore, the skewness of base rates depends on the individual sam-
pling strategy. Additionally, it is an open question whether subsequent choices will also
be based on (skewed) base rates (i.e., a pseudocontingency) when learning trials are not
predetermined. While preferences will depend on the individual sample in the sampling
conditions, we expected participants in the no sampling conditions to prefer option X1,
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with a lower underlying winning probability than option X2, as in Experiment 1 and in
line with a pseudocontingency inference.
Method
Participants and Design. To investigate differences between free information
sampling and predetermined learning trials within a predominantly positive context
as well as within a predominantly negative context, we implemented 2 x 2 between-
participants conditions with information sampling procedure (no sampling vs. sampling
by option) and context (predominantly positive C1 vs. predominantly negative C2) as in-
dependent variables. Additionally, option (X1 vs. X2) was realized as within-participant
factor. For Experiment 2, a total of 128 participants were recruited at the University of
Mannheim (104 female, Mage = 21.14, SDage = 4.43). They participated in return for a
compensation of either e1 or partial course credit and were randomly allocated to the no
sampling-positive context condition (n = 34), the no sampling-negative context condition
(n = 32), the sampling-positive context condition (n = 29), and the sampling-negative
context condition (n = 31). Two participants had to be excluded, because they did not
sample each option at least once during learning.
Material and Procedure. Materials and experimental procedure of Experi-
ment 2 were similar to Experiment 1. However, because context was manipulated as
between-participants factor, participants only observed a total of 34 trials during the
learning phase. The two options were again presented next to each other, but for Experi-
ment 2 at the center of the screen. The total number of trials was fixed for all experimental
conditions in order to ensure the same total amount of information per participant as well
as to prevent biases in samples only due to small sample sizes. For participants in the no
sampling conditions, the experimental procedure was identical to Experiment 1: in each
learning trial, one option and the respective outcome were presented. Participants in the
no sampling-positive context condition only observed the learning trials corresponding to
the absolute frequencies of context C1 depicted in Table 1. Likewise, participants in the
no sampling-negative context condition observed the 34 events of context C2 in random
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order. In the two sampling by option conditions, participants engaged in free information
sampling. There, in each learning trial, the two options were presented on the screen.
Then, participants selected one of the two options. After 650 ms, the respective out-
come was presented. They had to sample 34 events, but were free to sample from any
option and in any order they desired without each draw contributing to their individual
earnings. In the sampling by option-positive context condition, the outcomes were ran-
domly drawn from the distribution of each option within context C1 in Table 1. In the
sampling by option-negative context condition, the outcomes were drawn in accordance
with the event distributions of context C2 in Table 1 in random order. As in Experiment
1, the respective winning probabilities were assigned to options counterbalanced across
participants in all experimental conditions.
In the following decision phase, participants had to choose between the two options
20 times. As in Experiment 1, the first half of trials were forced choice trials whereas the
second half were free choice trials. The options’ winning probabilities were identical to the
learning phase. That is, both options were more likely to result in a gain in the positive
context conditions than in the negative context conditions and the underlying winning
probability of option X2 was higher than the underlying winning probability of option
X1. Again, in the decision phase, participants did not receive feedback on the obtained
outcome of each choice. At the end of the experiment, participants had to estimate the
options’ winning probabilities on a scale from 0 to 100.
Results
Means of relative frequencies of choices during the sampling phase and the deci-
sion phase as well as winning probability estimates are displayed in Table 3. Sampling
behavior and choice behavior were analyzed in generalized linear mixed models whereas
participants’ winning probability estimates were analyzed by means of a mixed ANOVA.
Whereas investigating sampling behavior on an aggregate level would inform about over-
all preferences during sampling, the generalized linear mixed model analysis allows to
predict information sampling behavior in individual trials as a function of individual
previous observations.
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Table 3
Relative Frequencies of Samples, Relative Frequencies of Choices, and Winning
Probability Estimates of Options in Each Experimental Condition of Experiment 2
Option X1 Option X2
M SD M SD
Relative frequency of samples
sampling, C1 46.55 17.47 53.45 17.47
sampling, C2 49.72 11.94 50.28 11.94
Relative frequency of choices
no sampling, C1 56.73 22.27 43.27 22.27
no sampling, C2 47.66 19.36 52.34 19.36
sampling, C1 42.22 24.71 57.78 24.71
sampling, C2 46.26 25.99 53.74 25.99
Estimated winning probabilities
no sampling, C1 59.88 15.31 53.62 19.05
no sampling, C2 42.50 19.09 45.09 18.17
sampling, C1 56.90 20.07 61.03 20.21
sampling, C2 36.94 15.38 49.55 19.82
Note. Data in percent. The experimental conditions in
Experiment 2 result from the 2 x 2 between-subject factors
sampling procedure (no sampling vs. sampling by options) and
context (predominantly positive C1 vs. predominantly negative
C2).
Information Sampling Behavior. In order to analyze the probability to sample
option X1 in an individual learning trial, a generalized linear mixed model was specified
that included a random intercept as well as fixed slopes for previous option (prevX) and
previous outcome (prevY) at the trial-level. When a participant sampled option X1 in the
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previous trial the predictor previous option had the value 1. When option X2 was sampled
in the preceding trial, it had the value -1. The predictor previous outcome was contrast-
coded, too (gain vs. loss, coded as 1 and -1, respectively). The contrast-coded predictor
context (predominantly positive context C1 coded as 1, predominantly negative context
C2 coded as -1) was entered at the person-level. Additionally, the predictors’ interactions
were added:3
ln
(
p(Yij = “X1”)
1− p(Yij = “X1”)
)
= γ00 + γ01 · context+ γ10 · prevX + γ20 · prevY (3)
+γ30 · context · prevX + γ40 · context · prevY
+γ50 · prevX · prevY + γ60 · context · prevX · prevY + u0j
Parameter estimates of the generalized linear mixed model are reported in TableA2
in the Appendix. The nonsignificant intercept reflected no overall preference for any
option during sampling, γ00 = −0.04, SE = 0.07, p = .559. However, as the effect
of previous option was significant and positive, γ10 = 0.67, SE = 0.06, p < .001, the
probability to sample option X1 in a learning trial increased if it had been sampled in
the preceding learning trial and decreased if option X2 had been sampled. Moreover,
when option X1 resulted in a gain or when option X2 resulted in a loss in the previous
trial, the probability to sample option X1 rose, γ50 = 0.29, SE = 0.06, p < .001. Put
differently, the probability to resample an option was high, especially when it led to a
positive outcome in the preceding trial. None of the other effects was significant, p ≥ .172.
Choice Behavior. Analyzing the relative frequencies to skip a free choice trial, a
2 (context: predominantly positive vs. predominantly negative) x 2 (sampling procedure:
no sampling vs. sampling by option) between-participants ANOVA showed a significant
main effect of context, F (1, 122) = 19.72, p < .001, η2 = 0.139. In the positive context
conditions, participants skipped less free choice trials (M = 1.46, SD = 1.37) than par-
ticipants in the negative context conditions (M = 3.16, SD = 2.68). Four participants in
the negative context conditions even skipped all free choice trials. The main effect of sam-
3 A model including previous option and previous outcome as random effects failed to converge, but led
to equivalent results although they should be interpreted with caution.
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pling procedure and its interaction with context were nonsignificant, F (1, 122) ≤ 0.41,
p ≥ .521.
As in Experiment 1, choice between options was analyzed by means of a generalized
linear mixed model predicting the probability to choose option X1 in each choice trial.
The model comprised a random intercept as well as the predictor type of trial (trial)
that contrast-coded whether the choice trial was a forced choice trial (coded as 1) or a
free choice trial (coded as -1). Moreover, the experimental conditions were added at the
person-level by including the two factors context and sampling procedure as well as their
interaction. They were each contrast-coded, as well, with value 1 indicating context C1
or sampling by option, respectively, and value -1 indicating context C2 or no sampling.
The full model also included all additional interaction terms:4
ln
(
p(Yij = “X1”)
1− p(Yij = “X1”)
)
= γ00 + γ01 · sampling + γ02 · context+ (γ10 + u1j) · trial (4)
+γ03 · sampling · context+ γ11 · sampling · trial
+γ12 · context · trial + γ13 · sampling · context · trial + u0j
Table A3 in the Appendix reports all parameter estimates of the generalized linear
mixed model. The intercept was nonsignificant, γ00 = −0.14, SE = 0.10, p = .173,
showing no overall preference for one of the two options. Still, the probability to choose
option X1 was lower in the sampling by option conditions than in the no sampling condi-
tions, γ01 = −0.21, SE = 0.10, p = .033, indicating a preference for option X2 with the
higher genuine winning probability in the sampling by option conditions. Furthermore,
the probability to choose option X1 was higher in forced choice trials as compared with
free choice trials, γ10 = 0.13, SE = 0.05, p = .007, especially in the conditions of the
predominantly negative context C2 as indicated by a significant interaction γ12 = −0.12,
SE = 0.05, p = .014. All other parameter estimates were non-significant, p ≥ .152.
Effects of Sampling on Choice Behavior. For the purpose of analyzing the
relationship between sampling behavior and choice behavior, we estimated a generalized
4 A model estimating correlations among random effects failed to converge. Although its results should
be interpreted with caution, they were equivalent to the reported model.
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linear mixed model of choice behavior only in the two sampling by option conditions.
Besides the between-participants condition context (predominantly positive context C1
coded as 1 vs. predominantly negative context C2 coded as -1), the relative frequency
of sampling option X1 during the learning phase was entered as person-level predictor
(relX1). The relative frequencies of option X1 samples were calculated by dividing the
number of times a participant had sampled option X1 by the total number of learning tri-
als (34) and subtracting the constant c = .50. Again, we included trial type (forced choice
trials coded as 1 vs. free choice trials coded as -1) as trial-level predictor. Consequently,
the full model was:5
ln
(
p(Yij = “X1”)
1− p(Yij = “X1”)
)
= γ00 + γ01 · context+ γ02 · relX1 + γ10 · trial (5)
+γ03 · context · relX1 + γ20 · context · trial
+γ30 · relX1 · trial + γ40 · context · relX1 · trial + u0j
Parameter estimates are reported in Table A4 in the Appendix. The negative
intercept, γ00 = −0.26, SE = 0.12, p = .032, reflects an overall preference for option
X2, if both options were sampled equally often during the learning phase. Still, the
more frequently option X1 was sampled during learning, the higher the probability to
choose option X1 in the decision phase, γ02 = 6.63, SE = 0.98, p < .001. Again, as was
observed for choice behavior of all participants, including the no sampling conditions, the
probability to choose option X1 was higher in forced choice trials in the negative context
condition and in free choice trials in the positive context condition as compared with
forced choice trials in the positive context condition and free choice trials in the negative
context condition, γ20 = −0.14, SE = 0.07, p = .083. None of the other effects was
significant, p ≥ .083.
Probability Estimations. We analyzed participants’ winning probability esti-
mates by a 2 (sampling procedure: no sampling vs. sampling by option) x 2 (context:
predominantly positive context C1 vs. predominantly negative context C2) x 2 (option:
5 A generalized linear mixed model including trial type as random effect failed to converge. Although
its results should be interpreted cautiously, they were equivalent to those reported.
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X1 vs. X2) mixed ANOVA. The winning probability estimates for the two options dif-
fered depending on context, as indicated by the main effect of context, F (1, 122) = 45.81,
p < .001, η2 = 0.135. In line with the genuine winning probabilities, participants in the
predominantly positive context conditions gave higher winning probability estimates than
participants in the predominantly negative context conditions. Moreover, according to a
significant two-way interaction between sampling procedure and option, F (1, 122) = 4.12,
p = .045, η2 = 0.019, the options’ estimated winning probabilities depended on the sam-
pling procedure, too. Follow-up analyses on this interaction, using the Bonferroni-Holm
method to control for the error rate, showed higher overall estimated winning probabili-
ties for option X2 than option X1 in the sampling by option conditions, t(122) = −2.30,
p = .046, whereas there was no significant difference between options for the no sampling
conditions, t(122) = 0.53, p = .598. All other main effects and interactions were not
significant F (1, 122) ≤ 2.97, p ≥ .087.
Discussion
In Experiment 2, we compared free information sampling by option with predeter-
mined learning trials and their consequences for pseudocontingency inference and choice
between two options. While participants in the no sampling conditions observed learning
trials in random order, our results suggest that participants engaging in free information
sampling used a win-stay/lose-shift strategy to decide which option to sample in each
trial. Besides, in line with some research on free information sampling (e.g., Hau et al.,
2008; Hertwig et al., 2004), overall, none of the two options was sampled more frequently
than the other. When both options were sampled equally often, no pseudocontingency
was inferred, but instead the option with the higher underlying winning probability was
preferred. However, the more frequently an option was sampled, the more likely it was
chosen in a subsequent decision phase, too, independent of whether it was the option
with the higher or lower underlying winning probability. At least for a predominantly
positive context, this means that pseudocontingencies may also be inferred if information
sampling is self-determined. Compared with free information sampling, participants in
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the no sampling conditions were more likely to choose the option with the lower underly-
ing winning probability after learning, although a pseudocontingency effect was also not
apparent in the winning probability estimates.
Most research on pseudocontingencies uses a trivariate scenario as in Experiment 1,
because pairwise contingencies of options and outcomes with a context factor may foster
pseudocontingency inferences (cf. Fleig et al., 2017; Meiser et al., 2018). Still, asymme-
tries in the strength of the inferred pseudocontingency between predominantly positive
contexts and predominantly negative contexts have been found (Fleig et al., 2017; Meiser
& Hewstone, 2004; Meiser et al., 2018), as well. For these reasons, Experiments 3 and 4
aimed at extending research on information sampling to a trivariate decision scenario.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 investigated whether attention is allocated to contexts to varying
degrees and whether asymmetric attention allocation may result in asymmetric pseudo-
contingency effects. Contexts may be sampled to varying degrees as a function of their
valences. On the one hand, as soon as a context is associated with losses it might be
considered as irrelevant. As such a context would be avoided for decisions as possible, it
might soon be disregarded during learning. Therefore, neither a pseudocontingency nor
a genuine contingency between options and outcomes would be inferred within that con-
text. On the other hand, decision makers might pay particular attention to and therefore
draw larger samples of options within a predominantly negative context (Lejarraga et
al., 2012; Wulff et al., 2018) in order to avoid negative outcomes and experiences in later
decisions.
Consequently, in Experiment 3, we compared free information sampling by context
to predetermined learning trials in a trivariate decision scenario with a predominantly
positive context and a predominantly negative context. When learning trials are pre-
determined, skewed base rates of options and outcomes are presented within a context
that covary across contexts (cf. Table 1). According to pseudocontingency research, a
pseudocontingency should be inferred resulting in a preference of the option which is
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predominant within a mostly positive context and infrequent within a predominantly
negative context (e.g, Fiedler et al., 2009; Fiedler, Kutzner, & Vogel, 2013; Meiser &
Hewstone, 2004, 2010). Again, we expected suboptimal choice behavior indicated by a
preference for option X1 instead of option X2 in the no sampling condition. Contrarily, if
learning is self-determined, decision makers engaging in sampling by context may sample
one context more extensively than the other. On the one hand, the focus on one context
may allow for increased performance in contingency learning within that context and
thereby choice. On the other hand, sampling by contexts may induce a general focus on
contexts and thereby increase the salience of pairwise contingencies of options and out-
comes with contexts that exist in the underlying event distribution. This in turn may lead
to stronger pseudocontingency effects (Meiser et al., 2018) when sampling information
by context in the trivariate scenario. Thus, we expected choice preferences and winning
probability estimates to depend on information sampling.
Method
Participants and Design. Seventy-six participants (53 female, Mage = 23.39,
SDage = 6.06) were recruited at the University of Mannheim to participate in Experi-
ment 3 in return for a compensation of either e2 or partial course credit. Information
sampling procedure (sampling by context vs. no sampling) was manipulated as between-
participants factor. The variables context (predominantly positive C1 vs. predominantly
negative C2) and option (X1 vs. X2) were implemented as within-participant factors.
Thus, the participants were randomly allocated to the no sampling condition (n = 37)
and the sampling by context condition (n = 39).
Material and Procedure. In Experiment 3, the materials and experimental
procedure were identical to Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. In the sampling
by context condition, participants sampled from each of the two contexts freely, in any
order they desired without each draw contributing to their earnings. In each learning
trial, participants first selected one of the two contexts. After 650 ms of presenting only
the selected context including both options, one option was highlighted by increasing its
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size and reducing its transparency. After another 650 ms, the outcome followed. Option
and outcome were drawn by the experimental program and in accordance with the event
distributions of the respective context in Table 1 in random order. In contrast, in the no
sampling condition, context, option, and outcome were determined by the experimental
program according to the event frequencies depicted in Table 1 and identical to Experi-
ment 1. Again, the respective winning probabilities were assigned to contexts and options
counterbalanced across participants in both experimental conditions. Besides, the total
number of following choice trials amounted to 16 forced choice trials and 16 free choice
trials.
Results
Information Sampling Behavior. In Experiment 3, the probability to sample
the predominantly positive context C1 in each learning trial was analyzed by means of a
generalized linear mixed model including a random intercept as well as previous context
(prevC) and previous outcome (prevY) as trial-level predictors. These two predictors were
contrast-coded and indicated the context (positive context C1 coded as 1 vs. negative
context C1 coded as -1) and outcome (gain coded as 1 vs. loss coded as -1) of the previous
trial:6
ln
(
p(Yij = “C1”)
1− p(Yij = “C1”)
)
= γ00 + γ10 · prevC + γ20 · prevY (6)
+γ30 · prevC · prevY + u0j
On average, participants in the sampling by context condition sampled the predom-
inantly positive context C1 in M = 35.23 (SD = 5.15) out of 68 learning trials. Accord-
ingly, the intercept of the generalized linear mixed model was nonsignificant, γ00 = 0.00,
SE = 0.04, p = .909, indicating no overall preference for one context during information
sampling. Yet, the probability to sample the predominantly positive context C1 increased
if it was sampled in the previous trial, γ10 = 0.64, SE = 0.04, p < .001, especially if it
6 A model including previous context and previous outcome as random effects failed to converge, but led
to equivalent results, although they should be interpreted with caution.
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resulted in a gain, γ30 = 0.18, SE = 0.04, p < .001. The main effect of previous outcome
per se was nonsignificant γ20 = 0.05, SE = 0.04, p = .249. All parameter estimates are
depicted in Table A5 in the Appendix.
Choice Behavior. The frequencies of making a choice within each context over
the course of the free choice trials were analyzed by a 2 (sampling procedure: no sampling
vs. sampling by context) x 2 (context: predominantly positive vs. predominantly nega-
tive) mixed ANOVA with context as within-participant factor. A significant main effect
of context, F (1, 74) = 29.96, p < .001, η2 = 0.182 indicated that in the decision phase,
participants skipped more trials in the predominantly negative context C2 as compared
with the predominantly positive context C1. On average, participants skipped M = 0.67
(SD = 1.20) out of eight free choice trials in context C1 and M = 2.58 (SD = 2.61) out
of eight free choice trials in context C2. Seven participants even skipped all free choice
trials in context C2. Neither the main effect of sampling procedure nor its interaction
with context was significant, F (1, 74) ≤ 0.42, p ≥ 0.517.
Mean relative frequencies of choosing the two options within each context are shown
in Table 4. Again, the probability to choose option X1 in each choice trial was analyzed
by using a generalized linear mixed model comprising a random intercept as well as
the contrast-coded predictors context (predominantly positive context C1 coded as 1,
predominantly negative context C2 coded as -1) and trial (forced choice trial coded as 1,
free choice trial coded as -1) as random effects at trial-level and experimental condition
at the level of person (sampling: no sampling coded as -1, sampling by context coded as
1):7
ln
(
p(Yij = “X1”)
1− p(Yij = “X1”)
)
= γ00 + γ01 · sampling + (γ10 + u1j) · context (7)
+(γ20 + u2j) · trial + γ11 · sampling · context
+γ21 · sampling · trial + (γ30 + u3j) · context · trial
+γ31 · sampling · context · trial + u0j
7 A generalized linear mixed model estimating correlations among the random effects failed to converge.
Although its results should therefore be interpreted with caution, they were equivalent to the estimated
model without estimating correlations among random effects.
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Parameter estimates of the generalized linear mixed model are reported in TableA6
in the Appendix. The probability to choose option X1 was significantly different from
chance in the predominantly positive context C1 as indicated by a significant positive
intercept, γ00 = 0.44, SE = 0.12, p < .001, together with the significant effect of context,
γ10 = 0.57, SE = 0.17, p = .001. As suggested by the effect of context outweighing
the positive intercept, participants did not prefer any option within the predominantly
negative context C2. All other effects were nonsignificant, p ≥ .150.
Effects of Sampling on Choice Behavior. In order to analyze the effect of
the relative frequency of sampling the predominantly positive context C1 during learning
on choice behavior, we estimated a generalized linear mixed model of choice only in
the sampling by context condition. The relative frequencies of context C1 samples were
calculated by dividing the number of context C1 samples of each participant by the
total number of learning trials (68) and subtracting the constant c = .50. The relative
frequency (relC1) was entered as a person-level predictor in the generalized linear mixed
model. Again, we included the trial-level predictor trial type (forced choice trials coded
as 1 vs. free choice trials coded as -1).8
ln
(
p(Yij = “X1”)
1− p(Yij = “X1”)
)
= γ00 + γ01 · relC1 + (γ10 + u1j) · context (8)
+(γ20 + u2j) · trial + γ11 · relC1 · context+ γ21 · relC1 · trial
+γ30 · context · trial + γ40 · relC1 · context · trial + u0j
The relative frequency of sampling the predominantly positive context C1 during
learning did not affect the probability to choose option X1 in individual choice trials,
γ01 = 1.69, SE = 3.32, p = .611. As for the generalized linear mixed model including all
participants, the intercept was significant and positive, γ00 = 0.64, SE = 0.25, p = .011,
indicating an above chance probability to choose option X1. Again, the probability to
choose option X1 was higher within context C1 as compared with context C2, γ10 = 0.67,
SE = 0.33, p = .046. All parameter estimates are shown in Table A7 in the Appendix.
8 A generalized linear mixed model that included the interaction of context and trial as random effect
and estimated correlations among random effects failed to converge. Although its results should therefore
be interpreted with caution, they were equivalent to those of the reported model.
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Table 4
Relative Frequencies of Choices and Winning Probability Estimates of Options Within
Contexts in Each Experimental Condition of Experiment 3
Context C1 Context C2
Option X1 Option X2 Option X1 Option X2
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Relative choice frequency
no sampling 65.49 22.59 34.51 22.59 46.30 23.44 53.70 23.44
sampling by context 66.54 33.16 33.46 33.16 50.75 32.98 49.25 32.98
Estimated probabilities
no sampling 62.76 22.81 39.76 19.20 34.24 20.09 41.81 21.30
sampling by context 55.82 21.71 41.56 22.13 39.69 20.05 41.46 21.64
Note. Data in percent.
Probability Estimations. Table 4 displays mean winning probability estimates
of the two options within each context. They were analyzed by a 2 (sampling proce-
dure: no sampling vs. sampling by context) x 2 (context: predominantly positive vs.
predominantly negative) x 2 (option: X1 vs. X2) mixed ANOVA with sampling proce-
dure as between-participants factor. Significant main effects of context, F (1, 74) = 36.61,
p < .001, η2 = 0.061, and option, F (1, 74) = 8.07, p = .006, η2 = 0.027, were qualified
by a significant two-way interaction between these factors, F (1, 74) = 13.32, p < .001,
η2 = 0.072. In line with participants’ choice behavior, participants gave higher winning
probability estimates within the predominantly positive context C1. Moreover, follow-up
analyses on the interaction, using the Bonferroni–Holm method to control for the error
rate, indicated higher winning probability estimates for option X1 than for option X2 in
the positive context C1, t(138.92) = 4.63, p ≤ .001, but no difference in the predomi-
nantly negative context C2, t(138.92) = −1.16, p = .248.
Analyzing the unconditional winning probability estimates of contexts by means of
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a 2 (sampling procedure: no sampling vs. sampling by context) x 2 (context: predomi-
nantly positive vs. predominantly negative) mixed ANOVA, we found higher estimates
for the positive context C1 (M = 61.83, SD = 14.82) than for the negative context C2
(M = 40.20, SD = 16.68), F (1, 74) = 55.33, p < .001, η2 = 0.325. Finally, in line with
the winning probability estimates of options within contexts, the estimated winning prob-
abilities of options across contexts were higher for option X1 (M = 52.75, SD = 16.59)
than for option X2 (M = 44.16, SD = 17.53), F (1, 74) = 6.83, p = .011, η2 = 0.061.
Discussion
In Experiment 3, we compared free information sampling by context with prede-
termined information with regard to contingency learning and choice. Besides, we tested
whether attention was allocated to contexts differing in their winning probabilities to
varying degrees when sampling by context is self-determined. Overall, participants did
not prefer one context during sampling, that is, both contexts were on average sampled
roughly equally often. This may contradict previous findings in research on free informa-
tion sampling reporting larger samples the more likely losses are (Lejarraga et al., 2012;
Wulff et al., 2018). However, in Experiment 3, an important difference is that partici-
pants had to sample a fixed number of observations and did not have the opportunity to
stop sampling at any point desired. This may have affected the allocation of samples to
the contexts, even independent of the contexts’ winning probabilities. Besides, similar to
the win-stay/lose-shift strategy observed in Experiment 2, participants were more likely
to resample the same context as in the preceding learning trial, especially if a positive
outcome was observed. When engaging in free information sampling by context, on aver-
age, the amount of information per context does not differ from predetermined learning
trials, whereas the order of information does differ from a random pattern.
Nevertheless, when making consequential choices, contexts’ overall winning prob-
abilities are included in decisions. Participants correctly identified and preferred the
context in which gains result more often than losses, independent of whether learning
was predetermined or self-determined. Moreover, with regard to the assessment of op-
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tions within a context, participants in the sampling by context condition did not perform
better than participants in the no sampling condition. Our results suggest that pseu-
docontingencies are inferred independent of the sampling condition and that they are
used as basis for decision making in predominantly positive contexts, although leading to
suboptimal choices. Yet again, the pseudocontingency effect was asymmetric. Within a
predominantly negative context neither a pseudocontingency nor the genuine contingency
was inferred, resulting in no preference at all.
Taken together, choices did not differ between free information sampling by context
and predetermined information. Even if one context was sampled more frequently than
the other, this seemed to neither affect contingency learning, judgments, nor choice be-
tween options. However, (pseudo-)contingency learning and choice in a trivariate decision
scenario may deviate if decision makers do not only sample information by contexts, but
also choose which option to be observed within which context in each learning trial. To
this we turn next.
Experiment 4
Experiment 4 aimed at investigating pseudocontingency inferences conditional on
free information sampling in a trivariate decision scenario when respondents sample by
both, contexts and options. As for Experiments 2 and 3, literature on free information
sampling is inconclusive whether and which information will be searched for more ex-
tensively. Nevertheless, according to pseudocontingency research a pseudocontingency
should be inferred whenever base rates of options and outcomes are skewed within a
context in the current sample and are taken into account (e.g., Fiedler et al., 2009). In
consequence, in predominantly positive contexts, the most frequently observed option
should be preferred, independent of whether it has the higher genuine winning proba-
bility. Contrarily, in predominantly negative contexts, a preference for the infrequently
sampled option should result. If both options are equally frequent within a context, none
should be preferred according to a pseudocontingency. Again, we expected contingency
learning and choice to depend on the individual sampling strategy.
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Method
Participants and Design. In order to compare free information sampling by
context and option to predetermined learning in Experiment 4, we recruited 76 partic-
ipants at the University of Mannheim (57 female, Mage = 22.07, SDage = 4.99). They
were randomly allocated to a no sampling condition (n = 38) and a sampling by context
and option condition (n = 38) and received a compensation of either e2 or partial course
credit. Again, the variables context (predominantly positive vs. predominantly negative)
and option (X1 vs. X2) were implemented as within-participant factors.
Material and Procedure. Materials and procedure were identical to Experi-
ment 3 except for the learning phase of the sampling by context and option condition:
Participants did not only sample from each of the two contexts freely, but also from each
of the two options within the chosen context. In each learning trial, they successively
selected one of the two contexts and one of the two options within the selected context.
After 650 ms the respective outcome was presented. The outcome was drawn from the
stimulus distribution in Table 1 by the experimental program.
Results
Information Sampling Behavior. Mean relative frequencies of samples per op-
tion within each context are displayed in Table 5. As for Experiments 2 and 3, information
sampling behavior was analyzed by a generalized linear mixed model. However, partic-
ipants in the sampling by context and option condition sampled from each of the two
contexts as well as from each of the two options within the chosen context. Therefore,
a multivariate generalized linear mixed model was estimated to analyze the probability
to sample the predominantly positive context C1 and the probability to sample option
X1 simultaneously (McCulloch et al., 2008). We estimated separate regression parame-
ters for each dependent variable by including two dummy-coded indicator variables, indC
and indX. The indicator variable indC coded sampling choice between contexts as 1 and
sampling choice between options as 0, whereas the variable indX indicated the dependent
variable sampling choice between contexts by a value of 0 and sampling choice between
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options by a value of 1. Besides, the model comprised the contrast-coded predictors pre-
vious context (prevC: positive context C1 coded as 1, negative context C2 coded as -1),
previous option (prevX: option X1 coded as 1, option X2 coded as -1), previous outcome
(prevY: gain coded as 1, loss coded as -1), and context (positive context C1 coded as 1,
negative context C2 coded as -1) on the trial level. Two separate intercepts were specified
by estimating regression coefficients for each of the two indicator variables (γ100 and γ200).
In order to prevent rank-deficiency the overall intercept had to be omitted (Snijders &
Bosker, 2012). Furthermore, separate slope parameters were specified conditional on the
dependent variable by multiplying all predictors by the indicator variables:
ln
(
p(Yhij = 1)
1− p(Yhij = 1)
)
= γ100 · indC + γ110 · indC · prevC + γ120 · indC · prevY (9)
+γ130 · indC · prevC · prevY + u10j
+γ200 · indX + γ210 · indX · prevX + γ220 · indX · prevY
+γ230 · indX · prevX · prevY + γ240 · indX · context+ u20j
Table A8 in the Appendix shows all parameter estimates of the multivariate gen-
eralized linear mixed model. The significant effects of indC, γ100 = 0.26, SE = 0.08,
p = .001, and indX, γ200 = −0.15, SE = 0.07, p = .030, indicated overall higher prob-
abilities to sample the predominantly positive context C1 as well as to sample option
X2. On average, participants sampled context C1 in M = 41.08 (SD = 9.19) trials out
of 68 learning trials in total and option X1 in M = 29.97 (SD = 7.73) out of 68 trials.
As in Experiment 3, the probability to sample context C1 increased if it was sampled in
the previous trial as well, γ110 = 0.71, SE = 0.05, p < .001, especially if it resulted in
a gain, γ130 = 0.22, SE = 0.05, p < .001. Furthermore, as in Experiment 2, the prob-
ability to sample option X1 was higher if option X1 was also sampled in the preceding
trial, γ210 = 0.29, SE = 0.04, p < .001, again, especially if it led to a gain, γ230 = 0.28,
SE = 0.04, p < .001. All other effects were nonsignificant p ≥ .100.
Choice Behavior. As for the previous experiments, frequencies of choices in the
free choice trials were analyzed by means of a 2 (sampling procedure: sampling by context
and option vs. no sampling) x 2 (context: predominantly positive vs. predominantly
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negative) mixed ANOVA. The probability to choose option X1 in individual choice trials
was modeled in terms of a generalized linear mixed model.
In the decision phase, participants made more choices during the free choice trials
given the predominantly positive context C1 (M = 7.29, SD = 1.33) as compared with
the predominantly negative context C2 (M = 4.21, SD = 2.90) which was indicated
by a significant main effect of context, F (1, 74) = 76.69, p < .001, η2 = 0.344. This
main effect was qualified by a significant two-way interaction of sampling procedure and
context, F (1, 74) = 13.45, p < .001, η2 = 0.084. Follow-up analyses showed that the
difference between contexts was even greater in the sampling condition, t(74) = 8.79,
p < 0.001, as compared to the no sampling condition, t(74) = 3.60, p = 0.001.
With regard to the individual choices between option X1 and option X2, mean rel-
ative frequencies of choices are shown in Table 5. The generalized linear mixed model
included a random intercept as well as the contrast-coded predictors context (predomi-
nantly positive context C1 coded as 1, predominantly negative context C2 coded as -1)
and trial (forced choice trials coded as 1, free choice trials coded as -1) at trial-level. The
effect of context was set to be random.9 Moreover, the model comprised experimental
condition (sampling: no sampling coded as -1, sampling by context and option coded as
1) at person-level, so that the total model was:
ln
(
p(Yij = “X1”)
1− p(Yij = “X1”)
)
= γ00 + γ01 · sampling + (γ10 + u1j) · context+ γ20 · trial(10)
+γ11 · sampling · context+ γ30 · sampling · trial
+γ40 · context · trial + γ50 · sampling · context · trial + u0j
Parameter estimates of the generalized linear mixed model of choice behavior are
displayed in Table A9 in the Appendix. The effect of sampling procedure was significant,
γ01 = −0.52, SE = 0.10, p < .001, indicating a higher probability to choose option
X1 in the no sampling condition as compared with the sampling by context and option
condition. In addition, there was a significant interaction between sampling procedure
9 A generalized linear mixed model that included both trial-level predictors and their interaction as
random effects and estimated correlations among random effects failed to converge. Although it should
therefore be interpreted with caution, the results were equivalent to those of the reported model.
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and context, γ11 = −0.64, SE = 0.14, p < .001, indicating a more pronounced differ-
ence between the two experimental conditions within the predominantly positive context
C1. Within the predominantly negative context C2, the results suggest that participants
did not prefer any option, as the interaction offsets the main effect of sampling proce-
dure. However, participants in the no sampling condition preferred option X1 within the
predominantly positive context C1, whereas the probability to choose option X1 in the
positive context C1 was below chance in the sampling by context and option condition.
All other effects were nonsignificant, p ≥ .170
Effects of Sampling on Choice Behavior. Furthermore, we analyzed the effect
of relative frequency of option X1 samples within a context on the probability to choose
option X1 within that context in the decision phase. For this reason, we estimated a
multivariate generalized linear mixed model analyzing only data from the sampling by
context and option condition. In order to be able to analyze the effect of sample size
on choice probability within a specific context we included two dummy-coded indicator
variables, indC1 and indC2. They indicate that a parameter is specific to the probability
to choose option X1 either within the positive context C1 (coded as 1 in indC1 and
coded as 0 in indC2) or within the negative context C2 (coded as 0 in indC1 and coded
as 1 in indC2), respectively. Again, two separate intercepts were specified (γ10 and γ20),
wherefore the overall intercept had to be omitted (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). The model
comprised two predictor variables relC1X1 and relC2X1 reflecting the relative frequencies
of option X1 samples within the respective context. Relative frequencies were calculated
by dividing the number of option X1 samples within a context by the total number of
samples within that context and subtracting the constant c = .50. By multiplying the
predictor variables by the indicator variables separate slope parameters are estimated for
each context:
ln
(
p(Yij = “X1”)
1− p(Yij = “X1”)
)
= (γ10 + u1j) · indC1 + (γ20 + u2j) · indC2 (11)
+γ11 · indC1 · relC1X1 + γ21 · indC2 · relC2X1
The effect of indC1 was significant and negative, γ10 = −0.86, SE = 0.21, p <
.001, indicating a below chance probability to choose option X1 given the predominantly
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Table 5
Relative Frequencies of Samples, Relative Frequencies of Choices, and Winning
Probability Estimates of Options Within Contexts in Each Experimental Condition of
Experiment 4
Context C1 Context C2
Option X1 Option X2 Option X1 Option X2
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Relative sampling frequency
samplinga 43.27 13.46 56.73 13.46 48.50 12.06 51.50 12.06
Relative choice frequency
no sampling 68.05 28.03 31.95 28.03 45.62 30.03 54.38 30.03
sampling 27.89 22.47 72.11 22.47 49.72 25.07 50.28 25.07
Estimated probabilities
no sampling 59.87 22.13 46.18 19.42 39.74 16.06 42.95 22.08
sampling 49.84 20.55 68.42 17.60 35.42 18.56 41.89 19.00
Note. Data in percent.
aRelative frequencies of sampled options conditional on sampled context.
positive context C1, hence a preference for option X2. Nonetheless, the more frequently
option X1 was sampled within the positive context C1 during the learning phase, the
more likely it was chosen within that context in the subsequent decision phase, γ11 = 5.70,
SE = 1.57, p < .001. The probability to choose option X1 in the predominantly negative
context C2 did not significantly differ from chance, γ20 = 0.03, SE = 0.19, p = .866, even
though the probability to choose option X1 tended to increase with its sample size drawn
within the negative context, γ21 = 2.66, SE = 1.52, p = .080. All parameter estimates
are displayed in Table A10 in the Appendix.
Probability Estimations. Mean estimated winning probabilities of options within
contexts per experimental condition are displayed in Table 5 and were analyzed by means
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of a 2 (sampling procedure: no sampling vs. sampling by context and option) x 2 (con-
text: predominantly positive vs. predominantly negative) x 2 (option: X1 vs. X2)
mixed ANOVA. The main effect of context was significant, F (1, 74) = 40.37, p < .001,
η2 = 0.148, whereas the main effect of option fell short of significance, F (1, 74) = 3.86,
p = .053, η2 = 0.009. Furthermore, main effects were qualified by a two-way interac-
tion between sampling procedure and option, F (1, 74) = 22.92, p < .001, η2 = 0.050,
as well as by a three-way interaction between sampling procedure, context, and option,
F (1, 74) = 8.87, p = .004, η2 = 0.034. Follow-up analyses using the Bonferroni-Holm ad-
justment of p-values, showed that participants in the no sampling condition gave higher
winning probability estimates for option X1 than for option X2 within the predominantly
positive context C1, t(138.27) = 3.16, p = .006. Estimated winning probabilities of partic-
ipants in the sampling by context and option condition were higher for option X2 as com-
pared with option X1 within the predominantly positive context C1, t(138.27) = −4.29,
p < .001. No differences between options were observed within the predominantly neg-
ative context C2, for the no sampling condition as well as for the sampling by context
and option condition, t(138.27) = −0.74, p = .460 and t(138.27) = −1.50, p = .274,
respectively.
In addition, the estimated winning probabilities of the two contexts reflected a
preference for the predominantly positive context C1 (M = 64.12, SD = 16.41) as
compared with the negative context C2 (M = 37.28, SD = 13.59). This was indicated
by a significant main effect of context in a 2 (sampling procedure: no sampling vs.
sampling by context and option) x 2 (context: predominantly positive vs. predominantly
negative) mixed ANOVA, F (1, 74) = 113.43, p < .001, η2 = 0.465. This main effect was
qualified by a significant two-way interaction with sampling procedure, F (1, 74) = 8.55,
p = .005, η2 = 0.061. The difference between the predominantly positive context and
the predominantly negative context was more pronounced in the sampling by context
and option condition, t(74) = 9.60, p < .001, as compared to the no sampling condition,
t(74) = 5.46, p < .001.
Finally, participants’ winning probability estimates of the two options across con-
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texts were analyzed using a 2 (sampling procedure: no sampling vs. sampling by context
and option) x 2 (option: X1 vs. X2) mixed ANOVA. The main effects of sampling
procedure and option were nonsignificant, F (1, 74) < 1, p ≥ .913. Yet, a significant
two-way interaction between sampling procedure and option indicated that participants
gave different winning probability estimates for the two options depending on the exper-
imental condition, F (1, 74) = 17.83, p < .001, η2 = 0.113. Follow-up analyses using the
Bonferroni-Holm method to control for the error rate showed that participants in the no
sampling condition gave higher estimates for option X1 than for option X2, t(74) = 3.05,
p = .006, whereas the mean winning probability estimation of option X1 was lower than
the mean winning probability estimation of option X2 in the sampling by context and
option condition, t(74) = −2.92, p = .006.
Discussion
Experiment 4 compared free information sampling by context and option to prede-
termined learning trials with regard to sampling behavior and choice. The results indicate
that options are sampled depending on their winning probabilities when engaging in free
information sampling. Although no draw was incentivized, participants sampled more
frequently within a predominantly positive context as compared with a predominantly
negative context. Additionally, the option with the higher underlying winning probability
was more frequently sampled within the positive context, whereas there was no difference
between options within the negative context.
With regard to choice in a decision phase, too, the results of Experiment 4 demon-
strate that contingency learning differs depending on the contexts’ overall winning prob-
abilities. Whereas the contexts’ winning probabilities are correctly inferred resulting in
a preference for the context in which gains resulted more often than losses, inferred con-
tingencies between options and outcomes within each context differ not only depending
on the context’s winning probability, but also depending on information sampling. An
asymmetry between positive contexts and negative contexts resulted in no preference for
any option within the negative context when both options were sampled equally often as
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well as when skewed base rates were observed during learning. By contrast, the probabil-
ity to choose an option within a predominantly positive context increased with its sample
size observed or drawn during the learning phase. On average, choice behavior within
the positive context reflected a preference for the more frequent option independent of
whether it had the objectively higher winning probability. In the no sampling condition
with predetermined learning trials, the frequent option within the positive context al-
ways had the lower objective winning probability; in the sampling by context and option
condition, in the majority of cases, the predominant option within the positive context
corresponded to the option with the higher winning probability.
General Discussion
The present series of experiments extended research on pseudocontingency inference
and research on free information sampling. We investigated information sampling behav-
ior in a choice scenario to analyze its impact on the inference of pseudocontingencies.
Pseudocontingency describes the phenomenon of inferring contingencies, for instance,
between options and outcomes from statistical regularities like base rates (e.g., Fiedler
et al., 2009). Accordingly, options are preferred that are frequent within contexts of
predominantly positive outcomes as well as options that are infrequent within contexts
where positive outcomes are rare. If options’ and/or outcomes’ base rates are uniform,
no contingency should be inferred on the basis of pseudocontingencies resulting in no
preference at all. Thus, empirical evidence suggests that options’ evaluations and result-
ing choices may be based on skewed base rates of options and outcomes covarying across
contexts. Pseudocontingency inferences are not necessarily wrong (Fiedler, Kutzner, &
Vogel, 2013; Klauer, 2015; Kutzner et al., 2011a), but may be misleading in certain cases
when the pseudocontingency is in discord with the genuine contingency. Such an event
distribution was designed in Experiment 1, so that the potentially inferred pseudocon-
tingency between options and outcomes within each context was of opposite sign to the
genuine contingency. Over the course of learning trials, participants observed gains more
frequently than losses within one context and vice versa within the second context. The
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options’ base rates too were skewed within a context and covaried across contexts. Sub-
sequently, participants chose between the observed options multiple times while aiming
at maximizing points and had to estimate the options’ winning probabilities. The same
experimental procedure was realized as experimental conditions in Experiments 3 and 4.
Replicating previous studies, we found the pseudocontingency effect on choice behavior:
a preference for the frequently observed option within a predominantly positive context
and a preference for the least frequently observed option within a predominantly negative
context. However, in Experiments 3 and 4, our results revealed an asymmetry between
positive contexts with mostly gains and negative contexts with mostly losses: whereas
participants preferred the frequent option within the positive context, they preferred
neither option within the negative context. Similar results have also been found in the
literature (Fleig et al., 2017; Meiser & Hewstone, 2004; Meiser et al., 2018). On the one
hand, the observed asymmetry might be the result of allocating more attention to the
task at hand when processing losses (Yechiam & Hochman, 2013, 2014). This might have
increased the focus on the genuine contingency as compared with the pseudocontingency
within the negative context. On the other hand, participants might have disregarded the
options within the negative context as irrelevant for subsequent choices with the aim of
avoiding to choose options within the negative context anyway (cf. e.g., Fiedler, Wöllert,
et al., 2013). Thus, neither the genuine contingency nor any other regularities like the
skewness of base rates could be learned.
Information sampling behavior might shed light on which information is considered
for contingency learning and choice, when information is not presented to, but actively
sampled by decision makers. Research on information sampling primarily uses bivariate
scenarios without the additional context variable. Likewise, in Experiment 2, we realized
the context variable of our design as between-participants condition. Participants were
free to sample any of the two options either within a predominantly positive context or
within a predominantly negative context. They could sample information in any order
they desired without each draw contributing to individual earnings during learning trials.
In line with, for instance, Hau et al. (2008) or Hertwig et al. (2004), our results indicate
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that two options are sampled equally often. Independent of the decision scenario, thus
regardless of whether participants sampled within a context of predominantly gains or
within a context of predominantly losses, sample sizes did not significantly differ between
the two options. In Experiments 3 and 4, we extended Experiment 2 and thereby re-
search on information sampling to the trivariate choice scenario with two contexts, two
options, and two outcomes. Comparing drawn samples within gain domains versus loss
domains, Lejarraga et al. (2012) as well as Wulff et al. (2018) reported larger samples to
be drawn from options when the task at hand involved losses. However, when realizing
the decision domain as a third (within-participant) variable, such as the context variable
in our trivariate choice scenario, results contradict. Depending on the variable sampled
by we either found no effect of context on sample size or asymmetric exploration with
larger samples drawn within a predominantly positive context as compared with a pre-
dominantly negative context. In Experiment 3, when participants sampled information
by context, both contexts were sampled equally often. When participants engaged in free
information sampling by context and option (Experiment 4), however, our results suggest
that options within negative contexts are rather disregarded. The focus is instead on the
options within the context of mostly gains. On average, participants moreover sampled
the option with the higher underlying winning probability most frequently within the
positive context.
Besides information sampling behavior itself and choice behavior after predeter-
mined learning trials, we also investigated choice behavior when preceding learning was
self-determined. Our results again indicated an asymmetry in the inferred contingency
between predominantly positive contexts and predominantly negative contexts. Not only
when learning trials were predetermined, but also when sampling information during
learning, subsequent choice behavior reflected preferences for one of the two options only
within positive contexts. In Experiments 2 and 4, when participants could influence the
sample size per option during learning, on average, they sampled both options equally
frequently within negative contexts. On the basis of pseudocontingencies, a contingency
between options and outcomes should only be inferred when both, the options’ base rate
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and the outcomes’ base rate are skewed. In Experiment 4, indeed, we found no difference
in choice probability within the negative context when both options were sampled equally
often during learning. However, we neither found a difference between options within the
negative context when predetermined skewed base rates were presented in Experiments 2
to 4. Moreover, in the negative context condition of Experiment 2, participants preferred
the option with the higher winning probability when they sampled both options equally
often. In a trivariate decision scenario, the indifference between options within negative
contexts could thus be the result of subjective uncertainty with regard to the options’
winning probabilities. Self-constructed feedback might have contributed. Even though
no external feedback on the outcome of each individual choice trial was given, individuals
may construct feedback themselves based on the outcome they expect to be most likely
(Henriksson, Elwin, & Juslin, 2010). Within the negative context this corresponds to a
loss for both options. Thus, both options might be equally devaluated by self-constructed
(learning) experiences resulting in a similar non-preference for either option. By contrast,
within positive contexts we observed the inference of a pseudocontingency between op-
tions and outcomes when learning trials were predetermined as well as when sampling
information by context. Additionally, when sampling information by option or by context
and option, participants’ preference for an option within the positive context increased
with its sampling frequency. Later choice preferences within the positive context were
already discernible in the information sample drawn within the positive context, whether
it was the option with the higher underlying winning probability or not. In the ma-
jority of cases, though, the frequently sampled and chosen option within the positive
context corresponded to the option with the higher winning probability. Therefore, an
inference of the pseudocontingency as well as an inference of the genuine contingency
between options and outcomes within the positive context would have resulted in the
same preference pattern given those self-generated samples: even if choices were based
on a pseudocontingency the option with the higher underlying winning probability would
be preferred.
Going beyond, contingency inference might have already influenced sampling behav-
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ior during the learning phase. Even though there were no direct consequences of sampling
an option during free information sampling, we cannot preclude that current evaluations
of options guided sampling behavior. Participants’ sampling pattern was characterized
by a stability in information sampling: in Experiments 2 to 4, we consistently found par-
ticipants’ tendency to repeat sampling the same event. This was in particular the case
when a positive outcome was observed, indicating a win-stay/lose-shift strategy besides
consistency in information sampling. Possibly, observing gains during a learning phase
is already positive and reinforcing in itself, even if they have no direct consequences.
As a result, individuals might be hedonically motivated to focus on positive events even
in free information sampling and engage more in exploitation rather than exploration
of the available options. First, this can lead to higher sampling frequencies of options
with higher winning probabilities (i.e., options within the positive context, as observed
in Experiment 4; cf. e.g., Denrell & Le Mens, 2011). Second, this might have contributed
to sampling one option within the positive context quite constantly and therefore most
frequently already during the learning phase. Yet, within the negative context, hedonic
motivation might have resulted in repeatedly switching between options and sampling
within the negative context less continuously. This in turn might impede learning and
foster a subjective uncertainty with regard to the options’ winning probabilities within a
predominantly negative context. Future research should further investigate the interplay
between information sampling and contingency learning to identify variables moderating
when free information sampling is more or less dependent on evaluations resulting in
lower or higher proportions of explorations versus exploitation during learning.
Moreover, the results suggest that active sampling from contexts and options that
differ in their objective winning probabilities enables individuals to conditionalize win-
ning and losing not only on contexts (i.e., learning outcomes’ base rates within each
context), but also on choice options. Active sampling can increase the attention towards
single events and thereby foster genuine contingency assessment, at least in predominantly
positive domains. In contrast, when passively observing predetermined information, as-
sessing proportions of winning and losing conditional on options as well as contexts is
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rather unlikely.
The experiments reported herein indicate that the adopted information sampling
procedure can on the one hand counteract the inference of a pseudocontingency that
could result in suboptimal subsequent choice behavior. On the other hand, (a priori) ex-
pectations about the options’ winning probabilities in combination with positive testing
strategies or exploiting positively evaluated options can contribute to drawing skewed
base rates and the inference of pseudocontingencies. Accordingly, it is possible that
(pseudo-)contingencies inferred on the basis of the current sample already guide further
sampling behavior even in free information sampling. A comparison with a partial feed-
back sampling paradigm in which each draw is incentivized would be worthwhile.
To conclude, the present research corroborates the notion that pseudocontingencies
are used for decision making. Still, we report original evidence that even if decision makers
rely on base rates, resulting choice behavior will often be in line with true contingencies
when information is not predetermined, but may be actively sampled. The asymmetry
in the strength of preferences between contexts of predominantly gains and contexts of
predominantly losses might arise from a reduced focus on negatively evaluated options,
an avoidance of negative outcomes (even in free information sampling), and/or from a
resulting subjective uncertainty.
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Appendix
Parameter Estimates of the Generalized Linear Mixed Models
Table A1
Parameter Estimates of the Generalized Linear Mixed Model of Choice Behavior in
Experiment 1
Parameter Estimate SE
Trial-level
Intercept (γ00) 0.68** 0.21
Context (γ10) 0.03 0.23
Trial (γ20) −0.05 0.09
Context × trial (γ30) −0.07 0.09
Variances
Intercept (σ2u0j) 1.49
Context (σ2u1j) 1.87
Trial (σ2u2j) 0.00
Context × trial (σ2u3j) 0.00
Note. Context (predominantly positive context C1 vs. predominantly
negative context C2, coded as 1 and -1) and trial (forced choice trial
vs. free choice trial, coded as 1 and -1) were contrast-coded.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Table A2
Parameter Estimates of the Generalized Linear Mixed Model of Information Sampling
Behavior in Experiment 2
Parameter Estimate SE
Trial-level
Intercept (γ00) −0.04 0.07
Previous option (γ10) 0.67*** 0.06
Previous outcome (γ20) 0.05 0.06
Context × previous option (γ30) −0.02 0.06
Context × previous outcome (γ40) 0.03 0.06
Previous option × previous outcome (γ50) 0.29*** 0.06
Context × previous option × previous outcome (γ60) −0.02 0.06
Person-level
Context (γ01) −0.09 0.07
Variances
Intercept (σ2u0j) 0.09
Note. Context (predominantly positive context C1 vs. predominantly
negative context C2, coded as 1 and -1), previous option (option X1 vs.
option X2, coded as 1 and -1), and previous outcome (gain vs. loss, coded
as 1 and -1) were contrast-coded.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Table A3
Parameter Estimates of the Generalized Linear Mixed Model of Choice Behavior in
Experiment 2
Parameter Estimate SE
Trial-level
Intercept (γ00) −0.14 0.10
Trial (γ10) 0.13** 0.05
Person-level
Sampling (γ01) −0.21* 0.10
Context (γ02) 0.08 0.10
Sampling × context (γ03) −0.14 0.10
Sampling × trial (γ11) −0.01 0.05
Context × trial (γ12) −0.12* 0.05
Sampling × context × trial (γ13) −0.02 0.05
Variances
Intercept (σ2u0j) 0.96
Trial (σ2u1j) 0.00
Note. Sampling (no sampling vs. sampling by option,
coded as -1 and 1), context (predominantly positive
context C1 vs. predominantly negative context C2,
coded as 1 and -1), and trial (forced choice trial vs. free
choice trial, coded as 1 and -1) were contrast-coded.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Table A4
Parameter Estimates of the Generalized Linear Mixed Model of Choice Behavior in the
Sampling by Option Conditions of Experiment 2
Parameter Estimate SE
Trial-level
Intercept (γ00) −0.26* 0.12
Trial (γ10) 0.11 0.07
Context × trial (γ20) −0.14* 0.07
Relative frequency of X1-samples × trial (γ30) −1.12 0.65
Context × relative frequency of X1-samples × trial (γ40) −0.49 0.65
Person-level
Context (γ01) −0.02 0.12
Relative frequency of X1-samples (γ02) 6.63*** 0.98
Context × relative frequency of X1-samples (γ03) −1.40 0.97
Variances
Intercept (σ2u0j) 0.55
Note. Context (predominantly positive context C1 vs. predominantly negative
context C2, coded as 1 and -1) and trial (forced choice trial vs. free choice trial,
coded as 1 and -1) were contrast-coded. Relative frequencies of X1-samples
during learning were calculated by dividing the number of X1-samples by 34
(total number of learning trials) and subtracting a constant c = .50.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Table A5
Parameter Estimates of the Generalized Linear Mixed Model of Information Sampling
Behavior in Experiment 3
Parameter Estimate SE
Trial-level
Intercept (γ00) 0.00 0.04
Previous context (γ10) 0.64*** 0.04
Previous outcome (γ20) 0.05 0.04
Previous context × previous outcome (γ30) 0.18*** 0.04
Variances
Intercept (σ2u0j) 0.00
Note. Previous context (predominantly positive context C1 vs.
predominantly negative context C2, coded as 1 and -1) and
previous outcome (gain vs. loss, coded as 1 and -1) were
contrast-coded.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Table A6
Parameter Estimates of the Generalized Linear Mixed Model of Choice Behavior in
Experiment 3
Parameter Estimate SE
Trial-level
Intercept (γ00) 0.44*** 0.12
Context (γ10) 0.57** 0.17
Trial (γ20) 0.08 0.05
Context × trial (γ30) −0.01 0.05
Person-level
Sampling (γ01) 0.11 0.12
Sampling × context (γ11) 0.00 0.17
Sampling × trial (γ21) 0.01 0.05
Sampling × context × trial (γ31) 0.06 0.05
Variances
Intercept (σ2u0j) 0.80
Context (σ2u1j) 1.81
Trial (σ2u2j) 0.00
Context × trial (σ2u3j) 0.00
Note. Sampling (no sampling vs. sampling by context,
coded as -1 and 1), context (predominantly positive
context C1 vs. predominantly negative context C2,
coded as 1 and -1) and trial (forced choice trial vs. free
choice trial, coded as 1 and -1) were contrast-coded.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Table A7
Parameter Estimates of the Generalized Linear Mixed Model of Choice Behavior in the
Sampling by Context Condition of Experiment 3
Parameter Estimate SE
Trial-level
Intercept (γ00) 0.64* 0.25
Context (γ10) 0.67* 0.33
Trial (γ20) 0.09 0.08
Context × trial (γ30) 0.05 0.08
Relative frequency of C1-samples × context × trial (γ40) 0.96 1.16
Person-level
Relative frequency of C1-samples (γ01) 1.69 3.32
Relative frequency of C1-samples × context (γ11) 0.72 4.38
Relative frequency of C1-samples × trial (γ21) 0.55 1.16
Variances
Intercept (σ2u0j) 1.94
Context (σ2u1j) 3.69
Trial (σ2u2j) 0.00
Note. Context (predominantly positive context C1 vs. predominantly negative
context C2, coded as 1 and -1) and trial (forced choice trial vs. free choice trial,
coded as 1 and -1) were contrast-coded. Relative frequencies of C1-samples
during learning were calculated by dividing the number of C1-samples by 68
(total number of learning trials) and subtracting a constant c = .50.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Table A8
Parameter Estimates of the Multivariate Generalized Linear Mixed Model of
Information Sampling Behavior in Experiment 4
Parameter Estimate SE
Trial-level
indC (γ100) 0.26** 0.08
indC × previous context (γ110) 0.71*** 0.05
indC × previous outcome (γ120) 0.04 0.05
indC × previous context × previous outcome (γ130) 0.22*** 0.05
indX (γ200) −0.15* 0.07
indX × previous option (γ210) 0.29*** 0.04
indX × previous outcome (γ220) 0.00 0.04
indX × previous option × previous outcome (γ230) 0.28*** 0.04
indX × context (γ240) −0.07 0.04
(Co-)Variances
indC (σ2u10j) 0.15
indX (σ2u20j) 0.11
indC, indX (σu10j ,u20j) −0.05
Note. The indicator variables indC and indX are dummy-coded and
indicate that a parameter is specific to the probability to sample context
C1 or the probability to sample option X1, respectively. Previous context
(predominantly positive context C1 vs. predominantly negative context
C2, coded as 1 and -1), previous outcome (gain vs. loss, coded as 1 and
-1), previous option (X1 vs. X2, coded as 1 and -1), and context
(predominantly positive context C1 vs. predominantly negative context
C2, coded as 1 and -1) were contrast-coded.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Table A9
Parameter Estimates of the Generalized Linear Mixed Model of Choice Behavior in
Experiment 4
Parameter Estimate SE
Trial-level
Intercept (γ00) −0.14 0.10
Context (γ10) 0.03 0.14
Trial (γ20) 0.07 0.06
Sampling × trial (γ30) 0.05 0.06
Context × trial (γ40) −0.03 0.06
Sampling × context × trial (γ50) 0.02 0.06
Person-level
Sampling (γ01) −0.52*** 0.10
Sampling × context (γ11) −0.64*** 0.14
Variances
Intercept (σ2u0j) 0.55
Context (σ2u1j) 1.31
Note. Sampling (no sampling vs. sampling by context
and option, coded as -1 and 1), context (predominantly
positive context C1 vs. predominantly negative context
C2, coded as 1 and -1) and trial (forced choice trial vs.
free choice trial, coded as 1 and -1) were contrast-coded.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Table A10
Parameter Estimates of the Multivariate Generalized Linear Mixed Model of Choice
Behavior in the Sampling by Context and Option Condition of Experiment 4
Parameter Estimate SE
Trial-level
indC1 (γ10) −0.86*** 0.21
indC2 (γ20) 0.03 0.19
Person-level
indC1 × relative frequency of X1-samples in C1 (γ11) 5.70*** 1.57
indC2 × relative frequency of X1-samples in C2 (γ21) 2.66 1.52
(Co-)Variances
indC1 (σ2u1j) 1.03
indC2 (σ2u2j) 0.87
indC1, indC2 (σu1j ,u2j) −0.52
Note. The indicator variables indC1 and indC2 are dummy-coded and
indicate that a parameter is specific to the probability to choose option X1
within context C1 or within context C2, respectively. Relative frequencies
of X1-samples within context C1 and within context C2 during learning
were calculated by dividing the number of X1-samples per context by the
total number of learning trials within one context and subtracting the
constant c = .50.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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